The Production of Consuming Less: Energy Efficiency, Climate Change, and Light Bulbs in North Carolina by Thoyre, Autumn
 
 
 
 
 
THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMING LESS: ENERGY EFFICIENCY, CLIMATE 
CHANGE, AND LIGHT BULBS IN NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
Autumn Thoyre 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department 
of Geography. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
       Approved by: 
       Martin Doyle 
       Sherryl Kleinman      
       Elizabeth Havice        
       Scott Kirsch 
       William Kinsella 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 
Autumn Thoyre 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED  
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Autumn Thoyre: The Production of Consuming Less: Energy Efficiency, Climate Change, and 
Light Bulbs in North Carolina 
(Under the direction of Martin Doyle) 
 
In this research, I have analyzed the production of consuming less electricity through a 
case study of promotions of compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs). I focused on the CFL 
because it has been heavily promoted by environmentalists and electricity companies as a key 
tool for solving climate change, yet such promotions appear counter-intuitive. The magnitude of 
CFL promotions by environmentalists is surprising because CFLs can only impact less than 1% 
of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. CFL promotions by electricity providers are surprising given 
such companies’ normal incentives to sell more of their product. I used political ecological and 
symbolic interactionist theories, qualitative methods of data collection (including interviews, 
participant-observation, texts, and images), and a grounded theory analysis to understand this 
case.  
My findings suggest that, far from being a self-evident technical entity, “energy 
efficiency” is produced as an idea, a part of identities, a resource, and a source of value through 
social, political, and economic processes. These processes include identity formation and 
subjectification; gender-coded household labor; and corporate appropriation of household value 
resulting from environmental governance. I show how environmentalists use CFLs to make and 
claim neoliberal identities, proposing the concept of green neoliberal identity work as a 
mechanism through which neoliberal ideologies are translated into practices. I analyze how using 
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this seemingly easy energy efficient technology constitutes labor that is gendered in ways that 
reflect and reproduce inequalities. I show how electricity companies have used environmental 
governance to valorize and appropriate home energy efficiency as an accumulation strategy. I 
conclude by discussing the symbolic power of CFLs, proposing a theory of green obsolescence, 
and framing the production of energy efficiency as a global production network. I found that 
promoting energy efficiency involves consuming less energy by consuming more technologies. 
This research contributes to understandings of how environmentalists become laboring subjects 
in an era of neoliberalism and how energy companies are responding to the threat of climate 
change by turning mitigation into an opportunity for profit.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
This research is about how energy efficiency is produced as an idea, as a part of 
identities, as a resource, and as a source of value. Energy efficiency is often defined as “physical, 
long-lasting changes to buildings and equipment that result in decreased energy use while 
maintaining the same or improved levels of energy services” (La Capra Associates 2006: iii). It 
is usually framed as something that results from the use of a technology. This research focuses 
on a case study of a prominent energy efficient technology, the compact fluorescent light bulb 
(CFL). Such energy efficient technologies can be thought to produce “negawatts,”1 where a 
negawatt is a unit of energy efficiency (Lovins 1989).  
The CFL has been heavily promoted by environmentalists and electricity companies as a 
key tool for solving climate change, yet such promotions appear counter-intuitive on the surface. 
The magnitude of CFL promotions by environmentalists appears at odds with the fact that CFLs 
can only reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by less than 1% even in the best case scenario. 
CFL promotions by electricity providers appear at odds with such companies’ normal incentives 
to sell more of their product. This research began with the question, Given these counter-intuitive 
promotions, how and why has the CFL become a key tool of climate change mitigation for 
environmentalists and electricity companies? 
                                                
1I use the term “negawatts” interchangeably with “energy efficiency,” “saved energy,” and “using less energy.” 
Following Lovins (1989), one negawatt is equivalent to 1 megawatt of energy efficiency, or 1 megawatt of 
electricity that one avoided using.  
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A central theme of this research is that rather than being an already-formed, self-evident 
technical entity - as it is often treated by environmentalists, energy companies, and policymakers 
- energy efficiency is produced through social, political, and economic processes. I will show 
that these processes include identity formation and subjectification; gender-coded household 
labor; and corporate appropriation of household value resulting from environmental governance. 
A central finding is that energy efficiency promotions involve consuming less energy by 
consuming more technologies. In these ways, this dissertation contributes to understandings of 
how environmentalists become laboring subjects in an era of neoliberalism and how energy 
companies are responding to the threat of climate change by turning mitigation into an 
opportunity for profits.  
 The dissertation proceeds as follows. In this introductory chapter, I begin by providing 
background on the case of CFLs, including their political economic and environmental contexts. 
I discuss my broad theoretical perspectives and research methods. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 represent 
the bulk of my findings and analyses, written as separate papers (with their own introductions, 
theoretical frameworks, methods sections, findings, discussions, and conclusions). In Chapter 2, 
I show how environmentalists use CFLs to make and claim neoliberal identities; I propose the 
concept of green neoliberal identity work as a mechanism through which neoliberal ideologies 
are translated into individualistic, consumptive, techno-centric environmentalist practices. In 
Chapter 3, I show how using even the seemingly easiest energy efficient technology, the CFL, 
constitutes labor that is gendered in ways that can reflect and reproduce inequalities. In Chapter 
4, I show how electricity companies have used environmental governance to valorize and 
appropriate home energy efficiency in ways that are an accumulation strategy. In the conclusion 
(Chapter 5), I bring together my findings by drawing out the symbolic power of CFLs, 
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proposing a theory of green obsolescence, framing the production of energy efficiency more 
broadly, and discussing directions for possible future research. 
CFL Promotions as a Case Study 
In spring of 2010, many residents of North Carolina received two mailings that hint at a 
convergence of views connecting an energy efficient technology, the CFL, with an 
environmental problem, global climate change. The first mailing was from the Sierra Club, the 
self-described “largest and most influential grassroots environmental organization in the United 
States” (Sierra Club 2011); it itemized “Ten things you can do to help curb global warming”: 
1. Drive Smart! 
2. Buy Local and Organic 
3. Support clean, renewable energy 
4. Replace incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescent bulbs 
5. Saving energy at home is good for the environment and for your wallet 
6. Become a smart water consumer 
7. Buy energy-efficient electronics and appliances 
8. Plant a Tree, protect a forest 
9. Reduce! Reuse! Recycle! 
10. Mount a local campaign against global warming [emphasis mine] (Sierra Club 2010) 
The second mailing, from residents’ electricity provider, Duke Energy, was a coupon for six free 
General Electric (GE)-brand CFLs to be collected at Wal-Mart. Text on the outside of this six-
pack linked these bulbs to climate change via greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions:  
Did you know if every household used one six pack of GE Energy Smart® CFL’s [sic], over the bulbs’ 
lifetime [sic] they would prevent the emissions equal to 4.6 million cars being on the road. GE Energy  
Smart® bulbs save money and resources compared to incandescent bulbs. [emphasis mine] 
Here lie strange bedfellows: a large environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) and 
a large electricity corporation agreeing that buying CFLs is an important action to prevent 
climate change. In the rest of this section, I provide background on CFLs as a case study, 
discussing CFLs promotions from policies, electricity providers, and ENGOs; CFL production 
and consumption; and CFLs’ environmental impacts.  
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U.S. Policies and Utility-Sponsored Programs to Promote CFLs 
CFLs have been promoted through several U.S. federal policies and programs; their 
promotions have also resulted from state-wide policies in NC. At the federal level, CFLs were 
incorporated into the U.S. labeling and quality-control program ENERGY STAR in 1999 to 
address some of the early performance problems people experienced while using them (Sandahl 
et al. 2006; U.S. DOE 2009). The Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 
2007 phased out energy-inefficient light 
bulbs like incandescents starting in 2012 
(U.S. Congress 2007 HR 6/S. 1419),  
following similar actions by Australia and the 
EU (Di Maria et al. 2010).  
In October 2007, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) launched the 
“Change a light, change the world” program 
(ENERGY STAR N.D.(a)). Figure 1.1 
shows an example of their advertising 
materials, which urge the reader, “Help us 
change the world, one ENERGY STAR light 
at a time. Take the ENERGY STAR Change 
a Light Pledge and join Americans nationwide in the fight against global warming.” Taking the 
Figure 1.1. EPA's ENERGY STAR "Change a Light, 
Change the World" Poster. The text reads, "Take the 
ENERGY STAR Change a Light Pledge and join 
Americans nationwide in the fight against global 
warming. Go to energystar.gov to learn more" 
(ENERGY STAR N.D.(c)). 
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pledge means agreeing to switch one light bulb from an incandescent to a CFL (ENERGY STAR 
N.D.(a)); as of March 31, 2014, over 3 million people had made this pledge in the U.S. 
(ENERGY STAR 2014). Their figures show that 69,000 North Carolinians have pledged to 
install over 480,000 CFLs, which, they calculate, would translate into saving over 500 million 
pounds of GHGs, $42,000, and 349 million kWh of electricity (ENERGY STAR 2014). As EPA 
Administrator Stephen L. Johnson explained about the program in January 2008, “More and 
more Americans are seeing the light – that protecting the environment, while saving money, is as 
easy as changing a light bulb… Together, we are brightening our country’s future, one Energy 
Star CFL at a time.” (Carter-Jenkins 2008) 
 Also in 2007, NC passed a Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard 
(REPS). A state law proposed in part to mitigate climate change, REPS requires electricity 
providers to get a portion of their electricity from renewable energy or energy efficiency (S.L. 
2007-397). NC has become a hotbed of energy and climate activism, and its REPS has frequently 
been touted as the first in the Southeastern U.S. (NC Energy Policy Council 2010). Yet 
promoting energy efficiency in NC is thought of as particularly challenging because electricity 
consumption per capita is high, electricity prices are low, and the population is growing (Brown 
et al. 2012). To meet their requirements under REPS, electricity providers in NC have given tens 
of millions of CFLs to residential customers (Duke Energy 2011; RAP 2010). This research is 
focused on the largest of these giveaways, which have been initiated by the Investor-Owned 
Utility (IOU) Duke Energy. Now the largest electricity company in the nation, Duke Energy is 
headquartered in Charlotte, NC (NC Energy Policy Council 2013).  
Duke Energy’s CFL giveaways in NC are some of the latest in a history of utility-
sponsored CFL promotions. Into the 1980s, the major choices for residential lighting were 
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among brands of Edison’s incandescent bulbs and most households who used CFLs got them 
from electric utility promotional programs, thought to have been one of the key drivers of the 
CFL market (Sandahl et al. 2006). These promotions grew out of Demand Side Management 
(DSM) programs implemented by state electricity regulators (Hirsch 1999). DSM is a way to 
“help utilities match energy demand with generating capacity” (Gillingham et al. 2006), mainly 
by shifting the times (rather than amounts) that electricity is consumed to spread out and dampen 
peak demand.  
CFLs are the public face of Duke Energy’s “Save-a-Watt” program, a program to meet 
the requirements of REPS with energy efficiency (Downey 2010); such a public face can be 
seen, for example, on the cover of Duke Energy’s 2007/2008 corporate Sustainability Report, 
which shows a full-page drawing of a CFL with people walking along the curves of the bulb, 
representing corporate sustainability efforts (Duke Energy 2007/2008). Duke Energy’s “Save-a-
Watt” program has offered discounted and free CFLs since 2009 (Duke Energy 2009). In 
summer 2009, it gave customers discounts on Sylvania bulbs at Lowe’s (Duke Energy 2009). In 
spring 2010 I received from Duke Energy (my electricity provider) a coupon for six free GE-
brand CFLs from Wal-Mart and in fall 2010 Duke Energy mailed me 12 more free Niagara 
Conservation-brand CFLs in the mail. As detailed more in Chapter 4, these programs are paid 
for via rate increases for customers and Duke Energy is paid for each kWh saved (Duke Energy 
2009). Over 200,000 CFLs have been given away in NC via these programs, saving over 40 
megawatts of power plant capacity (Downey 2010). Duke Energy has undertaken similar 
programs in SC, IN, and OH (NCDENR N.D.), giving away millions of CFLs in total (Duke 
Energy 2011). 
CFL Promotions by ENGOs  
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Many environmental groups promote CFLs prominently as a solution to climate change. 
In analyzing the websites of the “Big Ten” U.S. ENGOs (see methods section below), I found 
that nine of these groups portrayed using CFLs as a key action to mitigate climate change. Seven 
ENGOs listed CFLs as one of top 4-12 things an individual can do to mitigate climate change, 
and each time it appeared in those lists it was within the first four items. The Sierra Club excerpt 
at the beginning of this chapter is one illustration of these lists, and also shows that the majority 
of the other actions being promoted by these groups were consumptive, individual, and private. 
Showing how much CFLs have come to symbolize energy efficiency, when famous 
environmentalist Amory Lovins (1989) argued in a prominent forum in favor of negawatts as 
climate change mitigation, he used CFLs as a key example, urging us to consider them to be tiny 
power plants: 
Think of such a compact bulb, with 14 watts replacing 75, as a 61 negawatt power plant. By substituting 
14 watts for 75 watts, you are sending 61 unused watts – or negawatts – back to Hydro [a Canadian 
electricity company], who can sell the electricity saved to someone else without having to make it all over  
again. 
Another example of the widespread use of CFLs as symbols of energy efficiency and climate 
change mitigation can be seen in an image from the Sierra Club showing Rosie the Riveter 
holding up a CFL, saying “We can do it!” over the text “Forging a clean energy future” (Sierra 
Club 2008).  
CFL Production and Consumption 
The history of CFLs is marked by large corporate interests and partnerships. An 
employee of GE invented the CFL in 1976 (Sandahl et al. 2006), an invention that some 
researchers have argued was a response to the 1970s global energy crisis (Ramroth 2008: 5), 
while others say it was a survival strategy for large light bulb manufacturers in an increasingly 
competitive light bulb market (Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000). Yet the earliest CFLs often had 
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short lifetimes, poor lighting quality, and a “flicker” that some researchers think caused many 
consumers to form negative opinions of the bulbs (Sandahl et al. 2006). Partly as a result, U.S. 
use of CFLs grew slowly, so that their share of the market for bulbs in their class2 was still only 
1% in 2000 (U.S. DOE 2009).  
After 2001, the U.S. market for CFLs changed dramatically, so that by 2007 their market 
share had risen to 23% (U.S. DOE 2009). That year, the EU placed an anti-dumping tariff on 
CFLs made in China and other countries (EC 2007), causing a “glut” of inexpensive CFLs to be 
dumped onto the U.S. market (Sandahl et al. 2006). CFLs were promoted in California in 
response to the energy crisis and rolling blackouts and in the Pacific Northwest due to droughts 
that reduced hydropower capacity (Sandahl et al. 2006). The same year, Wal-Mart launched a 
massive CFL promotion where they sold 162 million CFLs, which was over half the 290 million 
sold that year in the U.S. (U.S. DOE 2009). Figure 1.2 shows that nearly all the CFLs sold in the 
U.S. are imported from China.  
                                                
2 “medium, screw-based” bulbs, i.e.: bulbs that fit in a normal household lampshade.	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Figure 1.2. Imports of CFLs to U.S. from World and China, 1996-2013. Graph made by author, using data from 
the U.S. Department of Congress and International Trade Commission (2014); HTS (Harmonized Tariff Schedule) 
#8539.3100.60, which is the import code for “discharge lamps, other than ultraviolet lamps” which are “fluorescent, 
hot cathode” and “with a single screw-in base.”  
At present, the global CFL market is led by three companies, GE, Osram-Sylvania, and 
Philips (OECD and IEA 2006: 251), which have dominated light bulb manufacturing for roughly 
a century (Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000). Headquartered in Europe and the U.S., they 
manufacture bulbs mainly in China (Navigant Consulting Europe 2009: 8); the U.S. buys 29% of 
the world market (OECD and IEA 2006: 256-7). TCP is another large CFL manufacturer, and 
one of the few opening factories in the U.S. (Sheeran 2006). Home improvement stores Wal-
Mart, Lowe’s, and Home Depot have partnered with GE, Osram-Sylvania, and Philips, 
respectively, to promote CFLs (Sandahl et al. 2006). As a result of the rise of CFLs, light bulb 
factories have moved from the U.S. to China (Supply Chain Digest 2009) and incandescent sales 
have been reduced (U.S. DOE 2009). Bulb sales have been predicted to fall by 75% because of 
 10 
 
CFLs’ longer lifetime (Creyts et al. 2007: 36). While incandescents tend to be bought at grocery 
stores, CFLs tend to be bought at large home improvement “big box” stores (U.S. DOE 2009). 
On the surface, CFLs are a smart bulb choice for consumers. They save users money (Di 
Maria et al. 2010) and can last eight times longer (Creyts et al. 2007: 35). Yet while some parts 
of Europe see CFL adoption rates of 50-60%, only 11% of U.S. residential bulbs are CFLs 
(Sandahl et al. 2006; U.S. DOE 2009). The average number of CFLs per household in the U.S. is 
4.4 (North Carolina is 2.5-3) (U.S. DOE 2009). More CFLs are used in parts of the U.S. with 
prior utility promotional programs such as California and Washington (U.S. DOE 2009). Studies 
suggest adoption of CFLs is influenced by financial benefits, culture, electricity prices, 
environmental motivations, and the meanings of lighting in different cultures (Urge-Vortsatz and 
Hauff 2001; Sandahl et al. 2006; Wall and Crosbie 2009; Wilhite et al. 1996; Bladh and Krantz 
2008). Slocum (2004b) has studied how some U.S. ENGOs use CFLs as a way to “bring climate 
change home,” but little is known about how environmentalists in particular think about or use 
technologies like CFLs. 
Environmental Impacts of CFLs 
Multiple Life Cycle Analyses have shown that “from cradle to grave,” CFLs produce 
fewer GHG emissions than incandescent bulbs (OSRAM and Siemens 2009; Ramroth 2008; 
Navigant Consulting Europe 2009; VITO 2009), yet Light-Emitting Diode bulbs (LEDs) are 
potentially even better (OSRAM and Siemens 2009: 1). Studies have suggested that for the U.S. 
as a whole and NC in particular, it is better in terms of toxic mercury emissions to switch from 
incandescents to CFLs because although CFLs contain mercury, there is net more mercury 
released into the air from burning coal to power incandescents (Eckelman et al. 2008). Lighting 
is estimated to represent roughly 9% of U.S. residential electricity use (U.S. EIA 2001) and 
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global electricity demand for lighting is increasing (OECD and IEA 2006: 26). The best CFLs 
use only one-quarter of the electricity to produce the same amount of light as incandescent bulbs 
(U.S. EPA 2008).  
 Although it does not appear, on the surface, to be a complex calculation, no one has 
publicly calculated the potential impact of CFLs on U.S. GHG emissions in the aggregate. 
Instead, it is more common for ENGOs to write about the number of imaginary cars that are 
removed from the road or imaginary houses electrified to equal the energy saved or GHGs 
avoided from using CFLs. For example, the Environmental Defense Fund writes on their 
website3, “If every household replaced just three 60-watt incandescent bulbs with efficient bulbs, 
the pollution savings would be like taking 3.5 million cars off the road!”  
I calculated the maximum percentage of U.S. GHG emissions that can be reduced in the 
best case scenario if everyone changed all their home light bulbs to CFLs as follows. Note that 
this figure is an upper limit that cannot be reached in practice because some people have already 
changed some light bulbs to CFLs and because it is unlikely that every single light bulb will be 
changed, particularly given the well-publicized stockpiling of incandescents. The calculation was 
made by multiplying the following figures: 
82.7%:  The proportion of total U.S. GHG emissions (after changing all gases into equivalent 
units of CO2, called “CO2eq”) that was due to CO2 in 2012 (U.S. EPA 2014: ES-8). 
94.2%:  The proportion of U.S. CO2 emissions that was due to fossil fuel combustion in 2012 
(U.S. EPA 2014: ES-8). 
14.3%:  The proportion of U.S. fossil fuel combustion that was due to residential electricity in 
2012 (U.S. EPA 2014: ES-11); the figure is a result of the author dividing the CO2eq 
emissions from residential electricity (725.8Tg CO2eq) by the total CO2eq emissions in 
the U.S. (5065.7 Tg CO2eq) within the category of fossil fuel combustion. 
                                                
3 Data collected in the present study; see methods below.	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8.8%:  The proportion of residential electricity use that was consumed in indoor and outdoor 
lighting in 20014 (U.S. EIA 2001). 
75%:  The average percent less electricity that a CFL uses compared to an incandescent (U.S. 
EPA 2008). 
Multiplying these figures yields: 
0.74%:  the maximum theoretical proportion of U.S. GHG emissions that could be 
reduced if every U.S. resident changed every home light bulb to CFLs. 
 In sum, the CFL is an energy efficient technology that has been highly promoted by U.S. 
and NC policies and programs, electricity providers, and ENGOs. They are a symbol of energy 
efficiency and climate change activism for utilities, policymakers, and environmentalists. Their 
production networks range from factories in China to homes in the U.S. (and beyond in both 
directions: “backward” along production networks to the extraction of raw materials and 
“forward” to landfills) and involve multi-national corporate actors. Their consumption has been 
growing in part due to policies and promotions and in part because they can save consumers 
energy and money. Yet the magnitude of the environmental savings for CFLs has rarely been 
calculated in the aggregate and is less than 1% of U.S. GHG emissions even in the best case 
scenario. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
I used several broad “sensitizing perspectives” for my research which acted as “points of 
departure” (Charmaz 2006: 17) for my assumptions, research questions, and methods. Political 
ecology and symbolic interactionism (SI) are the perspectives most useful in this research, and 
their emphases on context, power relations, inequalities, and how meanings are constructed shed 
particular light on my project. For example, political ecologists have pointed me toward 
understanding neoliberalism as a key political economic and environmental force, while 
                                                
4 The most recent date at which this data is available.	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symbolic interactionism has sensitized me to the ways that people together make meanings 
through identity work. Political ecologists see environmental problems as caught up in networks 
of power, influence, inequality, and dynamic forces. They emphasize analytical questions of who 
bears the benefits, who bears the costs, and how? SI scholars assume that together people create 
meanings for themselves, others, and things (Blumer 1969: 2). As an explicitly social 
constructionist perspective, SI scholars assume “the meaning of anything and everything has to 
be formed, learned, and transmitted through…a social process,” (Blumer 1969: 12). These 
perspectives are broadly compatible but have different emphases: political ecology has a rich 
history of work on large political economic forces and subjectivities, while SI provides methods 
and perspectives emphasizing everyday interactions and practices. In political ecology and/or SI, 
I drew from theories on environmental subjectivities, identities and labor, technology studies, 
and critical political economies to build my theories. I will outline the broad contours of these 
theories here; their applications to the dissertation research are drawn out in more detail 
especially within Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
Environmentalist Subjectivities 
Political ecologists and other critical theorists of environmental subjectivities view 
multiple possibilities for the environmentalist as a political actor and connect to scholarship on 
neoliberalism. By environmentalist subjects, I mean people who try to conserve natural resources 
and “protect the environment” in small and large ways. Many researchers have suggested that 
new subjects have formed with modernity (Foucault 1995), neoliberalism (Guthman and DuPuis 
2006), and the rise of environmentalism (Slocum 2004a; Agrawal 2005; Robbins 2007). These 
subjects seek to “shop for change” (Johnson and Szabo 2011) and see themselves as consumer-
citizens (Guthman and DuPuis 2006). Critics of green neoliberalism (the greening of neoliberal 
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capitalism and the neoliberaliszation of environmentalisms; see more below) have suggested that 
“neoliberal notions of citizenship and social capital are [being] discursively repackaged in the 
image of homo-economicus, the ideal, entrepreneurial, self-made individual,” in present 
discourses (McCarthy and Prudham 2004).  
These theorists signal the importance of viewing the environmentalist as a subject of 
multiple political and economic forces, and produced through multiple processes (Hinchliffe 
1996). “Turfgrass subjects” have been produced as caretakers of grass subject to neoliberal 
logics, in part through community norms of lawn care (Robbins 2007: 130). Much of the 
research on energy and climate change subjects uses the lens of governmentality to show how 
governments create green subjects who focus on individualized reductions of GHG emissions 
(Rutland and Aylett 2008), consumption of energy efficient products (Slocum 2004a), and home 
energy conservation practices (Hobson 2013).  
Identities and Labor 
I draw from Symbolic Interactionist scholarship to think about identities. These scholars 
conceptualize identities as ways people present themselves to claim characteristics that are tied 
to self-esteem (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996). Environmentalist can be seen as a “moral 
identity.” In such an identity, “our belief in ourselves as good people depends on whether we 
think our actions and reactions are consistent with that identity,” (Kleinman 1996: 5), so the 
success people have in accomplishing this identity is tied to feelings of self-worth. Identity work 
is “anything people do, individually or collectively, to give meaning to themselves and others” 
(Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996). Identity work is accomplished through talk (Snow and 
Anderson 1987) as well as “gestures, acts, dress, and appearances” (Hunt and Benford 1994). 
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Both groups and individuals can do identity work, since identities can be collective or personal 
(Smith 2013; Snow and Anderson 1987; Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996)  
I use SI and feminist political ecology perspectives to understand environmental actions 
as labor. Women are often the targets of environmental campaigns, “expected to be more diligent 
[than men] in adopting time-consuming green practices like recycling and precycling,” 
(MacGregor 2006: 69). This can increase women’s already-larger “care burden,” (Buckingham 
and Kulcur 2009). Many kinds of household labors, from childcare to cooking, have historically 
been labeled “women’s work” and therefore coded as non-work (Giminez 1990: 26). Federici 
(2009) has traced the assigning of household labor to women and labor outside the home to men 
to the beginnings of capitalism (53), where “work that women did at home was treated as non-
work and worthless” whether it was done “for a family or to make commodities to sell to others,” 
(51). In dual-income households, women in the U.S. do more labor overall because of the 
“second shift” of housework (Hochschild 2012).  
Technology Studies 
 I draw on two main areas of technology studies: theories of the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) and Feminist Technology Studies (FTS). SCOT theorists see technologies 
as inherently social, and that their development is not linear or inevitable. While several 
traditional histories of light bulbs and CFLs have already been told (Menanteau and Lefebvre 
2000; Sandahl et al. 2006; Hong et al. 2005: 22), they have tended to tell an atheoretical tale of 
the development of the bulb into a seemingly inevitable present form. SCOT developed out of 
the sociology of scientific knowledge, philosophy of science and technology, histories and 
sociologies of technologies, and innovation studies (Pinch and Bijker 1987: 18-25). Its theorists 
argue against technological determinism (Bijker et al. 1987: 2). They follow sociology of 
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scientific knowledge theorist Bloor in insisting on symmetry: that “successful” technologies be 
studied in the same way as “unsuccessful” ones (Pinch and Bijker 1987: 18, 28). The idea of 
symmetry allows me to problematize the “success” of CFLs, so I can assume that “how and why 
did CFLs arise in this form at this time and place?” is an unresolved question. SCOT theorists 
also call attention to the “relevant social groups” that form around a technology and how they 
often have different meanings for the same technology (Pinch and Bijker 1987: 29-34). Bijker 
(1992) shows this in his history of early (non-compact) fluorescent lights. This concept allows 
me to assume that CFLs will hold different meanings for different groups of environmentalists, 
for different companies, and for different policy groups.  
FTS scholarship has shown how gender and technology co-produce one another, so that 
“gender relations can be thought of as materialized in technology, and masculinity and 
femininity in turn acquire their meaning and character through their enrolment and 
embeddedness in working machines,” (Wajcman 2010). It allows us to expect that the meanings 
of the CFL as a technology used for climate change mitigation are partly constructed through 
gender and gender inequalities. Cowan’s work (1983, 1999) on the history of domestic 
technologies shows how as “labor-saving” appliances such as electric irons and washing 
machines were invented and adopted by housewives in the 1920s U.S., the norms of cleanliness 
changed (1999: 284), resulting in net “more work for mother” (1983). FTS scholarship also 
suggests that the gender coding of CFLs is likely to be complex. Cockburn (1997) alerts us to the 
correspondence of several binaries: technology, public, and masculine vs. (respectively) non-
technology, private, and feminine. Faulkner (2001) summarizes how different kinds of home 
technologies can be gendered differently because of their “association” with men or women in 
the division of home labor. This suggests that the ways that CFLs are seen by members of the 
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household matters for their gendering: are they low-tech (or “’soft’” tech, as Faulkner puts it), 
about cleaning and cooking and routine tasks, or are they high-tech, about home repairs and 
entertainment?  
Critical Political Economies 
I use critical political economic theories because they allowed me to assume that there are 
interests behind political-economic arrangements like discourses, subjectivities, and governance. 
As Castree (2002) explains, a political economic lens on environmental issues calls attention to 
“the broad logics of production and the distributive consequences of these logics.” I focus on 
geographers’ and others’ scholarship on green neoliberalism. Many geographers and others argue 
that since the 1970s, the capitalist economic system has taken a particular form, neoliberalism, 
representing a return (at least discursively) to laissez-faire economic ideologies (Heynen et al. 
2007: 287) as a response to crises in profitability in multiple industries (Harvey 2005). 
Neoliberal economies are characterized by movements toward free markets, de-regulation and 
re-regulation, privatization, and commodification of natural resources (Harvey 2005; Bakker 
2010). 
Green neoliberalism generally refers to both the “greening” of capitalist institutions like 
corporations and international trade organizations (Beder 2002: 177; McCarthy and Prudham 
2004; McCarthy 2007) and the neoliberalization of environmental groups (Guldbrandsen and 
Holland 2001; Slocum 2004b). Scholars of green neoliberalism have shown that in a neoliberal 
era, nature and the environment have been repeatedly appropriated, privatized, and commodified 
in ways that turn the value of ecosystem goods and services into new realms of profit. Scholars 
have called attention to the ways corporations and international trade organizations have 
incorporated environmental tenets into their practices to gain customers and legitimacy in an era 
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when the appearance of environmentalism can expand markets (Beder 2002: 177; McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004). Many of these theorists consider neoliberalizations of environmentalism and 
environmental policy to have had negative impacts on the environment (Heynen et al. 2007: 289; 
Prudham 2007), but Bakker (2007) offers evidence that in some configurations neoliberalism 
may protect the environment. Such scholars suggest that the trend is often not toward complete 
deregulation but is rather a reregulation that results in less transparency and more profits for 
large corporations (Swyngedouw 2007: 56). These theories highlight the need to understand who 
is driving economic or political processes and the impacts on various groups (Castree 2007: 
283).  
Related to this work on political economies of things, in the conclusion (Chapter 5) I 
draw on research on Global Production Networks (GPNs) to suggest some implications of the 
research as a whole. Scholarship on GPNs “aims to reveal the multi-actor and multi-scalar 
characteristics of transnational production systems through intersecting notions of power, value 
and embeddedness” (Coe et al. 2008a). Such analyses began in the work of commodity chain 
analyses, moved into analyses that included “governance structures in different global 
industries,” and is now focused on global networks of commodities, labor, and governance (Coe 
et al. 2008a). A “cultural political economy approach” to GPNs can be especially useful for the 
current case of CFLs and the production of energy efficiency because it such an analysis 
emphasizes the connections of global systems of production with people’s everyday lives and 
identities (Hudson 2008; Coe et al. 2008b).  
Research Methods  
This research was inductive, multi-sited, and included qualitative data from interviews, 
participant-observation, texts, and images. The focus was on the U.S. broadly and on local 
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dynamics in North Carolina. Multiple methods were used because they are complementary 
(Bryman 2004: 455) and to triangulate findings (Blee and Taylor 2002: 111). For example, 
observing how people at these environmentally-oriented events talked about, presented, and 
promoted CFLs in the context of larger environmental issues allowed me access to meanings that 
may be more hidden in interviews (Becker and Geer 1957; Emerson et al. 1995: 12). Interviews, 
on the other hand, are better for understanding personal and organizational histories or for asking 
about topics people may not talk about regularly (Trow 1957). I concentrated analysis on 
different types of data for different chapters. Broadly, my analysis for Chapters 2 and 3 focused 
on the interviews and participant-observation, supplemented with data from texts and images; 
my analysis for Chapter 4 focused on texts, supplemented with data from interviews and 
participant-observation. 
I followed Charmaz’s (2006) assumption that methods are technical and perspectival 
when collecting data. While interviewing people, I assumed that the interviewee and I were 
constructing meanings together. I assumed I could observe such meaning-constructing, but that it 
was more difficult to observe the meaning-making processes that had happened in the past and 
had already become stabilized in interviewees’ speech. I did not assume that what people tell me 
is what they believe all the time. While observing, I assumed that I have a better insight than 
during interviews into what meanings people might give CFLs, environmentalists, and climate 
change in their everyday conversations, and how meanings are informally made, passed on, 
interpreted, and negotiated. I was also able to see patterned absences. For example, despite how 
much IOU and ENGO texts talk about CFLs in the context of climate change, I rarely observed 
people connecting these two things verbally during participant-observation (in particular, I was 
surprised to find that CFL-talk was almost completely absent from the NCUC public hearings). 
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Given my other findings, I interpreted this patterned absence to be a result of both the common-
sense nature of this connection (so common it did not need to be said out loud) and ambivalence 
about CFLs’ significance (see Chapter 5 for more on this ambivalence). 
While collecting and analyzing public documents that IOUs, ENGOs, and policymakers 
have produced, my approach was slightly different. These texts, unlike my field notes and my 
interview transcriptions, were extant: I had no hand in making them, and in fact they were made 
for some other purpose. I assumed that they do not represent the views of everyone at the time or 
even everyone who made them at the time, since meanings are contested. However, they were 
useful for understanding how meanings flow, move, encounter one another, are stabilized 
momentarily, and otherwise change in public spheres. The policy and rulemaking documents 
were especially important because they codify political economic relations.  
Interviews and Participant-Observation 
I conducted three kinds of interviews in this research: longer formal semi-structured, in-
depth interviews; short informal interviews as part of my participant-observation; and longer 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key informants. All interviewees were given 
pseudonyms in this dissertation. From November 2011 to January 2013, I formally interviewed 
15 environmental activists in NC, all of whom performed multiple energy-related practices in 
and outside of their homes “for the environment.” Six were leaders of environmental 
organizations or committees and only two were not active within any such group. I gained access 
to these individuals via participant observation and the “snowball” method (Lofland et al. 2006: 
43). My sampling was theoretical rather than representative (Charmaz 2006: 96-7). Questions 
focused on how the interviewees think climate change should be solved, what sorts of actions 
they do “for the environment,” how they use CFLs, and how they came to buy and use CFLs. 
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Interviews were semi-structured, recorded, transcribed, and lasted 1-2.5 hours. Interviewees were 
white, in their 20s-80s in age, and included: 5 men and 10 women; unemployed or retired (9), 
part-time wage laborers (2), and full-time wage laborers (4); parents (10) and non-parents (5); 
relatively wealthy (8), middle-class (4), and poor (3) people; from six different towns in central 
NC; a fuller description of their demographics can be found in Table 3.1. Consent of 
interviewees was obtained. 
To complement these interviews (Emerson et al. 1995: 12), I conducted 55 hours of 
participant observation at public energy and environmental meetings and hearings in NC from 
February 2011 to November 2012. The events included an Earth Day celebration, an energy 
efficiency education fair, two climate activist rallies, three public utility commission hearings on 
state electricity issues like rate increases, and five professional clean energy conferences. I used 
these events and meetings as both a source of data itself and as the way I found interviewees. 
During the participant observation, I briefly interviewed 37 energy and environmentalist 
employees and volunteers at these events about their personal or their organizations’ views on 
energy efficiency and/or CFLs. About half of these informal interviews were done with men and 
half with women; all were white but one; and with people in their 20s-60s. They included: 
nineteen employees or volunteers with ENGOs; three employees of NC IOUs (two 
representatives of Duke Energy, one of Dominion); seven employees of clean energy businesses; 
four employees of central NC universities; one city lawyer involved in energy efficiency; one 
employee of the NC Utilities Commission Public Staff (which represents the electricity “using 
and consuming public”); and one representative of La Capra Associates (the consulting group 
that studied the potential for NC’s REPS policy). During participant-observation, I also observed 
lectures, public talks, and presentations from then-CEO of Duke Energy (Jim Rogers), a separate 
 22 
 
representative of Duke Energy, a leader of NCSEA (an ENGO in NC), a lawyer for the North 
Carolina Utility Commission (that governs electricity companies), a representative of DSIRE (a 
database on green energy policies), and others. 
Finally, I formally interviewed four key informants who consented for me to use 
identifying information (the organization they work at and their names, although I only used the 
former in this dissertation) in February 2011. I originally intended to interview more such 
informants, but was constrained by time in the present research. I interviewed the executive 
director and director of governmental relations of the NC League of Conservation Voters, a 
lawyer who serves as legal counsel for the ENGO NCWARN, and a senior policy analyst with 
DSIRE (part of the NC Solar Center). These interviews were recorded and used primarily as 
supplemental data in Chapter 4. 
Texts and Images 
I collected four broad types of texts and images: I systematically collected (1) U.S. 
ENGO websites, (2) google search images, and (3) REPS policy- and rule-making texts; I also 
collected and used (4) a wide variety of miscellaneous texts as supplementary data. For the first 
source of textual data, I collected websites, letters, and emails from what have been identified as 
the “Big Ten”5 mainstream U.S. ENGOs (Center for Media and Democracy 2011) as well as 
websites from the 35 other members of the U.S. Climate Action Network (US CAN 2010; see 
References for full listing) in summer 2010. Using “screen captures,” I began at the homepage 
of each group, clicked on the “issues” or “programs” tab, then on “global warming” or “climate 
change”; each group had some variation of this path. I then looked for links that indicated “what 
you can do” or other calls for the reader/viewer to act. I followed those links until they 
                                                
5 These 10 were Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace USA, National Audubon Society, 
National Resource Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, Nature Conservancy, Sierra Club, Wilderness 
Society, and World Wildlife Fund.	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intersected with CFLs or until I found no evidence they talked about CFLs. I looked for patterns 
among the ways that CFLs and climate change were linked and how the actions for mitigating 
climate change were framed. I conducted a discourse analysis, looking at the “text in context,” 
analyzing patterns and change in the way lighting technologies and CFLs in particular have been 
linked to climate change in a qualitative, interpretive, and holistic way (Wodak 2008: 5-6). I 
focused more effort on the “Big Ten” groups in my analysis, since they represent much of the 
mainstream, national, public environmental discourses in the U.S. These groups have been 
faulted as being too corporate and professionalized (e.g., Beder 2002); nonetheless, they 
influence millions of environmentalists, collect billions of dollars in revenue, and, unlike smaller 
groups, often have a voice in policy decisions. I used this data mainly in Chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
To understand the gender coding of CFLs, I collected a second set of textual data using 
google searches. I analyzed the first ten photos and their accompanying articles when I searched 
for several strings in Google (while signed out of google accounts like gmail). I searched for ten 
different terms (“mom,” “dad,” “mother,” “father,” “man,” “men,” “woman,” “women,” “girl 
scout,” “boy scout”), each paired with “CFL” once and with “compact fluorescent” once (using 
both CFL and compact fluorescent was necessary because “CFL” is also a common abbreviation 
for the Canadian Football League). For example, I searched for both “mom and CFL” and “mom 
and compact fluorescent.” These 20 searches resulted in 200 items total that I analyzed mainly in 
Chapter 3. 
A third major source of textual data, mainly used in Chapter 4, were legislative and 
rulemaking documents. In particular I examined three groups of data. First, the NC General 
Assembly commissioned a study of the potential for a Renewable Portfolio Standard in NC (La 
Capra 2006; GDS 2006); I analyzed that study’s report and the responses by IOUs, ENGOs, and 
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others to the study when it was publicized in 20066. Second, I analyzed the REPS bill itself 
(REPS of 2007) and its codification as a NC General Statute (G.S. § 62-133.8). Third, I analyzed 
the docket (E-100, sub 113) through which the initial rules for implementing REPS were hashed 
out among IOUs, ENGOs, the North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC), and others (more 
details in Chapter 4). In this docket, the NCUC first asked stakeholders for their opinions on 
potential rules for implementing the REPS bill; those stakeholders and others who wanted to 
participate filed comments officially through lawyers; then groups responded to each other; and 
finally the NCUC made its initial rules. This docket consisted of 208 separate documents from 
these different groups; the rulemaking docket goes beyond these 208 documents after the initial 
rulemaking, but focuses mainly on non-energy efficiency concerns after these first 208. I 
supplemented this textual data with a few documents that are part of the Save-a-Watt docket (E-
7, sub 831), which is the rulemaking proceeding through which Duke Energy’s energy efficiency 
programs (including CFL giveaways) were proposed, debated, and approved. It was beyond the 
scope of this research to analyze that entire docket (and its 338 separate documents) fully; 
instead, I used comments from groups like the Attorney General’s Office, the City of Durham, 
Duke Energy’s initial Save-a-watt proposal, and the NCUC’s ruling on Save-a-Watt to show the 
directions of energy efficiency rules after the initial rulemaking docket. 
My fourth source of textual data was not collected in the same “systematic” way as the 
prior three sources of data, which is why I called it “miscellaneous” textual data. I collected this 
data by picking up fliers, pamphlets, posters, etc. at events at which I conducted participant-
observation; I also received this type of document from people who knew about my research 
sending me such texts that they encountered and by coming across such documents online 
through my research. This miscellaneous data includes data from Duke Energy (its Sustainability 
                                                
6 Available: http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/reps/reps.htm 	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Reports and 10-K forms; websites on CFLs, energy efficient lighting, and energy efficiency; Jim 
Rogers’ testimony before Congress promoting energy efficiency in 2007; letters, coupons, and 
postcards to customers urging them to use CFLs), ENGOs located in NC (pamphlets, fliers, 
emails from NCSEA, NCPIRG, NCWARN, NCLCV, NCIPL, and others), and others.  
Analysis 
Because of my focus on meanings and processes and my assumptions about 
power/inequality, I used a feminist grounded theory approach to both data collection and 
analysis. By “feminist,” I draw on approaches to field work (Kleinman 2007) that stress ever-
present power relations and inequality in social settings, and the need to see and analyze these in 
any fieldwork (because they are already there). Feminist field work approaches have been 
successful at unpacking “taken-for-granted” meanings, which were helpful in understanding 
CFLs and energy efficiency. By “grounded theory,” I mean approaches to data collection and 
analysis that are at times inductive and deductive, that are about interpretation, the construction 
of data and theories, and constant comparison (between data and data, data and theory, theory 
and theory) (e.g., Charmaz 2006; Becker 1958). Analysis was ongoing, including open coding 
(Lofland et al. 2006: 200-1) and more holistic interpretation based on patterns among the 
interviews (Kleinman et al. 1997: 486). Findings are analytically generalizable (Kleinman et al. 
1997; Becker 1990) to processes and links between CFLs, cultures of environmentalism, and 
political-economies. 
During data collection, this feminist grounded theory approach meant that I had certain 
assumptions about myself and my relationship to research participants: my positionality. I 
assumed that I was not a “blank slate” (Kleinman et al. 1997): my experiences in the world, my 
previous readings, and my beginning assumptions all shaped the way I approached any field site 
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or research problem. Rather than trying to adopt a stance of seeing the world as if I had no 
background or assumptions, I assumed that the best way to reduce my biases was by examining 
them. While writing field notes, as Emerson et al. (1995) suggest, I assumed that it was 
impossible for me to transcribe the world exactly as it is. All data is constructed, and inevitably I 
constructed my data by filtering out certain things, deeming some important enough to jot down 
and others not important at all, by not even noticing certain things and being sensitive to others. 
This is inevitable for all researchers (both qualitative and quantitative), and I tried to reduce this 
bias by writing as complete of field notes as possible for interviews and participant-observation. 
Because of my own positionality in terms of class, gender, race, etc., I was more sensitive to 
certain experiences (e.g., gendered experiences) and may not have even noticed or understood 
others (e.g., racialized experiences). I assumed that only by being aware of my own privileges, 
disadvantages, and experiences and how they might relate to other participants could I begin to 
notice some of the power relations in the contexts I was studying. As Kleinman et al. (1997) 
write, however, my positionality (anyone’s positionality) is not an insurmountable bias: it is 
another source of data. How people reacted to me is how they are likely to react to other young, 
white, middle class, grad student women. 
 I treated interviewing, observing, and collecting publications, what we often call 
“methods,” as collections of techniques that are applied together, but can be applied in very 
different ways based on a researcher’s approach. My approach, feminist grounded theory, 
developed out of my initial research questions and my political ecological and symbolic 
interactionist perspectives. Together, my data and analyses form the basis for the next three 
chapters, which constitute the heart of my findings and interpretation for this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONSTRUCTING ENVIRONMENTALIST IDENTITIES  
THROUGH GREEN NEOLIBERAL IDENTITY WORK 
Introduction 
The question of how people become environmentalists is important to building more 
sustainable communities. Much of the research addressing this question has focused on the 
“determinants” of pro-environmental behaviors (like recycling or voting “green”), including 
demographics and holding particular values (e.g., Stern 2000; Bamberg and Moser 2007; Thoyre 
2011). A separate line of research has focused on environmentalists as subjects within neoliberal 
economic systems who focus their efforts on green consumptive practices (McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004; Slocum 2004a; Rutland and Aylett 2008). But the question of how neoliberal 
ideologies become translated into people’s everyday environmentalist practices is not yet fully 
understood (Agrawal 2005: 210; Barnett et al. 2008). In this paper, I use insights from symbolic 
interactionist (SI) sociology to expand our understanding of the mechanisms through which 
green neoliberal subjects7 are formed. Using SI theories of identity work, I develop the concept 
of green neoliberal identity work, a process through which groups and individuals construct and 
claim neoliberal environmentalist identities. Green neoliberal identity work can be seen as a 
mechanism through which neoliberal ideologies become translated into environmental practices 
as these subjects form themselves. 
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by building the concept of green neoliberal 
identity work by weaving critical perspectives on neoliberalism and neoliberal subjects with SI 
                                                
7 Although green neoliberal subjects are the focus of this paper, it should be noted that these are only one subset of 
environmentalists.	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perspectives on identities and identity work. I explain my empirical research approach to further 
examining the idea of green neoliberal identity work. Data from interviews, participant 
observation, and texts about environmentalists’ promotions and uses of energy efficient light 
bulbs revealed five generic patterns of such identity work. I close by discussing two implications 
of using the concept of green neoliberal identity work to examine how people become 
environmentalists. First, this concept illuminates the ways that neoliberal environmental subjects 
form themselves through talk, helping scholars better understand the mechanisms of neoliberal 
subject formation. Second, the concept of green neoliberal identity work opens up new ways of 
thinking about resistance to neoliberal environmental projects, through micro-processes I call 
critical green identity work.  
Conceptualizing Green Neoliberal Identity Work 
How do people become neoliberal environmentalists? In other words, how do neoliberal 
ideologies translate into people’s everyday environmentalist practices such as buying energy-
efficient light bulbs and other green consumptive acts? I begin to answer this question using 
critical perspectives on neoliberalism, where scholars have theorized current constructions of 
neoliberal subjects, showing how they privilege capitalist class interests. Yet this literature has 
not yet well-theorized “subject formation” (Agrawal 2005: 210), especially glossing over the 
mechanisms through which these subjects are formed. Often the green neoliberal subject is said 
to be “enrolled,” or, following Althusser, they are “interpellated,” into the project of 
neoliberalism without addressing how that process happens (c.f. Robbins 2007; Barnett et al. 
2008). Identities are assumed to be already-formed and static. I turn to SI perspectives to 
understand these mechanisms better, as SI theories highlight the processes through which 
identities are constructed and reconstructed through everyday practices. SI theories provide a 
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way to understand the question of agency within theories of green neoliberalism, illuminating 
how people become neoliberal environmentalists, and how neoliberal ideologies get translated 
into everyday practices. 
 In building the concept of green neoliberal identity work, it is important to note the 
relationship between concepts of subject and identity. When scholars study neoliberalizations of 
environmental discourses, people, and practices, they tend to view the environmentalist as a 
subject (Guldbrandsen and Holland 2001; Slocum 2004a; Robbins 2007), whereas when scholars 
study everyday processes of making environmentalists, they tend to view the environmentalist as 
an identity (Horton 2003; Saunders 2008). Little work has bridged the two, yet they are generally 
compatible perspectives. Both critical perspectives on neoliberalism and SI theories are social 
constructionist and, although they do it differently, both are attentive to the interests served by 
various processes and the ways that particular constructions of subjectivities/identities are 
influenced by current power relations. SI work can complement that of green neoliberalism 
scholars who have been conscious of power relations within capitalism. For example, Schwalbe 
and Mason-Schrock (1996) emphasize that SI research on identity work analyzes “the place 
where people, through expressive behavior and face-to-face interaction, both reproduce and 
resist larger social arrangements.” They stress that the ways people make and claim identities 
“are enabled and constrained by the conditions under which people act.”  
Critical Perspectives on the Green Neoliberal Subject  
Scholars of neoliberalism have shown that a range of groups are subject to neoliberal 
economic ideologies. Neoliberalism is considered the form of the U.S. economic system since 
the 1970s and a class project that seeks to restore rates of accumulation to elites at a time of 
declining profitability (Harvey 2005: 19). Neoliberal ideologies prioritize free movement of 
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capital (Harvey 2005: 11), market forces over state decisions about resource allocation 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004), individuals’ rights and responsibilities, and private property 
(Heynen et al. 2007: 10, 287). Much of the work on neoliberal subjectivities has its roots in 
Foucauldian ideas of power as productive of subjects (2007) who self-discipline (1995), so that 
even small, private actions like changing one’s light bulb are involved in power relations. 
Broader neoliberal ideologies “of citizenship and social action are discursively repackaged in the 
image of homo-economicus, the ideal, entrepreneurial, self-made individual,” (McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004). Using Foucault’s ideas about power, subjectivity, and governmentality, scholars 
have shown that neoliberalism has produced subjects who “shop for change” (Johnston and 
Szabo 2011) and are encouraged to think of themselves as consumers first rather than other kinds 
of citizens (Guthman and DuPuis 2006).  
Green neoliberal subjects are a type of neoliberal subject oriented toward environmental 
concerns, yet still subject to neoliberal ideologies of marketization, privatization, and 
consumption-as-social-change. Green neoliberalism generally refers to both the “greening” of 
capitalist institutions like corporations and international trade organizations (Beder 2002: 177; 
McCarthy and Prudham 2004; McCarthy 2007) and the neoliberalization of environmentalist 
organizations (Guldbrandsen and Holland 2001; Slocum 2004b). “Turfgrass subjects” have been 
produced as caretakers of grass subject to neoliberal logics, in part through community norms of 
lawn care (Robbins 2007: 130). Much of the research on energy and climate change subjects uses 
the lens of governmentality to show how governments create green subjects who focus on 
individualized carbon emissions reductions (Rutland and Aylett 2008), consumption of energy 
efficiency products (Slocum 2004a), and home energy conservation practices (Hobson 2013). 
Neoliberalizations often cause environmental degradation (Prudham 2007), but they can also 
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improve environmental quality (Bakker 2005) or go either way (Bakker 2010). There are hazards 
in the “co-optation” of environmental movements and subjectivities by neoliberal logics 
(Gulbrandsen and Holland 2001), as neoliberalized environmentalist subjects may damage 
democracy (Slocum 2004a), diminish a sense of responsibility among activists (Hinchliffe 1996), 
and widen inequalities (McCarthy 2007). Dowling (2010), reviewing the literature on climate 
change activist subjectivities, found that they both help and hurt inequalities. 
SI Perspectives on Identity Work  
Symbolic interactionism is a field of sociology that grew out of the pragmatist philosophy 
of George Herbert Mead and is often framed as having the following assumptions, as laid out by 
one of its founders: (1) “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the 
things have for them”; (2) “the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with one’s fellows”; and (3) “these meanings are handled in, and 
modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the thing he 
encounters,” (Blumer 1969: 2). Symbolic interactionists build the concept of identity work from 
the underlying idea that together people create meanings for themselves, others, and things 
(Blumer 1969: 2). As a social constructionist perspective, SI scholars assume “the meaning of 
anything and everything has to be formed, learned, and transmitted through…a social process,” 
(Blumer 1969: 12).  
An example useful for thinking about environmentalists as subjects can be found in 
Becker’s (1953) work on how people become marijuana users. Becker noted that many of those 
researching drug behaviors focused on the social psychological determinants of that behavior, 
similar to how much of current research on environmentalist behaviors has focused on its 
“determinants.” In contrast, Becker’s use of an SI perspective meant he assumed,  
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that the presence of a given kind of behavior is the result of a sequence of social experiences 
during which the person acquires a conception of the meaning of that behavior, and perceptions 
and judgments of objects and situations, all of which make the activity possible and desirable  
(emphases mine).  
This idea led Becker’s research away from a focus on “those ‘traits’ which ‘cause’ the behavior” 
and instead toward “describing the set of changes in the person’s conception of the activity and 
the experience it provides for him.” Marijuana users had to learn how to use marijuana for 
pleasure: veteran users taught beginners how to identify the bodily sensations they were 
experiencing while smoking as pleasurable experiences. In this way, an SI perspective 
emphasizes the processes through which people build environmentalist identities rather than the 
traits “causative” of pro-environmental behaviors. 
SI scholars conceptualize identity as a way that people present themselves to claim 
characteristics that are tied to self-esteem; it is “a sign that evokes meaning” to others (Schwalbe 
and Mason-Schrock 1996; emphasis theirs). Environmentalist can be seen as a “moral identity.” 
In such an identity, “our belief in ourselves as good people depends on whether we think our 
actions and reactions are consistent with that identity,” (Kleinman 1996: 5), so the success 
people have in accomplishing this identity is tied to feelings of self-worth. Identity work is 
“anything people do, individually or collectively, to give meaning to themselves and others”; 
people use the resources available to them to accomplish identities through identity work 
(Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996). Yet even those with minimal physical or financial 
resources can create and claim identities, as in Snow and Anderson’s (1987) study of homeless 
people who used identity talk to construct identities tied to high self-esteem. In addition to talk, 
identity work is about “gestures, acts, dress, and appearances, that communicate an identification 
with a particular worldview,” (Hunt and Benford 1994). Calling identity talk and other acts that 
claim, define, maintain, repair, contest, and police identities work calls attention to how the 
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processes of identity-making can fail and how successful identity-making often requires “care 
and skill,” (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996). Scholars have further distinguished subcultural 
from individual identity work, since identities can be collective (Smith 2013) or personal (Snow 
and Anderson 1987). Groups do subcultural identity work to construct collective identities, 
providing the resources in terms of “signs, codes, and rites of affirmation,” from which 
individuals draw to do the individual identity work of constructing personal identities (Schwalbe 
and Mason-Schrock 1996). 
Given these conceptions of green neoliberal subjectivities and identity work, I propose 
that we view the particular type of identity work through which neoliberal environmentalist 
subjects are constructed as green neoliberal identity work. It is the work of claiming, defining, 
maintaining, repairing, contesting, and policing green neoliberal identities. Based on what is 
already known about these subjectivities, I argue that the consumption of things within neoliberal 
logics of free markets, private property, and individualized action are central to this identity 
construction; this assumption motivates the choice of case study, below.  
Research Approach 
Case Study 
To examine green neoliberal identity work in detail, I use the case study of 
environmentalists’ promotions and use of energy efficient compact fluorescent light bulbs 
(CFLs). The CFL is an emblematic object of green neoliberal subjectivities focused on the 
consumption of things. Slocum (2004b) identified CFLs as a “boundary object” that city 
governments used to “bring climate change home” in discourses creating green neoliberal 
subjects in her research. She found that energy efficiency objects like CFLs are central to green 
neoliberal discourses because focusing on energy efficiency places “cost saving as the 
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gatekeeper of possibility” and individualize responsibility for climate action. I have found that 
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) position using CFLs as a key sign of 
green neoliberal identities, in part by giving the image of the CFL the meaning “energy 
efficiency action” and “climate change solution.” CFLs follow the tradition of incandescent light 
bulbs in meaning much more than light. The incandescent light bulb, for instance, has long been 
a symbol of modernity in the home, particularly modern electricity. During the Depression, the 
U.S. government’s Rural Electrification Administration famously used images of incandescent 
light bulbs to promote electricity through Lester Beall’s posters (MoMA 2012). Even today, 
people call electricity losses “blackouts” (Nye 2010). Even their common use to signify “aha!” 
moments, inventions, or ideas can be linked to a long history of light bulbs as symbols of 
novelty, speed, convenience, and modernity. The image of the CFL symbolizes a certain kind of 
modernity, what Hajer (1995) would call “ecological modernization,” characterized by extensive 
adoption of home green technologies.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data included interviews8, participant observation, and texts, collected from June 2010 to 
January 2013. I interviewed 15 environmental activists9 in North Carolina, chosen because they 
all told me they performed multiple energy-related practices in and outside of their homes for the 
environment. I began each interview by asking what the interviewee did in their everyday lives 
that made them think of the environment, and the interviewees then told me about actions they 
did that they framed as helping to reduce their impact on the environment. Six were formal 
leaders of environmental organizations or committees and only two were not active within any 
                                                
8 All interviewees have pseudonyms.	  
9 10 women, five men; all white; aged 20s-80s; three at or below 200% of NC poverty line, either upper middle 
class, four in between.	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such group. I gained access to these individuals via participant observation at public hearings at 
the North Carolina Utilities Commission and through the “snowball” method (Lofland et al. 
2006: 43). I contacted people who made public statements to the Commission about the 
importance of energy efficiency for helping mitigate climate change and other environmental 
problems; I then asked those interviewees to suggest people they knew who might be interested 
in being interviewed and who also were doing energy efficient actions in their homes for 
“environmental reasons,” broad construed. Interviews were semi-structured, recorded, 
transcribed, and lasted 1-2.5h. For these reasons, “environmentalist” was an identity defined by 
the interviewees rather than imposed on them, but all interviewees did at least a few home 
energy conservation actions (such as using CFLs, line-drying laundry, walking to work instead 
of driving, and others) at least in part, they said, “for the environment.” 
To complement these interviews (Emerson et al. 1995: 12), I conducted 55 hours of 
participant observation at public energy and environmental public, meetings, and hearings in 
North Carolina10. During the events, I briefly interviewed 37 energy and environmentalist 
employees and volunteers11 at these events about their personal or their organizations’ views on 
energy efficiency and/or CFLs. I also collected websites, letters, and emails from the “big ten”12 
mainstream U.S. ENGOs (Center for Media and Democracy 2011). I focused on the “big ten” 
groups13 because they represent much of the mainstream, national, public environmental 
                                                
10 The events included an Earth Day celebration, an energy efficiency education fair, climate activist rallies, public  
utility commission hearings on state electricity issues, and professional clean energy conferences.	  
11 Roughly half men, half women; all white but one; aged 20s-60s. 	  
12 Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace USA, National Audubon Society, National 
Resource Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, Nature Conservancy, Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, and  
World Wildlife Fund.	  
13 These groups have been faulted as being too corporate and professionalized (e.g., Beder 2002); nonetheless, they 
influence millions of environmentalists, collect billions of dollars in revenue, and, unlike smaller groups, often have  
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discourses in the U.S. I collected “screen captures” (digital computer screen images) of 
webpages of theses ten ENGOs, focusing on their discourses of climate change and personal 
actions. 
I analyzed the data with grounded theory methods, constructing my theories as they 
emerged from the data and being “constantly comparative,” (Charmaz 2006). Analysis was 
ongoing, including open coding (Lofland et al. 2006: 200-1) and more holistic interpretation 
based on patterns among the interviews (Kleinman et al. 1997: 486). Neither the nature of the 
environmentalist identities themselves nor the concept of identity work were assumed a priori, 
but instead emerged and grew from the empirical data itself and were subsequently tested against 
the data and others’ research. The findings are analytically generalizable (Kleinman et al. 1997) 
to processes that are similar to the links between CFLs and environmentalist identities rather than 
to populations. I developed five patterns of green neoliberal identity work; I call them 
“generic”14 to reflect that while they grew from the case of CFLs, similar patterns can be seen in 
the ways green neoliberal identity work is done with other things and through other kinds of talk. 
Note, however, that these five patterns are not meant to be exhaustive of all kinds of green 
neoliberal identity work. 
 
 
 
Generic Patterns of Green Neoliberal Identity Work 
                                                                                                                                                       
a voice in policy decisions. 	  
14 These generic patterns are similar to Snow and Anderson’s (1987) three “generic patterns of identity talk” 
(distancing, embracement, and fictive storytelling) or Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock’s (1996) “four major parts to 
the process of subcultural identity work” (defining, coding, affirming, policing).	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People used CFLs to do the subcultural and individual identity work of constructing 
green neoliberal identities through: 1) celebrations and 2) renunciations of particular 
technologies; 3) inclusive-talk; 4) performing moral math; and 5) technological progress-talk. 
1. Celebrations of Particular Technologies  
Through the identity work of celebrating the CFL as a technology, people constructed 
CFLs as a badge of environmentalism, signifying that the moral identity “environmentalist” is 
someone who buys “good” technologies. Groups constructed the environmentalist identity in this 
way by creating and emphasizing “what you can do” lists and energy audits that teach people 
how to claim the identity. Nine out of the “big ten” ENGOs promoted the use of CFLs as a key 
action people should do to fight climate change. All featured at least one list of “what you can 
do” actions15 to fight climate change on their websites. I interviewed three past and present 
leaders of one NC ENGO that sponsors energy audits16 of public buildings where members of 
the public are invited to attend. All three agreed that in addition to improving the building itself, 
one of the main purposes of the audits was education, so that people attending would return to 
their own homes and apply what they had learned. “What you can do” lists and energy audits are 
ways that groups teach people what actions “count” toward accomplishing the environmentalist 
identity and how to enact it, similar to how veteran drug users teach people how to use marijuana 
(Becker 1953). Like the drug, the CFL acquires a pleasurable meaning for individuals because 
groups teach them how to celebrate it. 
                                                
15 Beyond CFLs, the lists commonly included actions such as planting a tree, buying energy-efficient appliances,  
and keeping one’s car tuned up.	  
16 Energy audits are professional assessments of a building’s energy use designed to identify ways to use less energy 
through physically changing the building’s design or installing appliances. They usually include replacing 
incandescent light bulbs with CFLs as one of their recommendations.	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Individuals claimed environmentalist identities by following these lists, attending audits, 
and overwhelmingly by using CFLs. Fourteen of the fifteen environmentalists interviewed 
described using CFLs; during participant observation, no one I asked about personal use of CFLs 
denied using them. When I asked people what things they did in their daily lives that make them 
think of the environment, they listed their actions in ways that strongly emulate the “what you 
can do” lists, suggesting that such lists are powerful resources for identity-making. More than 
half (8/15) of those formally interviewed had participated in either a group audit of a public 
building or an audit of their own home. Those who had their homes audited used the information 
gained as a personalized “what you can do” list.  
CFLs have become one of the most prominent technological signs of environmentalism. 
Sally, former director of a large NC ENGO, described installing CFLs in a prominent fixture in 
her home, where she commonly fielded visitors’ questions about the importance of CFLs. The 
installation location invited the questions that allowed Sally to further perform the role of 
knowing environmentalist (and educator, another moral identity tied to environmentalism, for 
Sally) to onlookers by celebrating the CFLs. Using a CFL signified that one was committed to 
everyday environmental actions far beyond light bulbs, similar to how veils have become signs 
of broader piety for some Turkish women (Gokariksel 2009), while using an incandescent did 
not. Although some interviewees also spoke lovingly of solar panels, composters, energy-
efficient cars, and other “good” technologies they used (or aspired to using), these technologies 
did not necessarily signify other environmental commitments to the extent that CFLs did. The 
CFL, more than these other technologies, has become a symbol of energy efficiency and climate 
change activism more broadly in part because of the symbolic flexibility and power of the light 
bulb through history (see Chapter 5).  
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2. Renunciations of Particular Technologies 
Through the identity work of renouncing certain light bulbs, people constructed CFLs, 
incandescents, and LEDs as morally-significant technologies that signify different types of 
environmentalists. Through anti-incandescent talk, the most common way that study participants 
did the identity work of renouncing technologies, people could signify themselves as committed 
environmentalists. Anti-incandescent talk gave the incandescent the meaning “hypocritical 
environmental action”; using incandescents or talking about them in a favorable way, then, 
signified a person as an uncommitted environmentalist. ENGOs commonly coded incandescent 
use in this way by referring to them as an “old” technology that belongs in the past. As the 
Environmental Defense Fund writes, leading up to their CFL promotions: 
In the 1880s, light bulbs revolutionized the world. Though we call them ‘lights,’ traditional 
incandescent bulbs are actually small heaters that produce a little light – but waste a lot of energy  
producing heat. Today we can do better (emphases mine). 
In this frame, incandescents cannot signify being a good environmentalist. However, some 
interviewees still used a mix of incandescents and CFLs in their homes. To repair this breach to 
their identities, they went out of their way to explain that they used their incandescents only for 
special tasks (such as needlework) or never turned on those particular lamps. 
Participants also did identity work in renouncing technologies through anti-CFL talk. 
Such talk gave the LED light bulb the meaning “radical environmental action” and was a way for 
the speaker to accomplish a more radical environmentalist identity. At the same time, it made the 
use of CFLs a sign of being an uncommitted environmentalist. Of the 15 formal interviews, only 
one person did not use CFLs. Nathan, an active ENGO volunteer, explained that he used LEDs 
because, as he put it, “Um, I have a social conscience? They’re more efficient, you know, better 
for the planet, less electricity is used. I am slightly less dependent on the grid…” For Nathan, 
renouncing CFLs in favor of consuming LEDs - and speaking of getting off “the grid” - was a 
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way to claim a more radical environmentalist identity than what could be accomplished by using 
the more conventional CFLs. If celebrating CFLs is a key green neoliberal act, rejecting CFLs 
may appear anti-neoliberal. However, at present these renunciations tend to perpetuate neoliberal 
subjectivities by continuing to construct the environmentalist as someone who does 
individualistic, consumptive actions.  
Beyond CFLs, many codes of green neoliberal identities are about renouncing particular 
technological things. As with light bulbs, talk disparaging these technologies is identity work. 
For example, I had the following exchange with Bill, a home energy efficiency aficionado, in the 
middle of our outdoor interview:  
Bill: I saw you weren’t driving a big SUV. [gestures to where I parked the Corolla] 
Interviewer: It’s actually not even my car. 
Bill: Oh, ok. 
Interviewer: I borrowed it! 
Bill: [lowering voice conspiratorially] What burns me up about this area is that everybody says, 
[even softer:] ‘oh, we’re really environmentally sensitive [louder, sarcastic tone:] but we need to  
drive around [in] a big SUV, because, you know, we may get into an accident! 
The SUV, like the incandescent bulb, has been coded as a sign of being a bad environmentalist. 
Bill has checked to see if I am driving one to see if I follow environmentalist codes. In turn, I 
was aware, if not consciously (yet), that the rules of environmentalism are that you should 
minimize driving, so I perform the identity work of renouncing driving by exclaiming that the 
car is not even mine. The renunciation of particular technological things is pervasive in 
environmentalist narratives (e.g., “go car-free!” or vilifying coal-fired power plants). 
3. Inclusive17-Talk  
People used CFLs to define the environmentalist identity as one that everyone can and 
should claim. ENGOs frequently portray switching to CFLs as one of the easiest actions a person 
                                                
17 I call this type of talk “inclusive” after Bernstein’s (1997) distinction between gay and lesbian social movements 
that were “inclusive,” aiming “to educate and mobilize a constituency or maximize involvement in political 
campaigns,” while “exclusive” groups often “discourage popular participation.”	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can do for climate change. Four of the big-10 ENGOs especially emphasized the ease of solving 
climate change through actions like switching to CFLs. Former EPA administrator Stephen L. 
Johnson rolled out a nationwide CFL promotion by saying, “More and more Americans are 
seeing the light – that protecting the environment, while saving money, is as easy as changing a 
light bulb,” (Carter-Jenkins 2008). CFLs symbolize this inclusive identity and the message that 
all actions are important, even small things like changing one’s light bulbs. Sarah, director of a 
NC ENGO, explained her reasoning for focusing on small things:  
If you can get them to make one change, then they’ll do another, and they’ll story-tell about it... 
They’ll do the easy things, like lighting, and then maybe they’ll do something harder like give up 
their cars, and then maybe they’ll run for office... 
For individuals, the idea that small things make a big difference was implicit throughout 
the interviews. Hillary, a leader in her church’s environmental committee, made this 
assumption explicit, telling me what difference CFLs can make:  
it’s like, ‘if everyone changed 4 bulbs over a period of 3 years, it would be like 800,000 cars 
removed from-, you know, a million people change, 800,000 cars removed from the streets.’ So I  
mean, collectively it could make a big difference. 
The “big difference,” for CFLs, was frequently portrayed in terms of these cars off the road or 
pounds of carbon dioxide reduced. 
The idea that claiming the environmentalist identity is easy and only involves small 
things that make a big difference dovetails neatly into a larger message that everyone has a role 
to play in solving environmental problems like climate change. In the websites of the big-10 
ENGOs, it is common for “you” or “individuals” to be called upon to buy new technologies for 
our private homes so we produce fewer greenhouse gases (GHGs) in our daily lives. Van, a 
leader in his church’s environmental committee, justified his use of things like CFLs and solar 
panels by saying, 
I think it’s just a matter of us doing our part. You know, you may say, ‘it’s like a drop in a 
bucket.’ But if enough people do this stuff, a drop can fill up a bucket, the bucket becomes a  
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stream, enough stream becomes a river, enough river it becomes an ocean, an ocean a change. 
If environmentalists construct an identity that is all-inclusive, easy, about small actions, and 
about everyone doing their part, then using CFLs can come to signify an “ordinary person’s” 
environmentalism. This message of what it means to be an environmentalist went far beyond 
CFLs, as in Van’s explanation that he did things as different as changing light bulbs and buying 
solar panels, which arguably have very different material impacts, for the same reasons.  
4. Performing Moral Math 
Through the identity work of “moral math” performances, environmentalists turn the 
CFL into a morally good technology, signifying that an environmentalist is someone who uses 
self-education, math, and numbers to make decisions. By “moral math” performances, I mean 
the public weighing of numerical pros and cons of environmentally-significant decisions using 
scientific data, so that particular numbers and mathematical calculations take on moral 
significance. These calculations are part of a “neoliberal logic” that centers information so that 
consumers “make proper, socially responsible market decisions,” (Roff 2007).  
CFLs’ mercury issue18 is a clear example where the environmentalist as an identity is 
constructed so that you can only claim it properly by talking in terms of moral math. While few 
ENGOs mentioned the mercury in CFLs at all, those that did were quick to reassure the reader 
that, because of weighing the numerical pros and cons, CFLs are still the best lighting 
technology. Most of the interviewees who mentioned mercury as an issue in their decision-
making process told me that in the end they believed that the CFL was the morally good 
technology to choose.  
                                                
18 CFLs contain a small amount of mercury; incandescents do not. Given how much electricity they save, CFLs 
release net less mercury than incandescents in states with many coal-fired power plants like North Carolina and over 
the United States as a whole (Eckelman et al. 2008). However, these results were not known by all study 
participants. 	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A second area where discussions of moral math predominated was around the question of 
whether CFLs make a difference. ENGOs nearly uniformly justified the use of CFLs based on 
numbers that were supposed to hold moral significance, usually accounts of the pounds of carbon 
dioxide avoided by using them, or the equivalent numbers of imaginary cars that would be kept 
off the road. Demonstrating knowledge of these numbers and data was a way to claim an 
environmentalist identity, as when Hillary speaks of the “big difference” it could make, in terms 
of “800,000 cars removed from the streets” if more people used CFLs (see above). However, the 
use of these particular CFL calculations to determine if they make a difference is not self-
evident. A more straightforward figure than how many cars would be “removed from the streets” 
is the percent reduction in national GHG emissions CFLs could make. This calculation is a 
matter of multiplying five numbers: 82.7% (% of U.S. GHG emissions from CO219); 94.2% (% 
U.S. CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels20); 14.3% (% U.S. fossil fuel burning from 
residential electricity21); 8.8% (% U.S. residential electricity used for lighting22); and 75% (% 
less electricity that CFLs use23) to get 0.74%, or the maximum theoretical proportion of U.S. 
GHG emissions that could be reduced if every U.S. household changed all their bulbs to CFLs. 
In three years of research, I never found such a figure publicly calculated or discussed by 
anyone, including ENGOs, scientists, and activists. No one talks about CFL use in percent 
reduction of national GHG emissions, though that figure offers a clearer indication of the impact 
                                                
19 In 2012; after changing all gases into equivalent units of CO2, called “CO2eq.” (U.S. EPA 2014: ES-8). 
20 In 2012 (U.S. EPA 2014: ES-8).	  
21 In 2012 (U.S. EPA 2014: ES-11); the figure is a result of the author dividing the CO2eq emissions from residential 
electricity (725.8Tg CO2eq) by the total CO2eq emissions in the U.S. (5065.7 Tg CO2eq) within the category of  
fossil fuel combustion. 
22 In 2001, the most recent date that such data is available; includes indoor and outdoor lighting in 2001 (U.S. EIA  
2001).	  
23 Average; compared with incandescents (U.S. EPA 2008).	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of CFLs than other measures. This calculation is not too difficult; interviewees and ENGO 
websites spoke easily of much more complex calculations. The 0.74% figure is a significant 
patterned absence that strongly suggests that the figures that are used by environmentalists to 
justify the use of CFLs are more about performing moral identities than about what makes 
change. Likely the 0.74% figure is so low that it would feel dissonant to perform green identities 
by using CFLs if the figure were widespread knowledge24. 
Talking about CFLs using moral math grounds the environmentalist identity in self-
education about numbers and data. Similar dynamics occur in the epic cloth versus disposable 
diaper or paper vs. plastic bag debates among environmentalists. Brianna, an interviewee without 
ties to environmental groups, explains her decision about another longstanding debate, over 
whether it is more environmentally-friendly to hand- or machine-wash your dishes: 
I finally did some reading and found out the dishwasher [versus] by hand, it was kind of a wash, 
so [we] just use the dishwasher. [sounding defensive:] Um, I pay attention. I try to find out what  
is the better choice. 
An environmentalist is constructed as someone who cares about these minutiae, and scientific 
data are the guiding light for determining morally right individual actions. But not all data count. 
5. Technological Progress-Talk 
Environmentalists constructed and claimed identities by talking about their past and 
future uses of technologies in a frame of technological progress; this talk coded an 
environmentalist as someone who uses technology progressively. Snow and Anderson (1987) 
found that identity-talk commonly took the form of “fictive storytelling” by homeless people 
about their past and future selves. I found similar patterns of talk among environmentalists, 
                                                
24 Even academic audiences have resisted this figure. One grant reviewer, for example, wrote that I could not assume 
the ~1% figure was accurate without first establishing it through peer-reviewed research.	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especially the narrative that environmentalists are people who choose better and better 
technologies based on learning about new scientific data. 
Environmentalists talked about their past use of CFLs in two main ways, both centering 
narrations of technological progress and self-education. Some interviewees claimed they had 
been using CFLs from the moment they first heard of them and spoke of always having been 
good environmentalists. Others spoke of acting in “bad” ways toward the environment in the 
past, which they rectified when they learned better. For example, Sandy, an environmental leader 
in her church, explained with some embarrassment that “before I knew better,” she had disposed 
of CFLs by putting them in the trash, rather than following the extensive EPA guidelines for 
handling them as a toxic substance.  
Talk about using a technology more or in better ways in the future was another way that 
people claimed environmental identities through technological progress-talk. This type of talk 
was used to repair environmentalist identities. For example, early in my interview with Hillary, 
she told me she had replaced nearly every bulb in her house with CFLs. Later, while giving me a 
tour of her home, she expressed surprise as she noticed that she had many fewer CFLs installed 
than she had thought. Her response was to use talk about future CFL use to repair this identity 
breach, declaring, “Now that I know this, I can come up today and change it.” Similarly, when I 
asked people about what sorts of environmentally-significant actions they do now, they often 
responded by telling me about what they plan to do once they know or earn more. 
Technological progress-talk about choosing and using CFLs progressively better was 
primarily individual identity work, but it echoes larger environmentalist discourses of progress. 
The example (see above) from the Environmental Defense Fund’s narration of “traditional 
incandescent bulbs” that were inefficient, but “today we can do better” (with CFLs) was a clear 
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instance of this with lighting technologies. Communication scholars have shown how the 
“apocalyptic narrative” has been common in environmentalism for decades. As Killingsworth 
and Palmer (1996) explain,  
In depicting the end of the world as a result of the overweening desire to control nature, activists 
have discovered a rhetorical means of contesting their opponents’ claims for the idea of progress  
with its ascendant narrative of human victory over nature. 
They argue that in climate change mitigation movements, activists have brought the apocalypse 
discourse back to the public but without attacking progress wholeheartedly because of 
environmentalists’ generally high education and regard for science. My findings suggest that the 
emphasis of the technological progress narrative on green technologies improving over time 
continues in people’s identity work with CFLs. This narrative of technological progress is also 
found in the ways that people talk about the environmental impacts of power plants, as when 
“old” coal-fired plants are depicted as less environmentally friendly than “new” wind turbines. 
 
The data revealed five generic patterns in the ways that people talk about using things 
like CFLs to do the identity work of constructing neoliberal environmental subjectivities. 
Through this green neoliberal identity work, CFLs were given multiple meanings: badge of 
environmentalism, easy action, big change in a small package, morally good technology, and 
progressive technology. By giving CFLs these meanings, the environmentalist was constructed 
as someone who buys good technologies, renounces bad technologies, performs small actions, 
self-educates, uses math/numbers to make decisions, and uses technology progressively. Even 
though this sometimes produced a range of “environmentalists,” from an uncommitted to a 
radical to an “ordinary person” environmentalist, these identities can be seen as variations within 
the green neoliberal identity. Even when the environmentalist was defined as a “radical” through 
these types of identity work (for example Nathan renouncing CFLs in favor of LEDs), the 
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identity was still focused on individualistic, consumptive actions: buying green technologies to 
solve environmental problems. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
I began by theorizing green neoliberal identity work as a process through which groups 
and individuals construct and claim neoliberal environmentalist subjectivities. The case study of 
a quintessential green neoliberal technology, the CFL, brought to the fore five generic processes 
of green neoliberal identity work. Similar generic processes are likely to be at work in the 
formation of other kinds of neoliberal subjects, including ethical food consumer-subjects who 
“shop for change.” These processes likely are also at work as green neoliberal subjects use and 
talk about other things they code as environmentally “good” and “bad” in their everyday lives 
including bicycles, energy-efficient refrigerators, and hybrid cars on one hand and SUVs, air 
conditioners, and garbage bins on the other. 
I close by discussing why it is useful to frame environmental subject formation in terms 
of these five generic processes of green neoliberal identity work. Instead of emphasizing the 
green neoliberal identity as a static, already-formed entity, this framing underscores how such an 
identity is a process where the environmentalist as a subject is continuously being produced and 
reproduced, accomplished and re-accomplished. The concept of green neoliberal identity work 
illuminates mechanisms through which neoliberal ideologies get translated into environmentalist 
practices: neoliberal environmental subjects form themselves through identity talk, although the 
identities available to them and the resources with which to make such identities are constrained 
by broader power relations. Emphasizing identity work also opens up new ways of thinking 
about resistance to neoliberal environmental projects through micro-processes I call critical 
green identity work. 
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Green Neoliberal Subjects Form Themselves through Talk 
The concept of green neoliberal identity work illuminates one of the ways neoliberal 
environmentalists as subjects are made: they form themselves through talk. I argue that talk is 
central to this subject formation because it renders environmental practices visible. From 
celebrating and renouncing technologies to inclusive-talk, moral math performances, and 
technological progress-talk, a great deal of the green neoliberal identity work of using CFLs to 
construct identities was talk. There are at least two reasons to be surprised about this finding. 
First, the few other studies of environmentalist identity work have emphasized that these 
identities are all about the consumption and use of things (Horton 2003; Slocum 2004b). Beyond 
studies of environmentalists, much of the research on how people use things to make selves has 
focused on clothing and appearance (Freitas et al. 1997; Gokariksel 2009). However, instead of 
the materiality of identity performances being primary, my data show that talking is at least as 
important in forming identities. A second reason to be surprised by the finding that talk was 
central to green neoliberal identity work is because other research on identity work has suggested 
that such talk is usually central for identity formation when people lack financial or other 
physical resources, as with homeless peoples’ identities (Snow and Anderson 1987). However, 
we might expect that environmentalists, who on average have access to much greater variety and 
richness of resources than the average homeless person, would be able to construct their 
identities in different ways. 
How, then, can the finding that environmentalists do so much identity talk to construct 
green neoliberal identities be explained? It is easy to dismiss the question as a methodological 
issue: that if I had spent more of my research time watching environmentalists in their private 
daily lives, rather than talking to them or observing them in public, I would have observed more 
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material constructions of their identities. To some extent, this is likely true. However, I argue 
that talk is key to the ways that neoliberal environmentalists form themselves as subjects because 
it renders environmental practices visible, which is of particular importance to green neoliberal 
identity work. Green neoliberal practices are usually individualistic, private, and consumptive 
(although not all are: for example, driving a Prius is individualistic and consumptive, but much 
more public than using a CFL). As such, it can be difficult to make identities with them except 
by talking about them. How is one to perform identity if the marker of that identity is a light bulb 
in one’s closet? How does one claim a more radical environmentalist identity if no one sees you 
buy the LED? Since identity-construction is a social process, it requires that at least part of the 
time, the identity-claimant has an audience. This does not mean all identity work is done with a 
live audience or that environmental practices do not become private habits, but only that identity 
talk can take on new importance for the making and claiming of identities where the identity 
work is overwhelmingly focused on hidden, private, individualistic, and based on consumption, 
as it is in the making of green neoliberal subjects. 
 Through this identity talk, neoliberal environmentalists form themselves as subjects. The 
concept of identity work makes the abstract forces of “enrolment” and “interpellation” more 
concrete by making visible an agent and the mechanisms of subject formation. Some of the 
important agents in these processes are environmentalists, environmental leaders, and ENGOs 
themselves, working alone and with others to construct what an environmentalist means and 
does. The mechanisms include the subcultural and individual identity work of celebrating and 
renouncing technologies, inclusive-talk, moral math performances, and technological progress-
talk. In groups and as individuals, environmentalists make themselves into neoliberal citizens by 
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claiming, defining, maintaining, repairing, contesting, and policing particular environmentalist 
identities.  
Rather than implying that environmentalists are “dupes,” this re-framing of 
environmentalist actions shows how they become invested in neoliberal identities. Because 
“environmentalist” is a moral identity, fulfilling the codes and rites of affirmation, making and 
remaking oneself into this identity has become part of enacting a “good” self (Kleinman 1996: 
5). A critical political economy analyst might ask, “What do environmentalists do for the 
neoliberal environmental project by using and promoting CFLs?” and conclude that 
environmentalists perpetuate capitalism and neoliberal ideologies through their CFL actions (a 
story for another paper). Yet it is important also to ask, as SI scholars might, “What do 
environmentalists do with the CFL?” I argue that environmentalists use the CFL to claim and 
construct their identities as green subjects. CFL use and promotions do work for capitalism and 
for people. Environmentalists make these identities, drawing on symbolic and other resources 
from ENGOs, environmental scientists, politicians, and others who, with the rise of neoliberal 
environmentalism, are increasingly producing identity-making resources that embody neoliberal 
ideals. People help produce themselves as particular kinds of subjects through identity work, but 
the identities available to them and the resources of making those identities are limited by 
broader power relations. 
Toward Critical Green Identity Work 
Scholars have called for a remaking of green subjectivities to be more resistant to 
neoliberalism (e.g., Slocum 2004a). Since identities are continuously made and remade, they can 
be constructed and performed differently. One way to do them differently is to change the 
meanings of the things involved in subject formation through different identity talk. Looking at 
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green neoliberal identity work as a process, rather than green neoliberal identities as static, 
already-complete entities, opens up new points of resistance through critical green identity work. 
I propose “critical” green identity work as a process of creating identities which resist neoliberal 
drives toward individualism, privatization, accumulation of capital by a few, and instead 
emphasizes social justice. This goes beyond calls for a more reflexive consumer-citizen (Slocum 
2004a; Johnston and Szabo 2011) and instead moves toward more conscious makings and 
continuous re-imaginings of environmentalist subjectivities by groups and individuals. It raises 
questions about whether environmentalism should be about celebrating or rejecting particular 
technologies, each person making the same changes, easy actions, applying math to small 
choices between technologies and practices, and technological progress. While I saw glimmers 
of this type of identity work in the field, often peoples’ ideas about social justice did not translate 
into identity construction. I propose two examples of critical green identity work based on the 
current study. They are not meant as exhaustive of the possibilities for critical green identity 
work, but as ways to begin to open up the production of green subjects through the concept of 
identity work. 
First, environmentalists could embrace CFLs’ current status as a central badge signifying 
commitment and re-imagine the CFL as a Trojan horse, re-making its meaning so it better resists 
neoliberal environmental projects. One way to do this would be to emphasize the question “are 
CFLs just?” in the constructions of environmentalist identities, rather than “are CFLs better for 
the environment?” At present, environmental discourses focus on the latter question, so that 
people do identity work by discussing milligrams of mercury, pounds of carbon dioxide, and life 
cycle analyses. In contrast, asking “Are CFLs just?” focuses the discussion on what kind of 
world environmentalists want for the future, begging questions of “just for whom?” and “just 
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where?” It focuses attention on considering what a just world might look like and how 
environmentalists will go about deciding whether it is just before considering questions of 
mercury and CO2. Just as Wolford (2007) showed that a reliance on “moral reasoning” could be 
an act of resistance to neoliberal logics by the MST, so could questions of the justice of 
technologies like light bulbs be resistance. It might cause environmentalists to discuss the 
political economic history of CFLs and whether they can really be considered “progress” if they 
have more of some kinds of environmental impacts than their predecessors. It might go some 
small way toward Slocum’s (2004b) reworking of Haraway (2000, page 105, cited by Slocum): 
“climate politics…ought to ‘make visible all those things that have been lost in an object,’” 
which are, in many ways, questions of social justice as well as environmental impacts. 
The second example of critical green identity work is to create alternative identity badges 
for the environmentalist. Other technological badges are the most obvious alternative. One 
interviewee, Stephanie, who was perhaps the least interested in CFLs of all the interviewees, 
spoke of wanting to invest in solar panels with her neighborhood. Cooperative purchases like this 
might be less individualistic performances of identity than CFLs and potentially unravel some of 
the business-as-usual assumptions in CFLs. But there are clearly problems with many kinds of 
techno-badges, especially because they tend to be expensive, often laced with prohibitive cultural 
capital, and, as Feenberg (1991: 65) argues, inventing new and more technologies can help 
reproduce the capitalist system. It is easy to slip from vilification of one technology to treating 
another as a savior, when really it is the social relations, in addition to environmental impacts, 
that matter. 
Staying within the light bulb box, what would happen if talk about an imaginary lighting 
technology were constructed as the badge of environmentalism? There is no reason why an 
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identity badge needs to be material, given the importance of talk to green identity work. 
Environmentalists might create a new, imaginary light bulb that represents the perfect 
technology from a sustainability standpoint: it lasts forever, uses no energy, and is made of no 
toxic or nonrenewable materials. Claiming environmentalist identities might be positioned as 
something one does by talking in certain ways about this imaginary technology. This sort of 
thought experiment can raise key questions about what it means to be an environmentalist and 
what sorts of endgames environmentalists are aiming at. Setting aside physics problems, what 
might be the economic incentives and disincentives in the capitalist system to inventing such a 
light bulb? Who would benefit and who would lose from such a commodity? Where and when? 
Such thought experiments can raise important critiques of the present system by showing the 
contradictions within hopes for “greening” capitalist systems (O’Connor 1997; Polanyi 2001). 
And those are the sorts of questions that might begin to unravel the hold neoliberal logics have 
on environmentalist imaginaries, especially given how rare it is for environmentalists to even say 
the word “capitalism.” 
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CHAPTER 3: (NOT) “AS EASY AS CHANGING A LIGHT BULB”: USING CFLS  
AS GENDERED LABOR 
Introduction 
Understanding how different types of environmental solutions affect different groups of 
people is essential to evaluating which practices and policies can best enable sustainable and 
equitable communities. I examine this question through a case study of U.S. climate activists 
who use energy efficient compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs) to fight climate change. CFLs 
are central objects of environmental activism in the home (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2; 
Slocum 2004a, 2004b). City governments use them to “bring climate change home” in efforts to 
reduce residential greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Slocum 2004). They are a symbol of energy 
efficiency (Ramroth 2008: 5) and of individual, consumptive, and easy climate mitigation 
actions. They are also promoted by utilities and light bulb manufacturers, but are a key 
technology in the claiming and performing of environmentalist identities (Thoyre dissertation 
Chapter 2). CFLs are considered superior to incandescent bulbs in energy use and GHGs 
(Ramroth 2008) and they are positioned as key stepping-stones to further acts of 
environmentalism, especially for women. For example, CFLs are positioned as such in an article 
in the women’s magazine Redbook on women becoming environmentalists and “living green” 
(Smith 2008).  
I show in this paper that we can see CFL use as gendered labor that has important 
implications for inequities. I begin by using insights from feminist political ecology and feminist 
technology studies to understand the ways that gender roles and green technologies are mutually 
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constitutive, how using CFLs might be viewed as labor, and how technologies can be gender-
coded beyond individual awareness. I use qualitative data, including in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, participant-observation, and texts, and the methods of grounded theory for analysis. 
My findings indicate a contradiction: many environmentalists portray using CFLs as the easiest 
action to mitigate climate change, yet my data show that using CFLs is more complex and 
intensive labor than this portrayal suggests, involving five phases of labor. To explain this 
contradiction, I show how CFL labor is coded as “women’s work” and thus not really as work. 
CFLs are coded as women’s work through visual representations of environmentalism, the trope 
of the “eco-mom,” and the ways many parts of labor are the types of labor that has historically 
been done by women.  
I conclude by discussing the implications of coding CFLs and other environmentalist 
actions as (devalued) women’s work, focusing on the “climate gap” whereby groups of people 
are impacted differentially by climate change and climate change mitigation efforts. Literature 
on the “climate gap” has shown how the physical impacts of climate change are worse for low-
income people, people of color, and women (Grineski et al. 2012; Parry et al. 2007; Shonkoff et 
al. 2011). Little research has analyzed the climate gap for mitigation efforts, and most of existing 
research on it has focused on policy solutions (Isla 2009; Pastor et al. 2010; Shonkoff et al. 
2009). This paper suggests that a gendered climate gap for non-policy, home-focused mitigation 
efforts may also exist. 
Theoretical Context 
There is little existing work on the gendering of climate change mitigation, but feminist 
political ecology (FPE) and feminist technology studies (FTS) provide valuable theoretical tools 
for understanding it. FPE scholars have analyzed how gender “structures access to particular 
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types of knowledge, space, resources, and social-political processes” (Nightingale 2006). Such 
research has shown how gender and the environment co-produce one another, so that “not only 
are inequalities between men and women a consequence of environmental issues, gender is a 
cause of environmental change in the sense that gender is inextricably linked to how 
environments are produced” (Nightingale 2006). FTS scholars have examined the ways that 
technologies are gendered, understanding “both technology and gender…as socially shaped” 
(Faulkner 2001). Related to FPE research, FTS scholars have shown how gender and technology 
co-produce one another, so that “gender relations can be thought of as materialized in 
technology, and masculinity and femininity in turn acquire their meaning and character through 
their enrolment and embeddedness in working machines” (Wajcman 2010). Both perspectives 
tend to view gender as a socially-constructed category (Faulkner 2001), a “process” (Nightingale 
2006), and a performance (Wajcman 2010).  
These perspectives are useful because they suggest how gender inequality matters for 
people’s interactions with the environment (e.g., Rocheleau et al. 1996) and with technologies 
(e.g., Cockburn 1997). While FPE scholars have pointed toward the home as a key site of 
resistance (Elmhirst 2011), they have also noted that this sphere, especially for green scholars, 
has been little studied (MacGregor 2006: 61). FTS scholars have likewise pointed toward the 
home as a key site of gendered labor and gender encoding (Cockburn 1997; Doorly 1999; Cowan 
1983, 1999; Faulkner 2001), although green technologies have also been understudied. Several 
insights from FPE and FTS frame the current study, suggesting that environmental activism is 
shaped by unequal social roles, that such activism can be seen as labor, and that technologies can 
be gender coded. 
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FPE scholarship in particular suggests that individuals’ environmental activism is often 
organized around gendered social roles. Women’s environmental activism is often connected to 
their social roles as mothers and caregivers (Rocheleau et al. 1996:16). For example, Bell and 
Braun (2010) found that Appalachian women were more likely than men to be environmental 
justice advocates because such activism “corresponded” with their pre-existing identities as 
mothers. Because of their roles as caregivers, women often experience more negative impacts 
from environmental degradation than men (Buckingham et al. 2005; Seager 1996: 280). For 
example, in parts of the Global South experiencing deforestation, women who have to collect 
firewood for cooking may experience this work become more intensive as logging means they 
have to walk farther to find wood (Buckingham-Hatfield 2000: 75). Women are also likely to 
have less opportunity to impact environmental conditions than men because of the “gender 
division of power to preserve, protect, change, construct, rehabilitate, and restore environments 
and to regulate the action of others” (Rocheleau et al. 1996: 10). Women’s social roles as 
mothers and household managers can make them targets of consumer-oriented environmentalism 
(Buckingham-Hatfield 2000: 76) and can mean they experience environmental activism as more 
difficult than men, as they are often dismissed as “hysterical housewives” (Seager 1996: 279). 
Research has shown that women hold fewer leadership positions in ENGOs (Buckingham and 
Kulcur 2009) and have less access to climate change decision-making bodies (Buckingham 
2010).  
FPE and FTS researchers have contextualized environmental activism (Nightingale 2006; 
MacGregor 2006) and use of home technologies (Cowan 1983, 1999; Cockburn 1997) as labor. 
In asserting that environmental activism in the home should be considered labor, MacGregor 
(2006: 69) argues that environmental scholars have rarely considered social relations the 
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domestic sphere when imagining sustainable communities (97). Buckingham and Kulcur (2009) 
suggest that campaigns aimed at increasing rates of recycling and home energy conservation can 
be framed as increasing women’s labor or “’care burden.’” Women are often the targets of 
environmental campaigns, “expected to be more diligent in adopting time-consuming green 
practices like recycling and precycling,” (MacGregor 2006: 69). Few studies have traced what 
this might mean empirically (but see Oates and McDonald 2006 for the case of recycling as 
domestic labor), although there are indications that being the targets of such campaigns may 
mean more work for women than men (MacGregor 2009).  
FTS scholarship suggests that technologies often have gender codes which are in turn 
linked to their relationships to users’ social roles and the labor that goes along with such roles. 
Cockburn (1997) alerts us to the correspondence of several binaries: technology, public, and 
masculine vs. (respectively) non-technology, private, and feminine. Technologies associated 
with work that has traditionally been done more by men or by women have also been shown to 
be gendered, especially whether they are considered “high-tech” (frequently coded masculine) or 
“soft-tech” (frequently coded feminine) (Faulkner 2001). Thus the gender coding of CFLs is not 
clear from this research, because environmentalists sometimes treat CFLs as a somewhat “high-
tech” (masculine) “new technology” that is better than old, traditional incandescent light bulbs 
(Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2), yet CFLs might also be seen as used in private to care for the 
home (like vacuums, which are usually coded feminine). Little research has examined the gender 
coding of green technologies in particular. 
These lines of FPE and FTS scholarship suggest that it is useful to examine the 
relationship between gendered social roles and the use of environmental technologies, to view 
such use as labor, and to examine the ways that green technologies can have gender codes. 
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Research showing that women’s environmental activism is often connected to being mothers and 
caregivers suggests that home climate activism (like using CFLs) may also be connected to these 
roles. Research framing home environmental activism and technology use as labor suggests it is 
fruitful to view the use of CFLs for climate change mitigation as labor. According to the work of 
FTS scholars, the gender coding of CFLs for climate change mitigation is likely to be complex 
and depend on whether environmentalists consider CFLs as “high-tech” or “soft-tech.” These 
perspectives suggest that gender and the meanings of CFLs should be assumed to be mutually 
constitutive. This work suggests that gender inequalities are partly reproduced through the use of 
technologies like CFLs, and that the meanings of the CFL as a technology used for climate 
change mitigation are (re)constructed through gender and gender inequalities.  
Research Methods 
This study is qualitative and based on the collection of multiple types of data which are 
analyzed using feminist grounded theory. A qualitative approach illuminates the meaning-
making processes involved in co-producing gender and green technologies. Analysis of in-depth 
semi-structured interviews, participant-observation, and texts uncovered a wide breadth and 
variation of CFL labors. For my purposes, it is not necessary to know how many people actually 
do each of the CFL labor phases discussed below; my research revealed that all are endorsed 
explicitly or implicitly by environmental leaders, ENGOs, and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) as the “proper” ways to use, install, and dispose of CFLs. In this 
analysis, “gendered” means more than simply whether more men or women do the labor: it also 
includes the gendered meanings and other associations of CFLs.  
Data come from semi-structured interviews and participant-observation in the 
southeastern U.S. state of North Carolina, as well as physical and online texts, all collected from 
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2010-2013. The aim of the data collection was to reach theoretical saturation (Charmaz 2006: 
96-7) rather than to form a sample representative of larger populations; I found interviewees 
through participant observation and the snowball method (Lofland et al. 2006: 43). In addition to 
being women, the targets of home environmental activism in the U.S. are often white and 
middle- to upper-class (c.f. Gibson-Wood and Wakefield 2012). Therefore, my interviews were 
mainly, although not solely, with this group of people. I interviewed 15 self-identified 
environmentalists whose reason for using CFLs were predominantly guided by a desire to help 
the environment; Table 3.1 shows their demographic characteristics. In addition, note that they 
came from six different cities and towns in central North Carolina; all but one lived in urban 
areas. 
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Table 3.1. Characteristics of Formal Interviewees. Grouped first by gender, then by employment status within  
gender, and by whether they have children within employment status; all were white. 
Name# Age Employment Has children? Other current household members 
Male Interviewees 
Bill 60s Retired Yes Female partner 
Oliver 70s Retired Yes Female partner  
Nathan 50s Retired No n/a 
Jonathan 20s Unemployed No Female partner 
Van 60s Works full-time outside the home No Female partner 
Female Interviewees 
Claire 80s Retired Yes n/a 
Sally 60s Retired Yes n/a 
Jane 50s Retired No n/a 
Linda 60s Retired Yes Male partner  
Hillary 40s Stay-at-home-parent Yes Male partner, children 
Elizabeth 40s Works part-time outside the home No Male partner 
Diane 40s Works part-time outside the home Yes Male partner, children 
Brianna 40s Works full-time outside the home Yes Male partner, children 
Sandy 50s Works full-time outside the home Yes Male partner, children 
Stephanie 30s Works full-time outside the home Yes Male partner, children 
#all interviewee names changed for anonymity. 
I complemented interview data with participant-observation and textual analysis. I 
conducted 55 hours of participant-observation at public energy and environmental events, which 
included 37 informal interviews with energy and environmental leaders (roughly equal numbers 
of women and men, all but one of whom were white). I collected websites, letters, and emails 
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from the “Big Ten”25 mainstream U.S. ENGOs (Center for Media and Democracy 2011) as well 
as websites from the 35 other members of the U.S. Climate Action Network (US CAN 2010) in 
summer 2010. Using “screen captures,” I began at the homepage of each group, clicked on the 
“issues” or “programs” tab, then on “global warming” or “climate change”; each group had some 
variation of this path. I then looked for links that indicated “what you can do” or other calls for 
the reader/viewer to act. I followed those links until they intersected with CFLs or until I found 
no evidence they talked about CFLs. I looked for patterns among the ways that CFLs and climate 
change were linked and how the actions for mitigation climate change were framed. I conducted 
a discourse analysis, looking at the “text in context,” analyzing patterns and change in the way 
lighting technologies and CFLs in particular have been linked to climate change in a qualitative, 
interpretive, and holistic way (Wodak 2008: 5-6). I focused more effort on the “Big Ten” groups 
in my analysis, since they represent much of the mainstream, national, public environmental 
discourses in the U.S. I also collected ads, coupons, magazine articles, and fliers from these 
groups and others, as well as analyzing the EPA’s website for additional data. To understand the 
gender coding of CFLs and their use in particular, I collected the first ten photos and their 
accompanying articles using Google search (200 items total; searched while signed out of google 
accounts like gmail): “mom,” “dad,” “mother,” “father,” “man,” “men,” “woman,” “women,” 
“girl scout,” and “boy scout,” plus “CFL” and “compact fluorescent.” For example, I searched, 
“’mom’ + ‘CFL’” as well as “’mom’ + ‘compact fluorescent.’” 
 Analysis followed feminist grounded theory techniques, drawing on approaches to field 
work that stress power relations and inequality (Kleinman 2007). I used “constant comparison” 
between data and theories (Charmaz 2006). The idea that using CFLs was labor and that this 
                                                
25 These 10 were Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace USA, National Audubon 
Society, National Resource Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, Nature Conservancy, Sierra Club, 
Wilderness Society, and World Wildlife Fund.	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labor was gendered emerged from the data and was explored more pointedly as collection of data 
progressed. Because of the nature of CFLs as a case study, they are likely to be a particularly 
good indicator that other types of home climate or other environmentalist actions are gendered 
labor. As I will show, CFLs are touted as one of the easiest climate/environmental actions, so if 
using CFLs is complex, an unexpected amount of labor, and gendered, it is likely that more 
difficult actions, like composting, using solar panels, and participating actively in social 
movements are also complex, gendered labors. As such, my findings are analytically 
generalizable to similar processes (Becker 1990) rather than to populations of environmentalists. 
Further research, using quantitative methods, could reveal the generalizability to populations, or 
the extent to which the findings apply to groups of environmentalists or climate activists.  
As Easy as Changing a Light Bulb? 
My data paint a contradictory picture of what is involved in switching from incandescents 
to CFLs. On one hand, many environmentalists treat using CFLs as the easiest way to mitigate 
climate change, and they use CFLs to assert that solving climate change is “as easy as changing a 
light bulb.” The message that using CFLs is both easy and involves only popping in a new bulb 
was pervasive. So I was surprised to find in interviews and through a closer reading of the 
websites of both ENGOs and the U.S. EPA that switching from incandescents to CFLs could 
involve more labor than might be expected, especially if, as many environmentalists do, 
individuals try to use CFLs to the standards of ENGOs and the EPA. In this section, I will show 
how using CFLs is portrayed as extremely easy, then how using CFLs can involve five phases of 
labor, and finally I will discuss the conditions under which environmentalists frame using CFLs 
as labor. 
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Using CFLs as Easy 
Using CFLs is often portrayed by environmentalists as the easiest action an individual 
can do to help solve climate change. Often CFLs are literally positioned as the poster-child of 
easy-environmentalism, as when the EPA’s then-administrator Stephen L. Johnson promoted a 
federal campaign to encourage CFL use, “Change a Light, Change the World” by saying, “More 
and more Americans are seeing the light – that protecting the environment, while saving money, 
is as easy as changing a light bulb,” (Carter-Jenkins 2008). Four of the Big-10 environmental 
groups’ websites underscored the ease of solving climate change through actions like switching 
to CFLs. For example, the National Wildlife Federation wrote that switching to CFLs was #2 of 
the five “easiest things to do to conserve energy” for the climate. The Nature Conservancy’s 
message about CFLs extends beyond bulbs to other actions of that kind: “small changes in our 
everyday lives can make a big difference.” The Coalition on the Environment and Jewish Life 
(COEJL) pushed for CFLs the hardest of the U.S. Climate Action Network ENGOs, writing, 
“Our message is as easy as changing a light bulb: If you could conserve energy and help stop 
global warming in one simple step, wouldn’t you? ”  
I encountered the message that using CFLs was the quintessential easy green action in 
interviews as well as in popular media. Often people spoke of CFLs as the “low-hanging fruit” of 
climate change mitigation. As director of a large climate activist group in North Carolina, Sally 
developed climate change programs beginning in the early 2000s where CFLs played a key role 
precisely because they were easy and concrete, in order to appeal to non-environmentalists:  
…in the how-to part of it we have the little checklist and things like that. You know we had like “what you 
can do” and “how much greenhouse gases each one of these saves.” We had a campaign to get people to 
reduce their energy use by 10%, their electricity, mainly, ‘cause that’s the most measurable. And I guess  
most measurable, most easily…accessed, you know, like compact fluorescent light bulbs.  
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When he appeared on the Colbert Report TV show, climate scientist Michael Oppenheimer used 
CFLs as a key example of a “small” change to fight climate change that would not require any 
big sacrifices (Colbert Report 2007). Redbook, a popular women’s magazine, ran a story on three 
women who had become environmentalists, summing it up: “A few dozen new lightbulbs, five 
recycling bins, and one bamboo floor later, their lives are a little bit greener” (Smith 2008). In 
these ways, switching to CFLs stands in for many other small actions, symbolic of climate 
change mitigation more broadly but also symbolic of a kind of environmentalism that is easy and 
accessible to everyone (see also Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2). 
Using CFLs as Five Phases of Labor 
Given these messages, I was surprised to find in interviews that using CFLs could be 
more involved than the straightforward image of just “changing a light bulb.” This level of 
involvement was especially true when people tried to reach the standards set by ENGOs and the 
EPA. My data indicate five phases of CFL labor, each with sub-phases. I have focused on work 
that is additional to using CFLs, rather than the labor of using light bulbs in general, and I 
organize them in “phases” in the rough temporal order in which they are likely to occur: 
Choosing, Getting, Installing/Turning on, Disposing of, and Cleaning up Broken CFLs. 
1. Choosing: CFLs or Incandescents?  
Even before acquiring a CFL, people spent time and energy figuring out whether CFLs or 
incandescents are better for the environment, especially self-educating and deliberating about 
two issues: mercury and “wasting.” Environmentalists consider two main sources of light bulb-
related mercury: the mercury in CFL bulbs themselves and the lower mercury emissions from 
coal-fired power plants that occur when CFLs are substituted for incandescents. In places where 
much of the electricity comes from burning coal, including North Carolina and the U.S. on 
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average, CFLs produce net less mercury than incandescents when both mercury sources are 
included in calculations (Eckelman et al. 2008). Yet many respondents were not aware of this 
type of research. Some interviewees discussed their decisions to choose CFLs over incandescents 
as a matter of doing research into the “mercury issue” to determine whether CFLs or 
incandescents were a better choice. Several interviewees also described being unsure about a 
second issue: whether to change to CFLs immediately or to wait until their old incandescents 
burned out first. Hillary, a stay-at-home-mother in her forties, described feeling like she was 
“wasting something” if she threw out working incandescents, and debated with her husband over 
the issue.  
2. Getting CFLs  
Buying CFLs often involves an additional trip to the store that is not required to buy 
incandescents. Most people in the U.S. have traditionally bought their light bulbs at grocery 
stores, which tend to carry only one brand of bulbs (Sandahl et al. 2006), reducing the time 
commitment involved in purchasing them. However, over 75 percent of the CFLs bought in the 
U.S. are bought at “big box” stores like Lowe’s, Costco, Home Depot, and Wal-Mart (U.S. DOE 
2009). Out of 13 people who told me where they bought their CFLs, nine cited big box stores or 
hardware stores, and only three had never bought them in these locations. Only one shopped for 
CFLs at grocery stores alone. While it is possible that people wait to stock up on CFLs until they 
go to these big box stores for an unrelated reason, it is likely that sometimes they are making an 
extra trip, particularly since grocery stores are a more frequent and regular shopping destination.  
Once they have gotten to the store, respondents faced a wall of CFL choices and spent 
time reading the labels on boxes of bulbs and kiosks, looking for particular characteristics. Many 
seek out ENERGY STAR-labeled CFLs (which are certified energy efficiency by the U.S. 
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federal government), yet there were 5,695 certified models of CFLs available in the U.S. and 
Canada in June 2013 (U.S. EPA 2013), a year after the U.S. implemented the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 that effectively phased out incandescents in favor of 
bulbs like CFLs. Given this diversity, the EPA’s website recommends a mobile app for picking 
out the best CFL (U.S. EPA N.D.(b)) as well as a full-page chart directing the reader to pick the 
bulbs based on socket type, color temperature, quantity of light, and fixture type (U.S. EPA 
N.D.(a)). It was not enough, for many, simply to read the packages of CFLs at the store, as 
people said they needed extra knowledge to know what to look for; Hillary called this “knowing 
how to read a box.” As directed by the EPA as well as ENGOs, climate activists teach 
themselves about how to convert watts to lumens as well as lighting temperature in degrees 
Kelvin to know how to pick the right CFL when they get to the store. For example, Jane, a retiree 
in her fifties, held up a box of CFLs during our interview and narrated her thought process for 
picking it out at the store:  
I just read the back of it, and I thought, “it’s ENERGY STAR partner, that sounds good... They’re telling 
me how much I’m going to save here…in lumens, and that seemed a pretty good thing.” So, [reading out 
loud:] “for 13 watts save 250 lumens, replaces 60 watts, 350 lumens.” You know, that looked pretty good 
to me. And [reading:] “10,000 hours, lasts 9 years, now smaller than ever.” I thought, “well, that looks like 
a pretty good deal. And they’ll fit into all my light fixtures and they won’t stick out.” So that’s how I  
bought this one. 
Picking up on this extra effort required for CFLs, big box stores have begun to provide kiosks 
comparing the wide variety of different kinds of CFLs. 
3. Installing and Turning on CFLs 
On the surface, the question of where people will install CFLs in their homes seems 
straightforward; wouldn’t climate activists want to replace all incandescent bulbs to maximize 
their energy savings? However, both ENGOs and interviewees said that CFLs should not be used 
everywhere; instead, installing them involves evaluating each location for its suitability. 
Greenpeace, for example, tells people to use CFLs “in all lamps that are used for 30 minutes a 
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day or more.” Mary, director of an ENGO in her forties, echoed this idea, telling me she thought 
it was better to use incandescents where lights would be on only briefly, because “CFLs use all 
their energy up-front” when they are turned on, whereas incandescents use it evenly. Jonathan, 
an environmental leader in his twenties, said he switched from CFLs back to incandescents in his 
bathroom after he learned CFLs burn out quickly when frequently turned on and off. 
Related to what they had learned about the energy consumption patterns of CFLs, some 
environmentalists told me about particular CFL-using habits they had developed. Before he 
switched his bathroom lights back to incandescent bulbs, Jonathan told me he always tried to use 
the hallway light (an incandescent) when going to the bathroom in the middle of the night, to 
avoid switching the bathroom CFLs on and off too much. Claire, a retiree in her seventies, 
described how she purposefully turns on only CFL-lit lamps in her apartment; she remembered 
which lights were “good” to turn on and only used those, since she had not replaced all her bulbs 
with CFLs. In these ways, using CFLs can even shape the ways people travel through the spaces 
of their homes. 
4. Disposing of CFLs 
After a CFL burns out or breaks, there is the labor of getting it out of people’s homes 
because of the mercury in the bulbs. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) explains: “All 
fluorescent lights contain trace amounts of mercury… When they burn out years down the road, 
recycle them. Visit Recycleabulb [a link] or Earth911 [a link] to find your closest recycling 
location.” Respondents frequently searched out additional information on how to dispose of 
CFLs to avoid the mercury they contain. EDF’s idea that CFLs can be recycled is misleading 
because they are not supposed to be placed in curbside recycling bins. Instead, ENGOs and 
interviewees say CFLs are supposed to be taken either to special disposal receptacles located at 
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some big box stores or to hazardous waste collection points in landfills. Like the trip to the store 
to buy the bulbs, it is possible that this does not involve an extra car trip. For example, some 
interviewees told me they saved up burned-out CFLs along with paint and batteries to take them 
all at once to the landfill. Jane, for example, told me that because she does not own a car, she 
saved up spent CFLs and then got a ride with somebody to the dump. When she got there, she 
found out that they are only open a few days a week during particular hours, so she had to get 
another ride from someone on a different day. It was most common for interviewees to talk of 
taking their spent bulbs to the hazardous waste site at the dump rather than to the big box stores’ 
collection receptacles. 
5. Cleaning Up Broken CFLs 
ENGOs’ websites and several interviewees directed me to the EPA’s website as their 
source for knowledge about what to do if a CFL breaks. The EPA’s (2012) instructions are a 3-
page single-spaced entirely-text document “designed,” the EPA writes, “to be useful to the 
general public.” The instructions include detailed suggestions to screw in the bulb in particular 
ways to avoid breaking it, and steps for cleaning up in the event of a break, including picking up 
the shards and glass powder from carpeted vs. “hard” surfaces, needing to “air out the room” for 
several hours after the break, and cleaning those surfaces differently in routine housecleaning 
even days or weeks after the break. Although no one I interviewed said they did everything the 
EPA instructed, I observed how involved even an abbreviated clean-up can be when Hillary 
accidentally dropped a CFL during our interview: 
Hillary: Crap! …we’re not even supposed to be in here when you break that bulb. 
Interviewer: What are we supposed to do? 
Hillary: Well, I’m guessing you already know, but let me tell you what I read. We’re not supposed to be in 
the room for the next hour. Particularly if you’re pregnant or you’re a child. Then you’re supposed to put 
rubber gloves on, put it into a sealed bag, supposed to duct-tape up the pieces, so you don’t touch it, put 
that in the bag, and come back and mop it, put that in the bag, and throw it out, not even in your garbage, 
you’re supposed to take it to- 
Interviewer: Do you want to go someplace else? 
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Hillary: Well, I mean, it’s not much of a crisis, I’ve broke many before and I haven’t-, but um, why don’t I  
just clean it up, if you don’t mind. 
In addition to these steps Hillary performed, the necessity of taking the CFLs to the dump in the 
first place puts people at risk of having CFLs break during storage. For example, Sally, former 
director of an ENGO in her sixties, described how she had saved up CFLs and put them in a box 
in her car, but then a car mechanic accidentally “slid my seat back and smashed all of them.” She 
then had to clean her car, a process not specified by the EPA instruction sheet. 
When Using CFLs is Considered Work 
 What are the conditions under which people treat using CFLs and doing similar home 
environmentalist actions (including other actions interviewees identified as “environmentalist” 
such as recycling, composting, buying clothing from a thrift store, etc.) as labor? Although only 
part of the explanation for this contradiction between CFLs-as-easy and CFLs-as-labor, in a 
handful of instances people did talk about CFLs as labor. They primarily did this to accomplish 
particular kinds of identity work. Broadly, identity work refers to efforts to make and claim 
identities through patterns of talk, dress, appearance, and other acts (Schwalbe and Mason-
Schrock 1996; Hunt and Benford 1994; Snow and Anderson 1987). Other research has shown 
that people use CFLs to do the identity work of making and claiming neoliberal environmentalist 
identities (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2). Scholars have distinguished subcultural from 
individual identity work, since identities can be collective (Smith 2013) or personal (Snow and 
Anderson 1987).  
 Talk of the labor of using CFLs could accomplish two kinds of identity work for people 
that are also contradictory. Some people talked about using CFLs (and other environmentalist 
actions) as labor when they were distinguishing themselves from non-environmentalists through 
Othering processes (Schwalbe et al. 2000) that allowed them to claim personal moral identities 
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(Kleinman 1996: 5). For example, when I labeled her recycling, composting, walking to work, 
using CFLs, and other environmentalist actions as “work” and “like chores,” Brianna appeared 
uncomfortable, her face looked skeptical:  
I guess, “yes,” but it’s not. If you really had to measure time, the time that’s spent on that work, it seems 
like it’d be pretty small. But! I don’t even know if it’s time that people don’t want to do it. I think it’s just 
pure lazy…or that it’s just maybe not realizing that there’s a real reason to do it, that it makes any  
difference. 
The idea that failing to use CFLs meant one was lazy was a common sentiment among 
interviewees. Such interviewees also attributed moral attributes to themselves when they, at 
times, expressed guilt when explaining why they were not doing as many environmentalist 
actions as they said they thought they should. Such individual identity work frames using CFLs 
as work by positioning environmentalists as good people who are willing to expend the 
necessary efforts of acting morally. 
Environmentalists also did subcultural identity work by framing environmentalism as an 
identity for everyone in their talk about CFLs as work. Other research (Thoyre dissertation 
Chapter 2) has shown that through such “inclusive-talk,” people are able to narrate an 
environmentalism that is so easy that it is accessible to everyone. Peoples’ framing of CFLs as 
extremely easy to use is part of this inclusive talk. Yet there is also some room for talking about 
using CFLs as labor within this narrative, but only by minimizing the labor as insignificant when 
compared with the benefits of such efforts. For example, Oliver, a retiree in his 70s, replied to 
my remark that many climate change mitigation actions seem like work by saying, “It’s work, 
but it has positive benefits that outweigh negative work parts even for individuals,” noting that, 
for example, people get to know their neighbors better by using public transit. Such minimizing 
of CFL labor can be seen as a rhetorical strategy for environmentalists, who may worry that if 
people think it is too hard to be an environmentalist, they will not do any environmentalist 
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actions. However, this attitude implies that it is, in fact, work to do home environmentalism. This 
minimizing of the labor involved is closely tied to my argument that using CFLs is coded as 
women’s work, and thus as not really work at all, which I turn to next.  
Coding CFL Labor as Women’s Work 
How can we explain the ways that using CFLs can be a complex and involved process yet 
is treated as simple, as easy as “changing a light bulb”? This contradiction can be explained by 
understanding how using CFLs is coded as women’s work, and therefore as not really labor. 
Being coded as women’s work does not necessarily mean that women are the only ones 
performing CFL labor or even that they are performing the majority of each CFL labor phase. 
Instead, my data show how the coding of CFL use as women’s labor means that using CFLs (and 
doing other types of home environmental work) is dismissed as non-work similar to how other 
types of labor that have historically been coded as women’s work are dismissed as unvaluable. 
Using CFLs has been coded as women’s work through visual representations of 
environmentalism, through the trope of the eco-mom, and through the ways the types of labor 
involved are the kind of work traditionally associated with women.  
Visual Representations and Cultural Tropes 
Using CFLs is coded as women’s work through visual representations of 
environmentalism. For example, the Sierra Club (2008) created an image re-envisioning “Rosie 
the Riveter,” icon of feminism and working women, holding up a CFL as a heroic symbol of 
climate change activism, saying “We can do it” over the text “Forging a clean energy future.” In 
photos of scouts and CFLs, I found more than twice as many images of girl scouts promoting 
CFLs than boy scouts (14 to 6), suggesting that girls are more commonly socialized into the role 
of preventing climate change via domestic labor. For example, searching for “girl scout” + 
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“compact fluorescent,” I found an image used by the Northern California chapter of the Girl 
Scouts featuring a cartoon girl holding up a CFL with a large grin on her face, over the text, 
“Change a light bulb, change the world” (Ryan 2007). In images of mothers and fathers and 
CFLs, I found mothers were more commonly invoked as using CFLs to help the environment 
than fathers (5 to 2). In the articles attached to these photos, mothers were more likely to speak to 
the reader about the importance of using CFLs, whereas “father” was commonly invoked when 
referencing the male inventor of the CFL.  
CFLs are also coded as women’s work through the trope of the eco-mom. Other 
researchers have shown how women’s environmentalism is often associated with the trope of the 
“earth mother” where women are tasked with caring for the environment as part of their 
mothering duties (MacGregor 2009). In my research, eco-moms were more likely to be described 
as the users of CFLs than environmentally-minded fathers. For example, the national U.S. 
nonprofit EcoMom Alliance, an “organization nurturing, connecting, and empowering mothers 
to create a healthy and sustainable world” (EcoMom Alliance 2013) was founded out of a 
moment of mothers sharing stories about CFLs: 
After Kimberley Danek Pinkson coproduced an event for World Environment Day in 2006, she was 
touched to hear that it had inspired a friend to switch out her incandescent lightbulbs for fluorescent ones. 
“We were on a moms picnic, and everyone started sharing planet-saving tips,” Pinkson says. “I suddenly 
realized the power moms have to effect global change.” So Pinkson started the EcoMom Alliance. (Palmer  
2013) 
Similarly, articles in Redbook (Smith 2008) and the New York Times (Brown 2008) profile 
mothers who use CFLs as key environmental actions motivated by their children’s health and 
futures, but no such articles exist for “eco-dads.” 
CFL Labor as the Type of Labor Typically Done by Women 
The types of labor embodied by the five phases of CFL work are the types of labor that 
have traditionally been done by women, with several notable exceptions. Women in the U.S. 
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spend more time per day cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping, doing laundry, and interior 
decorating, while men tend to do more outdoor care and interior repairs (UNDP 2007: 342; U.S. 
BLS 2012; Newport 2008). In general in the U.S., women’s extra work compared to men due to 
having larger housework duties on top of full time jobs has been termed the “second shift” and it 
was estimated in the 1980s as about an extra month of labor per year (Hochschild 2012: 3-4). 
Recent analyses have suggested this extra labor persists, although it may have shrunk (Milkie et 
al. 2009). Recent surveys confirm Hochschild’s (2012: 8-9) findings that women’s domestic 
tasks tend to be ongoing and daily (for example, food preparation, shopping, laundry), while 
men’s tend to occur more infrequently and with greater control over timing (for example, lawn 
care or home repair).  
Here I organize the subphases of CFL labor according to the type of work, since some of 
the types of work (e.g., self-education) happen in several (temporally-organized) phases. In the 
five phases of CFL labor, there are six general types of labor, which indicate how CFL labor is 
likely to fit into existing patterns of domestic divisions of labor: three are most likely done by 
women (cleaning, ongoing chores, self-education); one is likely done by men (shopping); and 
two are unclear based on existing divisions of labor (disposal, installing). 
Cleaning. Women have been shown in the U.S. to do more housecleaning than their male 
partners (Newport 2008; U.S. BLS 2012) and Hochschild (2012: 9) found that women do “two-
thirds more of the daily jobs at home, like cooking and cleaning.” This suggests that cleaning up 
from a broken CFL is more likely to be done by women. 
Ongoing chores. Women have been shown to do more ongoing household chores than 
men; Hochschild (2012: 8) argued that the women she studied “felt more responsible for the 
home” and “kept track of doctor’s appointments, arranged playdates, and kept up with relatives” 
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more than their male partners. To the extent that using CFLs involves a similar kind of ongoing 
tasks, such as deciding which light bulbs to use in which locations, turning on certain lights and 
not others, and using CFLs for certain lengths of time, these types of labor are most likely done 
by women. Such “headwork” or “household management,” which is more often done by women 
(U.S. BLS 2012), is often coded as not really labor in ways similar to how CFL tasks are seen as 
not work. For example, when I suggested that home environmental tasks like changing to CFLs 
was a lot of effort, Hillary paused a beat, then told me, “I don’t know if it takes-. Like, it takes 
more of an intention than maybe more energy.” Similarly, a woman wrote to Redbook, “going 
green isn’t difficult – it just requires a change in thinking” (Letters 2008).  
Self-Education. Other studies have shown that women are more knowledgeable and 
worried about climate change than men (McCright 2010), and that women inform others, 
“propose,” and “decide” about recycling tasks more than men (Meneses and Palacio 2005). This 
suggests that self-education to choose whether to use CFLs, to bone up on information before 
picking CFLs out at the store, and about CFL disposal is likely to be part of women’s domestic 
division of labor. Women across the globe have been shown to be more involved with 
environmental issues that impact family health (Seager 1996: 276) and mothers have been shown 
to do more healthcare work for their families than fathers (HMSO 1996, cited in Buckingham-
Hatfield 2000), suggesting that self-education about clean-up of CFLs is likely to be done more 
by women. To the extent that they do buy CFLs at the store (see below), women are also more 
likely to spend time reading the light bulb labels at the store, as Furlow and Knott (2009) found 
that women more commonly “read and use” labels of recycled content and “no CFCs” content 
more than men at the store.  
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Shopping. Women more commonly do the household shopping for groceries and other 
goods (Newport 2008; Buckingham-Hatfield 2000), but more than three-quarters of CFLs bought 
in the U.S. are bought at big box stores (U.S. DOE 2009), where men are more likely to shop 
than women (WI Focus on Energy 2009). Another study has suggested that men living alone buy 
more CFLs than women living alone26 (Reid 2008). Thus the labor of traveling to a home 
improvement store, as well as the time spent at the store picking out the right CFL, is more likely 
to be done by men.  
Disposal. It is unclear whether men or women, according to the traditional divisions of 
home labor, are more likely to dispose of CFLs when they have broken or burned out. Such 
disposal is likely to involve an extra trip to landfill. Some research suggests that women are more 
likely than men to take recycling (Oates and McDonald 2006) and e-waste (Saphores et al. 2006) 
to the landfill. However, other data on trips to the landfill for recycling is more mixed (Meneses 
and Palacio 2005) and my interviews suggest that men may be more likely to do this labor.  
Installing CFLs. According to traditional divisions of labor, it is unclear whether CFL 
installation is more likely to be done by women or men, because it is unclear whether such 
installation is viewed more as home decorating, which women do more of (Newport 2008), or 
home repairs, of which men do more (U.S. BLS 2012).  
The gendering of CFL labor is thus complex, with women and men likely doing different 
parts of each phase, which makes sense given that CFLs are high-tech (more commonly coded 
masculine) but used in homes as a type of “care-work” (more commonly coded feminine). 
However, pre-existing patterns in the domestic divisions of labor suggest that women do more 
CFL labor tasks than men, because cleaning, ongoing chores, and self-education are labor types 
more commonly done by women and coded as women’s work. However, the types of labor more 
                                                
26 Data was not available on who buys them in households of more than one person.	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commonly done by men, like shopping for CFLs, may be more time-intensive depending on the 
local infrastructure and geography; for example, the extra trip to the store may be a longer trip 
for households located in rural areas when compared to those in urban areas, and the  majority of 
this study’s participants lived in urban areas. 
Women’s Work Coded as Not Work 
Historically, labor that is associated with women has been less valued and deemed “not 
work.” Many kinds of household labor, from childcare to cooking, have historically been labeled 
“women’s work” (especially when done by middle- and upper-class white women) and therefore 
coded as non-work (Giminez 1990: 26). Federici (2009) has traced the assigning of household 
labor to women, and labor outside the home to men, to the beginnings of capitalism (53), where 
“work that women did at home was treated as non-work and worthless” whether it was done “for 
a family or to make commodities to sell to others” (51).  
Similarly, the limited research done on the gendering of home environmentalist 
technologies suggests that the labor aspects of using such technologies is left out because such 
work, typically associated with women, is not seen as labor. Berg (1999: 309) shows that energy-
efficient “smart homes” are often designed without conceiving of the labor that goes on in homes 
at all. By imagining green technologies as “outside” gender relations, environmentalists may 
implicitly imagine CFL users as men, as have the designers of the smart house. Cockburn (1997) 
points out that technology is often assumed to be “environmental nemesis or salvation” but 
usually “anything but housework,” so that environmentalism that happens in the home is often 
devalued in the same ways as other types of housework dismissed as non-technology.  
There is also a long history where new home technologies are invented and touted as 
“labor-saving” and easy to use, but which in practice actually increase women’s labor, a 
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phenomenon an historian of domestic technologies Cowan (1983; 1999) called “more work for 
mother.” Cowan shows how as supposedly labor-saving appliances such as electric irons and 
washing machines were invented and adopted by 1920s U.S. housewives, the standards for 
cleanliness were raised at the same time (1999: 284). The result of these labor-saving 
technologies was an increase in the time women spent cleaning clothes (1983). As another 
example, the shift from cleaning rugs by hand to using a vacuum cleaner involved less labor 
done by men and children, but more frequent, solitary labor done by women (1983: 12).  
Implications 
There are several implications of the ways that CFL labor has been coded as women’s 
work and thus as simple non-work. When environmental movements promote solutions to 
climate change without examining how these solutions can reproduce gender inequalities, they 
can reflect and reproduce those inequalities. Work can be fulfilling, a central component to 
modern identities, and will be part of building more sustainable communities, but there are 
consequences when a certain kind of work, such as home climate activism, becomes coded as the 
kind of work done by a particular group of people - women. 
A growing body of literature on the “climate gap” examines how the physical impacts of 
climate change are worse for low-income people, people of color, and women (Grineski et al. 
2012; Parry et al. 2007; Shonkoff et al. 2011). The climate gap for mitigation is less well 
understood, and has focused on policy solutions (Isla 2009; Pastor et al. 2010; Shonkoff et al. 
2009). The findings of the current research suggest that a gendered climate gap for non-policy, 
home-focused mitigation efforts may exist. This can occur through women doing more of the 
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labor of producing a healthy atmosphere27, through the particular ways that devalued labor can 
pose challenges to activists with fewer resources, and through the ways such devalued labor can 
hide ongoing shifts in who is considered responsible for producing a healthy atmosphere. 
Although it may seem that using CFLs, even given all five phases of labor, is not likely to 
constitute an enormous quantity of time and effort by individuals, it is important to remember 
that CFLs are treated as the lowest of the low-hanging fruit of climate change mitigation. If even 
such an “easy” action constitutes work for women, the implications are likely to be more 
substantial for other actions already considered more difficult (such as doing laundry in a more 
environmentally-friendly way by line-drying clothing).  
More Work for Women? 
If environmentalist discourses become translated into practices such as CFL labor 
without simultaneously resisting existing gender inequalities, environmentalists may reproduce 
those inequalities by producing a “climate gap” whereby women do more of the labor of 
producing a healthy atmosphere than men. In this way, using CFLs may amount to “more eco-
work for mother” by extending the scope of the second shift of labor for female heterosexual 
partners and mothers. As others have shown, in dual-income U.S. households, women already do 
more labor overall than men because of the “second shift” of housework (Hochschild 2012). 
Although I do not have the quantitative data to definitively show that women are spending much 
more time than men in using CFLs, my data suggest that using CFLs is strongly coded as 
women’s work, and include multiple phases of labor that, because they are similar to other types 
of labor more often done by women, are likely done more by women. This can increase women’s 
                                                
27 Other types of consumptive labor – beyond home environmental labor - may also be increasing simultaneously, as 
when the choices of breakfast cereals and the demands to read the labels to follow strict diets (gluten-free or Atkin’s, 
for example) can increase the time spent shopping. 
 80 
 
already-larger “care burden” (Buckingham and Kulcur 2009), especially in combination with 
other, more extensive environmental tasks. 
Given that using CFLs is promoted as one of the easiest and most straightforward of 
environmentalist actions, it is likely that other actions already deemed more difficult will involve 
more labor than using CFLs and that this labor will also be gendered. For example, women likely 
will be the ones responsible for line-drying laundry instead of using energy-intensive dryers as 
well as shopping for local/organic foods, both eco-friendly tasks some environmentalists 
promote. It is likely that these eco-tasks are more complex than they would appear at first glance, 
as using CFLs was surprisingly complex. Gardner and Stern (2008) calculated a “short list” of 
individual actions that can most reduce U.S. GHGs. Applying the lessons of this study to theirs, 
we might ask, for example, who is most likely to be responsible for learning about and then 
doing the daily, ongoing (i.e., more likely women’s) household chore of changing one’s 
thermostat temperature based on the time of day and season? Given that women are more likely 
to do laundry, their suggestion to wash clothes with certain settings is likely to become women’s 
responsibility. On the other hand, their suggestions for one-time tasks such as weather-stripping 
and installing insulation are more likely to be done by men, because these are the type of labor 
more commonly done by men. Further research is needed to understand the gendered 
implications of these environmental actions, because even the simplest action - changing one’s 
bulbs to CFLs - turns out to have at least five phases of labor.  
Supermom Anxiety 
 Coding CFL labor as easy non-work when it constitutes more complex labor can pose 
challenges to activists with fewer resources. Other research (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2) has 
shown that using CFLs can be a crucial “badge” of environmentalism, a way that many people 
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announce their identities as environmentalists. However, if using CFLs is work, it may not be as 
easy for everyone to do such identity work. People with less time and money may find it difficult 
to signal their identities in this way. 
Given their already-larger burden of housework and childcare overall than men (and the 
fact that women are paid less on average than men for the same jobs), women are likely to have 
greater trouble finding the resources in time, money, and energy to perform CFL labor. I found 
evidence of this in my research. For example, I separately interviewed two working, married 
mothers who were friends with each other. The first, Stephanie, is active in local environmental 
and other politics in addition to doing a wide range of home environmental practices. Stephanie 
recommended I interview Brianna as another person she knew who did energy-saving practices 
in her home. When I arrived at Brianna’s house, I mentioned that Stephanie had recommended 
her for the interview. Brianna expressed anxiety, saying almost apologetically, “I don’t know if 
we do energy efficient things, especially compared to Steph. She’s much more of an activist kind 
of person. We’re much more like fly-by-the-seat of our pants and do what we can.” Brianna then 
told me about how, for health and environmental reasons, she recycles, composts, gardens, shops 
local, takes public transit to work, insulated her house, buys bulk, and other actions, in addition 
to working full-time with two small children. Over the course of the interview, Brianna 
repeatedly expressed anxiety over how many environmental actions she was unable to do 
because she was too busy or did not have enough money.  
We can see such performances of anxiety in part as identity work, a way that Brianna is 
making up for what she perceives as a shortfall in her identity as an environmentalist. For an 
environmentalist stretched to the limits of her time and energy by parenthood, a full-time job, 
and living at the poverty line, using emotions to perform identity work can be seen as one way 
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for Brianna to make up for a lack of other resources she could devote to shoring up her 
environmentalist identity. But Brianna’s anxiety-talk, which was not only a performance (as 
identity work is rarely a “mere” performance) also suggests the toll that not being able to 
accomplish what she perceives as the appropriate amount of environmentalist labor can take. 
Although race and class were not the focus of this study, we might ask what the 
implications of these findings are for other poor women and for women of color. It was difficult 
to even find research participants who worked full-time and were primary caregivers, suggesting 
that being an environmentalist requires available time and may be an accomplishment available 
only to those with certain class privileges. The eco-mom has come to signify a type of morally 
good mother and is coded white and upper-middle-class. But if the moral goodness of 
motherhood is based on ever-expanding duties, it can make it even harder for women already at 
the margins to properly (according to gendered environmentalist standards) perform motherhood. 
Already, marginalized women are least able to avoid chores that put them at risk for 
environmental toxins and degradation (Buckingham-Hatfield: 80).  
Narratives of Climate Change Responsibility 
 Devaluing the labor of using CFLs can also hide ongoing potentially problematic shifts in 
who is considered responsible for producing a healthy atmosphere. The gendering of CFL labor 
fits into a larger context of climate change mitigation discourses where private, individualistic, 
household-scale, consumptive actions are privileged by environmentalists over other kinds of 
solutions (Rutland and Aylett 2008; Slocum 2004a; Hobson 2013; Maniates 2002). These 
environmentalist emphases can reproduce misleading narratives of climate change responsibility, 
re-inscribing sexist ideas about how environmental problems should be solved. It can imply that 
women and households are to blame for environmental problems like climate change, following 
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a long history of blaming and subsequently seeking to get women to solve social problems 
domestically (e.g., Federici 2009). The photos of scouts and CFLs often portrayed girls and 
women as the workhorses of environmentalism, as the objects that should be moved in the right 
direction to solve climate change, whereas boys and men are portrayed as the ones who think, 
decide, and learn about solutions. Similarly, women are often blamed for environmental 
problems in overpopulation arguments in racialized, classed ways (Brownhill and Turner 2009: 
231).  
Yet in practice, women and households are not the primary agents of climate change. In 
the U.S., the residential sector is responsible for 17.6 percent of GHG emissions, while industry 
is 29.0 percent, transportation 27.6 percent, and the commercial sector 18.0 percent (based on 
data from U.S. EPA 2011, p. 1928). Men are far more likely to be the decision-makers within 
industries, governments, and other institutions that are more responsible for these sectors than 
households (Buckingham 2010), and they are thus, at present, more able to make a difference 
than households (Spitzner 2009). 
This research suggests the importance of making the labor of performing home climate 
activism visible when evaluating the merits of various climate change practices and policies. The 
gendered labor involved in environmental solutions is not usually a part of these discussions. For 
example, the designers of the energy-efficient smart house tended to view users of their 
technology as male by ignoring housework and the gendering of domestic space (Berg 1999: 
309). MacGregor (2006: 103) has noted a tendency among environmentalists to focus on 
“nostalgia for the self-reliant and self-managing community” of the past, a fictive past which we 
might imagine includes housewives (or servants) for every environmentalist who can do the 
labor of this self-reliance. Given the growing popularity of do-it-yourself (DIY) 
                                                
28 Figures include electricity but not the U.S. territories.	  
 84 
 
environmentalism, the fact that self-reliance in the form of DIY energy efficiency means more 
work for women indicates that there are similarly gendered implications for other types of 
actions. Thus a key step toward revaluing green domestic labor is re-coding these tasks as labor 
and acknowledging this labor is gendered. 
Conclusions 
In this research, I found that using CFLs to mitigate climate change is often portrayed by 
environmentalists as “easy as changing a light bulb,” yet it can involve multiple types of labor, 
suggesting that using CFLs is not always as easy as it is portrayed. To understand this apparent 
contradiction, I looked to the ways such labor is gendered. My data suggest that using CFLs is 
coded as women’s work in visual representations of environmentalism, in tropes of the eco-
mom, and in the ways that many CFL tasks are the types of labor that are performed more by 
women than by men in current domestic divisions of labor. The ways using CFLs is coded as 
women’s work help explain why CFL labor is dismissed as not really labor at all: because 
women’s work has historically been unvalued and not counted as “real” labor. I suggested 
several implications of this work here, focusing on the ways that such home environmentalist 
activism may (re)produce a gender “climate gap.” Although it may seem that using CFLs, even 
given all five phases of labor, is not likely to constitute an enormous quantity of time and effort 
by individuals, it is important to remember that CFLs are treated as the lowest of the low-
hanging fruit of climate change mitigation, so if even such an easy action constitutes gendered 
labor, the implications are likely to be more substantial for other actions that are already 
considered more difficult. 
 In NC and other places, two recent political economic changes might appear to affect 
CFL labor, but are unlikely to have changed the fact that CFLs do involve more labor than just 
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“changing a light bulb.” First, starting in 2012, the U.S. joined Australia and the EU (Di Maria et 
al. 2010) in passing a federal law, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) (U.S. 
Congress 2007 HR 6/S. 1419) that effectively phases out energy-inefficient light bulbs like 
incandescents. While many have perceived this law as a ban on incandescents and a requirement 
that everyone use CFLs, there are actually a number of models of incandescents that have 
emerged on the market that meet the standards of EISA, and people also can choose to buy 
LEDs, halogens, and other non-CFL bulbs. Thus it is not likely that this law has substantially 
reduced the labor involved in using CFLs, since people are still making choices between CFLs 
and other bulbs; between the thousands of models of ENERGY STAR-certified CFL models; 
traveling to big box stores to buy CFLs; and facing the same disposal and clean-up challenges.  
 A change that is more likely to have altered CFL labor has been the massive giveaways 
of CFLs that electricity companies in NC have initiated to meet the requirements of a statewide 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard implemented in 2007 (S.L. 2007-
397; Duke Energy 2011; RAP 2010). These giveaways have likely reduced the CFL labor 
involved in traveling to the store to buy CFLs as well as choosing which kind of CFL to use, 
because electricity companies are doing this labor for customers. However, the labor of CFL 
disposal, use, and cleanup remains. Thus the remaining labor is the kind of work that is likely 
done more by women, while the averted labor is the type likely done more by men. This suggests 
that the parts of CFL work typically done by women remains invisible in these programs, and we 
might see such programs as another way of valuing labor performed by men but not by women. 
In addition, several of the interviewees in this study told me they had been offered CFLs from 
their electricity company, yet they were still traveling to the store to buy their own CFLs, either 
to supplement the number of CFLs they got from their electric utility or because they had chosen 
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not to accept the CFLs the utility had given them because they were skeptical of the utility’s 
intentions. 
 Further research in several directions would be especially fruitful. It would be useful to 
know the extent to which other home environmentalist actions, from installing insulation to 
gardening to laundry to dishwashing to turning out one’s lights and more are also gendered and 
in what ways. Surveys could determine this, but would be strongest if they began with a 
qualitative exploration of the phases of these different actions, given that the CFL study has 
shown that these phases are likely to be complex and sometimes unexpected. Further research to 
understand the ways that the climate gap for home mitigation efforts is also racialized and 
classed are likely to uncover concrete ways that particular environmentalist actions can 
reproduce, but also perhaps resist, other types of inequalities in addition to gender.  
Further research could measure the time it takes to use CFLs (although parts may be very 
difficult to quantify, given that some of the labor is invisible “headwork”) and determine the 
extent to which different groups do it. In particular, it would be useful to understand differences 
in the time and effort spent on different parts of CFL labor and how these differences have 
geographic components. For example, while the majority of CFL labor efforts for people living 
in cities may be centered on cleaning up after broken bulbs and self-education (labor likely done 
more by women), in rural areas, where distances traveled to buy and dispose of bulbs may be 
much longer, CFL labor efforts may be dominated by tasks more commonly done by men. The 
gendering of even such a simple task as changing a light bulb is more complex than it appears on 
the surface. 
 
 
 87 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: “ENERGY EFFICIENCY AS A RELIABLE, VALUABLE  
RESOURCE”: NEOLIBERALIZING NEGAWATTS IN NORTH CAROLINA 
Introduction 
Prior to 2007, North Carolina households who used home energy-saving technologies 
like compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs) created value for themselves mainly in the form of 
lowered electricity bills. Because of the regulatory structure of electricity markets in the U.S., 
those households’ electricity providers largely experienced this creation of value as a temporary 
loss in sales, which the utility could recover by increasing prices for all customers within a few 
years. Yet with the passage of NC’s Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio 
Standard (REPS) in 2007, a struggle arose over who benefits from and controls saved energy. By 
2009, many North Carolinians began to receive energy-saving technologies like CFLs from their 
electricity providers and to pay a higher price for all their electricity to compensate those utilities 
for encouraging such conservation. How did these electricity companies gain control over the 
value of this energy efficiency? Using the contested implementation of the energy efficiency 
portions of REPS as a key political arena where this struggle played out, I will show how 
shareholder-owned electricity companies used environmental governance to redefine and 
appropriate the value of energy efficiency in a way that expanded their accumulation of profits. 
 This research focuses on NC’s political and economic context for several reasons. NC’s 
REPS policy, like many other renewable portfolio standards across the U.S., was proposed in 
part to mitigate climate change (S.L. 2007-397). NC has become a hotbed of energy and climate 
activism in the Southeastern U.S., where its REPS has frequently been touted as the first in the 
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Southeastern U.S. (NC Energy Policy Council 2010). Yet promoting energy efficiency in NC is 
thought of as particularly challenging because electricity consumption per capita is high, 
electricity prices are low, and the population is growing (Brown et al. 2012). I focus in particular 
on the Investor-Owned Utility (IOU), Duke Energy, which is now the largest electricity company 
in the nation and headquartered in Charlotte, NC; Duke Energy produces electricity for the 
majority of NC’s residents (NC Energy Policy Council 2013). The implementation of energy 
efficiency programs by utilities in NC can be seen as test cases for other states29. Duke Energy 
has given away tens of millions of energy-efficient compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs) to 
residential customers (e.g., Duke Energy 2011) as part of these programs (RAP 2010). I use the 
case of CFLs as an example throughout this paper because they are a symbol of energy 
efficiency more broadly (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2) and because, in NC, they are likely the 
way most residents have experienced the energy efficiency programs resulting from REPS 
because of their widespread dispersal.30 CFLs can be thought of as a technology that creates the 
value of energy efficiency for households. I also adopt the language of “negawatts” throughout; a 
negawatt31 can be thought of as a unit of energy efficiency (after Lovins 1989). 
In focusing my research on the implementation of the 2007 NC REPS policy, I analyzed 
both the policy itself (Session Law 2007-397, codified as General Statute § 62-133.8) and the 
                                                
29 For example, Bill Clinton publicly declared Duke Energy’s Save-a-Watt energy efficiency plan (the plan through 
which Duke Energy is compensated for energy efficiency programs under REPS), “a simple, brilliant idea. It has the  
capacity to fundamentally change what we do in the United States.” (Thompson 2008)	  
30 I received 18 CFLs from Duke Energy when I was their customer from 2009-2012: 6 via a rebate program where I 
could receive free General Electric brand CFLs at Wal-Mart, and 12 Niagara Conservation brand CFLs in the mail 
with a sticker proclaiming them “compliments of Duke Energy.” I encountered residents who had received similar  
CFL giveaways from Duke Energy throughout my participant-observation.	  
31 I use the term “negawatts” interchangeably with “energy efficiency,” “saved energy,” and “using less energy.” 
Following Lovins (1989), one negawatt is imagined as equivalent to 1 megawatt of energy efficiency, or 1 megawatt  
of electricity that one avoided using. 	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rulemaking proceedings32 overseen by the state regulatory body governing NC’s energy 
providers, the NC Utility Commission (NCUC). Such legal documents are windows into 
environmental governance (Robertson 2000; McCarthy 2004) where 38 different stakeholders, 
including electricity companies, their natural gas competitors, consumer advocacy groups, 
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), and both industrial and commercial 
electricity customers proposed and contested different ways to implement the REPS policy. To 
provide context and deepen the argument, I supplement this research with findings from 54 hours 
of participant-observation I conducted at public energy and climate change events33 in central 
NC from June 2010 to January 2013. Analysis was conducted using grounded theory methods 
(Charmaz 2006). Following Robertson (2000, 2004) and Prudham (2007), this research 
emphasizes the “discursive work” that different groups do in struggles over natural resources in 
environmental governance arenas. 
I analyzed how IOUs gained control over the value of negawatts through NC’s electricity 
governance. I will begin by discussing the present study’s analytical framework based on 
scholarship on neoliberal natures and background on electricity’s  regulated monopoly status. I 
describe the ways energy efficiency poses a challenge for IOUs under traditional regulation, 
showing how such conservation is disincentivized from the point of view of energy providers but 
results in value for customers, showing how the REPS legislation seeks to incentivize energy 
efficiency. I then turn to three types of struggles in which groups engaged during the REPS 
rulemaking proceedings that ultimately decided who accrues the value of energy efficiency under 
                                                
32 I analyzed 208 separate documents from multiple stakeholders, submitted in the initial rulemaking for REPS from 
27 August 2007 to 4 September 2008; they can be found in docket E-100, sub 113 at 
http://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/portal/ncuc/PSC/DocketDetails.aspx?DocketId=d63a7855-50af-4ac4-8e19-  
cce6aedd2c16.	  
33 The events included an Earth Day celebration, an energy efficiency education fair, climate activist rallies, public 
utility commission hearings on state electricity issues, and professional clean energy conferences.	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REPS: struggles to valorize negawatts, struggles to define negawatts’ spatiality, and struggles to 
claim negawatts that have effectively captured home energy efficiency for IOUs. I then discuss 
the implications of these struggles for how IOUs accumulate wealth within electricity systems, 
placing the findings within the broader context of neoliberal natures scholarship on 
accumulation, spatiality, and the neoliberalization of electricity. I conclude by suggesting policy 
implications and possible future research directions.  
Neoliberal Natures 
This case shares commonalities with other cases of the neoliberalization of nature. 
Scholars of green neoliberalism have shown that in a neoliberal era, nature and the environment 
have been repeatedly appropriated, privatized, and commodified in ways that turn the value of 
ecosystem goods and services into new realms of profit. The U.S. economic system has been 
considered neoliberal since the 1970s, characterized by movements toward free markets, de-
regulation and re-regulation, privatization, and commodification of natural resources (Harvey 
2005; Bakker 2010). Scholarship on green neoliberalism has called attention to the ways 
corporations and international trade organizations have incorporated environmental tenets into 
their practices to gain customers and legitimacy in an era when the appearance of 
environmentalism can expand markets (Beder 2002: 177; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). At the 
same time, environmental movements have incorporated neoliberal ideologies into their practices 
and discourses (e.g., Guldbrandsen and Holland 2001; Slocum 2004b), but also in the ways some 
environmentalists have adopted individualized, consumeristic subjectivities (Robbins 2007; 
Hobson 2013; Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2). 
Resource geographers have shown that all natural resources have to be produced, and that 
this production is “political, economic and cultural work” (Bridge 2010). Nature-as-commodity -
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and resource - is constructed, not discovered (Castree 2003, Bridge 2010). The construction of 
such things as resources frequently happens through political and social processes such as 
environmental governance, including for things traditionally thought of as resources (e.g.,  
minerals) (Bridge 2007) and more clearly constructed like carbon offsets (Bumpus and Liverman 
2008). The formation of nature into something valuable to IOUs and available for capital 
accumulation through policies, rulemaking, and other forms of environmental governance has 
been shown for multiple cases. Liverman (2004) has argued that in the neoliberal era, 
environmental governance brings new actors into the realm of environmental politics, including 
consumers, social movements, and corporations. Robertson (2004) has shown how wetlands 
have been commodified through such regulation. McCarthy (2004) has shown how even 
seemingly non-environmental regulations like NAFTA can be seen as environmental governance 
in the ways that it results in accumulation of the conditions of production by codifying the rights 
to pollute. In the realm of climate change, scholars have shown how climate governance has 
commodified the atmosphere through emissions trading (Bailey 2007) and carbon offsets 
(Bumpus and Liverman 2008). 
Environmental crises like climate change have been shown to be both a threat to and an 
opportunity for profits for many industries (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Bridge 2010). Some 
have argued that because climate change mitigation can involve possibly less centralized and 
more democratic technologies like solar and wind energy (e.g., Winner 1980), that climate 
change mitigation may be a threat to traditional electricity companies (but McCarthy [2013] 
argues against solar/wind energy as resistance to capitalism). In the current case, as I will show 
in section 2, efforts to mitigate climate change that call for using less energy may be a threat to 
IOU profits in both the short- and long-term because of the electricity industry’s economic 
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structures and regulations. Yet many (e.g., Bridge 2010) have also argued that climate change 
can be – and is being – turned into a source of profits, even for the same industries threatened by 
mitigation efforts. For example, Bumpus and Liverman (2008) have argued that carbon offsets 
are being used as a new arena of accumulation in an age of concern about climate change. 
Similar dynamics have been shown to operate for other environmental problems, such as wetland 
loss (Robertson 2004). 
Neoliberalism, Electricity, and Energy Efficiency 
Neoliberalism has been characterized as a class project seeking to restore rates of 
accumulation to elites at a time of declining profitability (Harvey 2005: 11), a narrative that fits 
the dynamics of the electricity industry beginning in the 1970s. Hirsch (1999: 135-8) has shown 
that prior to that decade, the electricity industry in the U.S. had seen relatively steady growth, but 
several influences converged in the 1970s to spark a fundamental shift in that industry. 
Environmental activists and scholars questioned the mantra of economic growth and turned 
against nuclear energy (171); the 1973 oil crisis and its resulting increases in the price of 
electricity made conservation appear more desirable to consumers and energy managers (55; 
155); and what had been a steady increase in efficiency and scale of power plant facilities leveled 
off substantially (55); all threatened the profits and structure of the electricity industry. Yet little 
work has been done by geographers or others on the resulting shifts in U.S. electricity markets 
and governance through the lens of neoliberalism; work on neoliberalism and electricity has 
tended to focus instead on developing countries (e.g., Ahmed 2000) or on the U.S. in broad 
strokes (e.g., Hess 2011).  
 Although scholars of green neoliberalism have researched and theorized a myriad of 
socio-natures, including gold, oil, wetlands, carbon offsets, pets, breast milk, and GMOs (Bakker 
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2010), scholarship on electricity has tended to remain separate from such scholarship on political 
ecological understandings of natural resources. Yet electricity is no less a socio-nature than 
carbon; the kilowatt-hours produced by burning coal can be seen as natural resources in ways 
that connect to coal as a natural resource. In this work, I place an understanding of electricity as a 
key socio-natural system into conversation with political ecological understandings of 
neoliberalism, capital accumulation, and environmental governance. Little critical work34 has 
also been done on energy efficiency, despite having become a key arena of climate change 
mitigation efforts. Research on energy efficiency is important in part because, like work on the 
carbon economy, it connects everyday life (e.g., energy efficient appliances in the home) with 
larger political economies (state and federal environmental policies, the production networks of 
large electricity companies, and the global production networks of energy efficiency 
technologies). The present study heeds Bakker’s (2010) call to research the edges of what is 
traditionally thought of as “nature.”  
Bakker (2010) has argued that different socio-natures are neoliberalized differently, so 
we can expect that just as oceans (Mansfield 2004), drinking water (Bakker 2000), wetlands 
(Robertson 2000), minerals (Bridge 2007), and other environmental goods and services have 
been neoliberalized differently, there will also be unique aspects of the neoliberalization of 
electricity. One difference between some other neoliberalizations of environmental crises where 
environmental goods and services have been newly valorized, appropriated, privatized, and 
commodified and the current case is that energy efficiency has long had monetary value. In 
addition to being valuable to households who use energy efficient technologies to lower their 
electricity bills, negawatts are also often thought to have value to society by reducing pollution 
                                                
34 The majority of critical work on energy efficiency has focused instead on the Jevons paradox or the rebound effect 
(e.g., Brookes 1990; Herring 2006).	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and to electricity systems in their reliability (RAP 2011b: 77). Therefore, the struggle to 
accumulate off of negawatts is less about the creation of nature as having value per se, although 
there are components of that process, given the unwieldy nature of negawatts as thing and non-
thing, and has focused more about the control of this value. Neoliberalization of electricity in the 
U.S. is especially important to study given that it is the largest spatial and economic monopoly in 
the world, with complex histories of deregulation, reregulation, and, increasingly, environmental 
governance. I turn to the broad contours of electricity as a regulated monopoly in the next 
section.  
Electricity in the U.S. as a Regulated Monopoly System 
In the U.S., electricity is a highly regulated monopoly commodity that is both unusually 
abstractable and aspatial compared with other neoliberalized socio-natures; these unique parts of 
its socio-nature affect the ways that the value produced by energy efficiency is neoliberalized. 
Starting in the early 1900s, electricity companies were granted monopoly status and a system for 
regulating them began to develop (Hirsch 1999: 11), recognizing electricity as an “essential 
service” that is tied to broader societal interests (RAP 2011b: 3). As monopolies, utilities are 
protected from competition in the geographical area they cover: the location of a customer’s 
home, business, or industry determines the company from which they buy electricity (Hirsch 
1999: 11). As regulated monopolies, utilities are considered responsible for providing electricity 
to all who can pay for it, at prices that are set by a state regulatory body rather than through 
competition (RAP 2011b: 4-5). In NC, that regulatory body is the NC Utilities Commission 
(NCUC).  
Similar to water and sewer in its regulated monopoly status, electricity is arguably the 
largest spatial and economic monopoly in the world. It is highly fungible, interchangeable as the 
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same commodity across large spaces (along transmission lines, for example). Like water and 
sewer services, the landscape across which electricity can flow is shaped by infrastructure, yet 
electricity landscapes tend to be much larger in their extent than more local water and sewer 
systems. The spatiality of electricity is bound mainly by political economic borders, rather than 
by biophysical35 constraints (as we see in some other socio-natures: for example a stream in a 
particular watershed, carbon in a particular forest, etc.) or localized infrastructure (as with water 
and sewer). In the U.S., the boundaries of the flow of electricity include areas of interconnected 
transmission lines, such as the Eastern Interconnection, which includes NC and most of the states 
east of the Rockies (RAP 2011b: 15). In this eastern space, electrons can in theory flow 
anywhere, but when they are constrained, this happens mostly because of state boundaries, and 
this is because electricity providers are regulated at the state level. In states, the electricity 
landscapes are further divided into service areas, or geographical extents of the companies 
providing electricity; within those service areas, another division affecting the flows of 
electricity is across customer classes (residential customers, commercial customers, and 
industrial customers).  
There are generally three types of electricity providers in the U.S., all of whom are 
regulated by states: 1) Investor-Owned Utilities36, which are private entities owned by 
shareholders; 2) publicly-owned municipalities; and 3) electric membership cooperatives. Three-
quarters of the U.S. population gets their power from IOUs (RAP 2011b: 9), which are the focus 
of this paper. At the beginning of this study, there were three IOUs in NC (Duke Energy, 
                                                
35 This is not to say that electricity has no biological or physical constraints, or that other socio-natures do not also 
have political economic borders, but rather that electricity is remarkable in its ability to physically flow across 
diverse landscapes. There are efficiency (loss or waste) barriers to perfect flow of electricity across landscapes, but  
they tend to be lower barriers than those existing against other environmental goods or services.	  
36 However, IOUs are often called “public utilities” in practice.	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Progress Energy, and Dominion); in 2012, Duke Energy merged with Progress to become the 
largest electricity company in the U.S. New Duke Energy represents 96% of the electricity 
generated within NC (NC Energy Policy Council 2010) and supplies 68% of NC’s total 
electricity customers (NC Energy Policy Council 2013). Figure 4.1 shows the service territories 
of Duke Energy at present, showing which areas used to be Progress Energy. 
 
Figure 4.1. Map of Duke Energy’s NC Service Territory. Duke Energy’s present service area includes areas that,  
before the merger, were Duke Energy (**) and Progress Energy (*) (Image from NCUC 2013). 
Traditionally, electricity rates (prices) in such regulated monopoly systems are set 
through a process of negotiation overseen and ultimately decided on by the NCUC. This makes 
electricity an unusual commodity in its pricing. Regulators set the price37 of an IOU’s electricity 
so that the company meets its revenue requirement, or the projected sum of all their costs 
(including operational expenses, taxes, and profits) between the time of one rate case (the 
                                                
37 Electricity has many prices, including for different classes of customers (residential, industrial, commercial) and 
at different times of the day and season for some customers. For simplicity, I will generally refer to the “price” of 
electricity in this paper.	  
18
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regulatory proceedings through which prices are set) and the next rate case (RAP 2011a: 3). In 
other words, the NCUC sets the price so that, when multiplied by the projected demand, the 
amount of incoming revenue matches the projected costs. In a traditional ratemaking system, 
after prices are set for a given time period during the rate case, they do not change until the next 
regularly-scheduled rate case. For most utilities, general rate cases happen when the electricity 
company requests one, usually every two to five years (RAP 2011b: 31); Duke Energy, in recent 
years, has been having base rate cases every two years (Duke Energy 2011, 2012).  
The Challenge of Energy Efficiency under Traditional Regulation 
The ways that IOU shareholders earn profits within traditional ratemaking systems are 
thought to discourage electricity companies from encouraging their customers to conserve 
energy. Profits for shareholders stem from a rate of return on investments (the rate base), for 
example in new power plants (Shively and Ferrare 2004: 174-5). This means that in the long 
term, IOUs experience an incentive to expand this rate base (Shively and Ferrare 2004: 175) by 
investing in new power plants and other infrastructure to meet perceived or actual increasing 
demand by customers. This Averch-Johnson Effect can result in long-term disincentives for 
IOUs to encourage energy conservation among their customers because this lowered demand can 
make it difficult to justify the investments upon which profits are based (RAP 2011b: 60). In the 
short term, the disincentive to encourage energy efficiency is called the throughput incentive: 
once the price of electricity is set in a rate case, any amount of electricity that the utility sells 
above what it projected during the rate case adds to profits (NCUC 2008: 13)38. This means that 
a utility has a disincentive to encourage energy efficiency among its customers because typically 
such saved energy means lower sales than those used to calculate the rates.  
                                                
38 In other words, once prices are set, a utility can only increase profits by either increasing sales or decreasing 
expenses below what it had projected during the rate case (RAP 2011a: 7).	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Effects of Energy Efficiency under Traditional Regulation 
Under this traditional regulation, energy efficiency39 performed by a group of customers 
on their own (e.g., installing CFLs in their homes) that was not accounted for in a rate case 
reduces projected utility revenues. Figures 4.2-4.5 represent a conceptual model of these 
relationships. The figures assume a general rate case occurs in year 0 which results in particular 
electricity prices starting in year 1; the prices set in year 0 were based on the projected sales 
estimated at the time of the rate case (the dotted line in Figure 4.2). In the model, it is assumed 
that customers implement energy efficiency measures (e.g., install CFLs) in year 2, which has 
the immediate effect of lowering the actual sales of electricity compared with the projected sales 
(Figure 4.2). As a result, Figure 4.4 shows that the electricity providers experience a revenue 
shortfall in years 2 and 3, where their revenue is lower than the costs, because the price of 
electricity was set assuming a higher level of sales. Under traditional regulation, an IOU would 
respond to this drop in revenues by filing for a rate case in year 3, which would come into effect 
as a higher price of electricity in year 4 (Figure 4.3). As a result, the IOU would again 
experience a match between costs and revenues in year 4 (Figure 4.4). 
 
 
                                                
39 Saved energy is not the only factor that cuts into revenues and thus profits: other changes such as unforeseen 
increases in fuel costs or cooler-than-predicted summer temperatures can also mean that the revenue requirement is 
not met through sales; however, fuel cost increases can be met through fuel charge riders in NC (NCUC 2008: 13). 
Likewise, unforeseen decreases in fuel costs or warmer-than-predicted summers are also unforeseen factors that can 
increase revenues and thus profits between rate cases. The key point is that these changes are unforeseen, and so can 
mean revenue shortfalls or surpluses until a new price of electricity is set in the next rate case. 	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Figures 4.2-4.5. Effects of customer-implemented energy efficiency, under traditional (non-REPS) regulation, on 
electricity sales (Fig. 4.2), price (Fig. 4.3), an electric utility’s balance of costs to revenues (Fig. 4.4), and customer 
electricity bills (Fig. 4.5). Assumes a rate case at year 0 impacts rates in years 1-3, and a rate case in year 3 impacts 
rates starting in year 4; also assumes customers who implement energy efficiency (by, for example, changing light 
bulbs from incandescents to CFLs) do so in year 2, leading to decreased sales starting that year. Two types of 
customers are shown: those who implement energy efficiency measures (Customer “B”) and those who do not  
(Customer “A”).  
The effect of these changes in price on customers’ electricity bills under traditional 
regulation differs by whether an individual customer implemented energy efficiency or not 
(Figure 4.5). Customers (like “B”) who implement energy efficiency in their home have lowered 
electricity bills in years 2-4, although the magnitude of the lowering of their bills is lower in year 
4 due to the higher price of electricity in that year. Customers (like “A”) who do not implement 
energy efficiency experience a rise in overall rates in year 4, with no benefit from energy 
efficiency. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 suggest what the struggle over control of negawatts is about. The 
lowering of customer bills for those who implement energy efficiency themselves (Customer “B” 
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in Figure 4.5) is the direct value that customers produce for themselves by implementing their 
own energy efficiency. IOUs experience what is valuable to customers as a loss in revenues that 
they did not predict (Figure 4.4). While they are able, in the short-term, to adjust prices to 
account for this decrease in demand, they are generally not able to recoup losses that resulted in 
years 2 and 3. Add to this the Averch-Johnson Effect, which pushes IOUs to increase 
investments in facilities, and the stage is set for IOUs to resist energy efficiency programs and to 
perceive energy efficiency as a threat to profits. For example, Duke Energy refers to this effect as 
the risk of “regulatory lag” that energy efficiency can pose to their profits, since under traditional 
regulation they can only adjust rates to account for lowered demand due to conservation every 
few years (Duke Energy 2012). 
Governance to Encourage Energy Efficiency 
Because of these disincentives and the electricity regulatory system, encouraging energy 
efficiency is a governance challenge that states in the U.S. have met in multiple ways, beginning 
in the 1970s (Hirsch 1999: 136). Various state policies have encouraged energy efficiency 
programs administered by state agencies, third parties, or, as in the case of NC40, the utilities 
themselves (Hausauer 2009). Fifteen states have adopted electricity decoupling (Morgan 2013), a 
regulatory approach that allows the price of electricity to be adjusted more frequently than 
traditional rate cases in order to adapt to, and even incentivize, implementation of energy 
efficiency41 programs (RAP 2011a: 9). NC has decoupled some natural gas systems but not 
electricity (Morgan 2013).  
                                                
40 NC has additional energy efficiency-encouraging policies beyond REPS, including energy codes for buildings, a  
“public benefits fund,” tax incentives, rebates, local grants, and loan programs (DSIRE 2014). 	  
41 In addition to energy efficiency, such decoupling can also apply to other factors such as weather and fuel,  
depending on the type of decoupling (RAP 2011a).	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 Although it shares some features with decoupling frameworks (NCUC 2008: 2)42, NC’s 
lawmakers have sought to deal with the throughput incentive for energy efficiency through an 
alternative mechanism in its REPS. With NC, 29 states and D.C. have passed Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, but only seven are like NC in including energy efficiency as part of the 
RPS43 (data from DSIRE 2014). RPS laws generally require electricity companies to get a certain 
percentage of their electricity from renewable energy resources like wind and solar; NC’s policy 
allows IOUs to meet up to a quarter of their requirements through energy efficiency until 2021 
when this allowance rises to 40% (REPS of 2007).  
Much of the controversy within REPS rulemaking to implement the energy efficiency 
part of the law has been about how to appropriately compensate IOUs for encouraging their 
customers to use less energy. The NCUC concluded this debate44 by determining that between 
normal rate cases, IOUs can file for riders, or small additions to the base price of electricity, to 
compensate for energy efficiency programs through two main mechanisms. First, they can 
increase the price to pay for the implementation of the energy efficiency programs themselves 
(S.L. 207-397). A high rate of return for shareholders on such energy efficiency investments is 
said to incentivize them over traditional investments (RAP 2010). In their residential energy 
efficiency program, called Save-a-Watt, Duke Energy is compensated for energy efficiency in a 
way that some groups, like the NC Attorney General, have argued results in a rate of return on 
                                                
42 According to RAP’s typology of decoupling frameworks, NC’s REPS rules can be considered a form of “limited 
decoupling”; however, an NCUC-commissioned study on implementing REPS rejected decoupling as a possible  
framework, in favor of a “net lost revenue adjustment” (NCUC 2008: 14).	  
43 Other than NC, these are: CT, HI, MI, NV, OH, PA, and WA. 20 states have separate energy efficiency  
portfolio/resource standards (DSIRE 2014).	  
44 E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order)	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energy efficiency investments to as high as 58%45, compared with a more standard 8-12% return 
on traditional investments (Duke Energy 2012). By bringing such energy efficiency 
implementation into the investment fold, IOUs are able to receive a return for shareholders as 
high or higher than for traditional investments, potentially also reducing the Averch-Johnson 
incentive toward greater and greater investments in traditional, more polluting electricity 
facilities. 
Second, IOUs can apply for compensation for “net46 lost revenues,” or compensation for 
sales of electricity that do not occur because the energy is saved instead47. While full decoupling 
separates revenues from sales by adjusting the price of electricity as demand changes due to a 
number of factors (including energy efficiency but also weather), NC’s REPS mechanism is 
focused on decoupling energy efficiency alone through “lost margin recovery” (RAP 2011b: 86-
7). This first mechanism of compensation is said to level the playing field for energy efficiency 
compared with traditional investments by addressing the way the throughput problem 
disincentivizes conserving energy (RAP 2010). Thus the two mechanisms of negawatt 
compensation may be thought to address the two disincentives to energy efficiency: the Averch-
Johnson Effect and the throughput incentive. 
Struggles over Who Accrues the Value of Energy Efficiency 
In this section, I discuss the ways that, in the REPS rulemaking proceedings, the question 
of who accrues the value of energy efficiency was determined through struggles to valorize 
                                                
45 E-7, sub 831: 2-9-10 (NCUC Order); however, the true rate of return on energy efficiency investments is hotly 
contested in that docket. The AGO was including both the program costs and the net lost revenue compensation in  
its calculations of this resultant rate of return on energy efficiency investments.	  
46 They are called “net” because the REPS rulemaking specifies that utilities are only compensated for revenues 
“lost” from energy efficiency programs net of revenues “found” through programs that increase customer demand  
(E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order)).	  
47 E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order) 	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negawatts, to define their spatiality, and to claim them. The resolution of these struggles through 
NCUC rules resulted in the creation of negawatts as a valuable resource located in homes for 
which IOUs are credited with production, allowing IOUs to turn what was a threat to profits into 
an opportunity for further accumulation. 
Struggles to Valorize Negawatts 
Is energy efficiency a thing or an absence of a thing? Struggles over negawatt 
valorization are about defining what energy efficiency is. The ability of energy efficiency to take 
on somewhat paradoxical characteristics as both a material thing and an absence makes it 
possible for the negawatt to be a source of accumulation in multiple ways48. Framing negawatts 
as both a thing and an absence involves arguing that saving energy is both a source of value and 
a cause of value loss. By ruling that IOUs could apply for energy efficiency riders to compensate 
them both for the costs of implementing energy efficiency programs (implying a materiality to 
energy efficiency) and for net lost revenues (implying energy efficiency is an absence or loss), 
the NCUC’s ultimate rules highlight this dual nature of energy efficiency’s valorization 
processes. The conditions under which groups define energy efficiency as a thing or an absence 
show that these struggles over definition are about creating a resource that is valuable mainly for 
IOUs. 
Defining Energy Efficiency as a Creator of Value 
When they treat energy efficiency as a thing, IOUs and others fashion the negawatt as a 
loss of value for which IOUs should be compensated. Saving energy already has some value 
even before REPS, which in traditional regulatory settings can result in a shortfall of revenues 
                                                
48 In this paper I do not intend to resolve the question of whether energy efficiency “really is” a thing or an absence, 
but aim instead to show the struggles to define it in each/both way(s).	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for utilities. One part of making negawatts available for accumulation by IOUs, then, involves 
defining them as a resource similar to other resources that IOUs already control and are paid for. 
The framing of energy efficiency as such a resource is often explicit and can be seen in 
the discourses of IOUs, ENGOs, and others. For example, multiple ENGOs49 together wrote 
approvingly of “energy efficiency as a low cost resource” in comments about REPS when it was 
first proposed. Duke Energy goes further, framing energy efficiency as a “fifth fuel” in their 
2007 Energy Efficiency Plan50: 
Duke Energy Carolinas…recognizes energy efficiency as a reliable, valuable resource, that is, a “fifth 
fuel,” that should be part of the portfolio available to meet customers’ growing need for electricity along 
with coal, nuclear, natural gas, or renewable energy. The ‘fifth fuel’ helps customers meet their energy  
needs with less electricity, less cost and less environmental impact.  
Treating energy efficiency as a fuel51 opens up the possibility that that fuel will “belong” to a 
group, such as IOUs, who will in turn process and produce it in a similar way to other fuels, and 
then sell it to customers. Rather than state it outright, ENGOs more commonly imply that using 
less energy is a fuel when they compare energy efficiency to nuclear or fossil fuels. ENGOs 
frequently praise energy efficiency for its ability to cause the retirement of coal or nuclear power 
plants or prevent new construction of such plants52. These comparisons, which make it appear 
                                                
49 In official comments on the La Capra’s pre-RPS NC study, 19 Jan 2007 (NCSEA, NC Sierra Club, Environmental  
Defense, Carolinas Clean Air Coalition, NC Cons. Network, NCWARN, et al.).	  
50 E-7, sub 831: 5-7-07	  
51 This framing is particularly noteworthy because it distinguishes between two fossil fuels (coal and natural gas) 
that arguably have much more in common economically, politically, and materially than the wide range of 
renewable energy sources (solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, biomass, etc.) lumped together in “renewables,” 
while giving energy efficiency its own category. In practice, this valorizes fossil fuels and energy efficiency while  
devalorizing renewables. 	  
52 Instead of replacing fossil fuel/nuclear power plants, however, IOUs more commonly talk about the benefits of 
energy efficiency as a matter of “deferment” of coal/nuclear power plant construction. It was rare for IOUs to talk 
about energy efficiency resulting in existing power plants being taken offline or canceling future constructions; 
instead, negawatts are framed as slowing growth enough so that new traditionally-fueled power plants are built later 
in the future. These differing frames make sense for environmentalists who want energy efficiency to increase, while  
IOUs want to continue a similar business model based on investment in large power plants into the future. 
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that energy efficiency is easily interchangeable with coal, nuclear, and other things traditionally 
thought of as fuels, imply that negawatts are a similar kind of material resource.  
IOUs and some environmentalists also both imagine energy efficiency a power plant. For 
example, Duke Energy53 writes, “the most environmentally sound, inexpensive and reliable 
power plant is the one the utility does not have to build because it has implemented cost-effective 
EE and DSM54 programs. A type of virtual power plant, EE and DSM are…” The idea that the 
cheapest power plant is the one we do not build has the dual effect of both implying energy 
efficiency is distinct from traditional power plants while also marking such efficiency as a kind 
of power plant, a “virtual power plant.” Framing energy efficiency as a power plant is especially 
striking given the following quote from environmental scientist Amory Lovins (1989) in an 
famous Keynote Address to a Green Energy Conference: 
…roughly 42 percent of U.S. lighting energy…goes to incandescent bulbs. Those we normally replace with 
compact fluorescents…that have roughly quadrupled efficiency -- 11 watts replacing 40, 14 [sic] watts 
replacing 75, and so on… Think of such a compact bulb, with 14 watts replacing 75, as a 61 negawatt 
power plant. By substituting 14 watts for 75 watts, you are sending 61 unused watts -- or negawatts – back 
to Hydro, who can sell the electricity saved to someone else without having to make it all over again. It is  
much cheaper to save the electricity than to make it… 
Here Lovins is asking that we view a CFL, the quintessential energy efficiency technology, as a 
power plant itself. Similarly, some groups also frame energy efficiency as having a supply and 
even its own supply curve (GDS Associates 2006), similar to more conventional energy 
resources. Together, framing energy efficiency as a resource, a fuel, a substitute for coal and 
nuclear power plants, and a power plant position saving energy as a valuable thing itself, making 
it available for various groups to claim control of.  
 
                                                
53 E-100, sub 113: 9-24-07	  
54 Demand-Side Management, or DSM, refers to programs that shift the peak in electricity demand to another time 
of the day; in contrast, energy efficiency is about reducing the total amount of electricity consumed.	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Defining Energy Efficiency as a Destroyer of Value 
 While no one in these proceedings explicitly questions the idea that energy efficiency is a 
source of value similar to other material resources, a struggle is simultaneously occurring in 
these legal proceedings over the idea that energy efficiency also destroys value, resulting in “lost 
revenues.” Claiming that energy conservation removes value from IOUs allows such companies 
to claim that they should be compensated for these losses. By calling these revenues “lost,” 
multiple groups imply that the revenues originally belonged to IOUs, and that IOUs are entitled 
to get them back.  
In a similar framing, the throughput incentive in these debates is commonly also called 
the “revenue erosion problem.” In the REPS rulemaking, for example, three environmental 
groups55 explained the need for compensation for net lost revenues, illustrating how hegemonic 
the idea that IOUs should be compensated for selling less of their product has become; they 
argued that some parts of the country, 
…have explicit methods to address the revenue erosion which utilities may experience when their [energy 
efficiency or demand-side management] 56 successfully reduces their sales below otherwise expected 
levels… the revenue erosion issue should be addressed through an explicit mechanism, just as program 
costs are. In most cases, a utility’s prices…are set using a sales forecast that does not account for future 
energy efficiency savings. As a result, when sales are reduced by energy efficiency, the electricity prices 
are not high enough to recover all the costs incurred by the utility. The utility’s variable costs will be 
reduced along with the lower sales, but the fixed costs will not. Therefore, there is said to be ‘lost revenues’ 
created by the energy efficiency programs; these lost revenues are generally said to be equal to the amount  
of energy saved times the fixed-cost portion of a utility’s electricity price. 
                                                
55 E-100, sub 113: 9-21-07 (Environmental Defense, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, and Southern  
Environmental Law Center)	  
56 Note that they say only “demand-side management” in the original quote, but given the rest of the paragraph, it  
seems clear that they are referring to both DSM and energy efficiency.	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It has become common sense among ENGOs and IOUs that IOUs should be compensated for 
these “lost” revenues, but such compensation is not obvious. For example, few ENGOs suggest 
that oil companies should be paid for lost revenues when people drive hybrid cars57.  
Positioning revenues as “lost” or “eroded” does discursive work. It supports the 
assumption by multiple parties that IOUs have a right to exist – and benefit - even as demand for 
their product dwindles, and that they have a right to future sales. Part of the challenge here is that 
the regulatory compact of electricity monopolies guarantees such companies’ survival and 
continued opportunities for shareholder profits. Instead of questioning whether the structure of 
electricity monopolies is appropriate in a world of climate change and new decentralized energy 
technologies, however, the debate becomes centered on the question of how to appropriately 
compensate IOUs for lost revenues. ENGOs tend to frame this question as a practical issue, 
assuming that the only way that IOUs would be willing to implement energy efficiency programs 
would be if they can earn a high enough return on such investments. But framing these revenues 
as “lost” and “eroded” makes these processes appear natural and without an actor: they are 
divorced from who loses the revenues, or what political, economic, and social processes lead to 
their loss or erosion. The debates also become separated from energy governance mandates. For 
example, NC energy providers are charged, by law (G.S. § 62-2(3a)), with providing energy 
using “least-cost” resources, which many people believe are usually energy efficiency (e.g., 
Duke Energy’s statement on the cheapest power plant is the one they do not have to build, 
above). The implication is that if the rate of return is the same for both traditional and energy 
efficiency resources, IOUs are bound by law to choose energy efficiency, thus negating the need 
to incentivize such negawatts further.  
                                                
57 One reason for this difference is that more competitive market for oil in comparison with electricity.	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In the REPS proceedings, only two actors, the NC Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and 
Nucor Steel-Hertford (an industrial electricity customer), seem to question these frames of loss 
and erosion that position IOUs as having a right to sell electricity. AGO58 writes: 
Net lost revenues are better characterized as missed sales opportunities associated with DSM and EE 
programs that may discourage utilities from undertaking ambitious measures to promote energy efficiency 
and other demand-side management options. By allowing recovery of net lost revenues in conjunction with 
particular EE programs, the utility would be allowed to take back some of the benefit of energy savings that 
are brought about by the utility’s measures as an incentive to promote wise rather than wasteful use of  
energy. 
By implying that IOUs are “taking back” the value of energy conservation when they are paid for 
net lost revenues, the AGO is taking the unusual position that the value of negawatts belongs to 
electricity customers. The AGO also reframes revenue erosion as the “underrecovery of 
revenues,” suggesting that IOUs may not be “entitled” (AGO’s term)59 to recovery of sales 
underrecovered due to energy efficiency. Yet even though the AGO goes far here in struggling 
against hegemonic assumptions about who owns the value of save energy, the AGO’s position is 
not that IOUs should be uncompensated for such “lost sales opportunities.” Rather, the AGO is 
arguing that IOUs should have to ask for lost revenue recovery, rather than be granted it 
automatically, but the AGO is not outright questioning whether such recovery should happen at 
all. Likewise, Nucor60 writes, “from a customer’s perspective, these net lost revenues are actually 
savings brought about by the actions of customers.” Nucor makes this argument in order to 
suggest that recovery of lost revenues should be “on a case by case basis.” Ultimately the NCUC 
ruled with the AGO and Nucor that net lost revenues be considered in each case, but utilities like 
                                                
58 E-100, 113: 12-17-07	  
59 The AGO also points out that the problem of negawatts for IOUs is a short-term problem (because a later rate case 
adjusts price to compensate for “lost” revenues), one of the only times this is pointed out in the proceedings. Nucor  
also questions this “entitlement” (E-100, sub 113: 12-17-07)	  
60 E-100, sub 113: 12-17-07	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Duke Energy have successfully argued61 for higher electricity rates to pay for net lost revenues 
nonetheless. In these ways, the questioning of these frames of loss and erosion is merely 
procedural in effect, allowing IOUs to continue to position themselves as having experienced a 
loss of value to which they have a right to seek compensation when energy efficiency is 
implemented. 
Struggles to Define Negawatts’ Spatiality 
Beyond creating the negawatt as a resource that both creates and destroys value, the 
creation of energy efficiency as a resource valuable to IOUs involves struggles to define where 
such valuable negawatts are located. These struggles resulted in an understanding of energy 
efficiency as a valuable resource located in homes. 
Defining Energy Efficiency as a Demand-Side Resource 
Where is this valuable resource, saved energy, located? A surprising contradiction in 
discourses happens here. On one hand, negawatts are treated as if they are a resource, a fuel, and 
a power plant, which for traditional resources like coal would be considered part of the 
production or supply-side of electricity. Yet in the REPS discourses, energy efficiency is treated 
almost entirely as a demand-side resource62, or part of the consumption side of electricity 
systems, even though it is far from obvious that energy efficiency is located only in the 
consumption side of electricity systems. For example, a common model of energy losses or 
waste, what might be thought of as energy inefficiencies, in electrical systems, is often pictured 
similar to Figure 4.6. 
                                                
61 E-7, sub 831	  
62 Not to be confused with “demand-side management”, which is a subset of “demand-side resources.”	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Figure 4.6. Model of Energy Losses in an Electricity System. The figure, made by the author, is adapted from a 
National Academy of Sciences (2008) article entitled, “What you need to know about energy.” 
In the article, the figure’s caption reads:  
Example of energy lost during conversion and transmission. Imagine that the coal needed to illuminate an 
incandescent light bulb contains 100 units of energy when it enters the power plant. Only two units of that  
energy eventually light the bulb. The remaining 98 units are lost along the way, primarily as heat. 
Note that the original authors chose lighting as the key example here, which is not surprising 
given that incandescent lights have become the poster-child, to many, of inefficient technologies, 
just as CFLs are the symbol of energy efficient technologies (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 2). 
This figure shows how there are substantial losses of energy at the power plant, in the 
transmission lines, and finally in appliances within homes. These might be thought of as three 
possible targets of a state energy efficiency policy such as REPS that are all under the purview of 
electricity companies.  
Yet the REPS struggles are mainly about energy efficiency as a “demand-side” resource 
happening in the course of electricity consumption. The REPS law (2007) defines an “energy 
efficiency measure” as  
COAL • Assume 100 units of energy 
POWER PLANT • 100 units enter • 62 units lost 
TRANSMISSION 
LINES 
• 38 units enter 
• 2 units lost 
INCANDESCENT 
LIGHT BULB IN 
HOME 
• 36 units enter 
• 34 units lost (to heat) 
• so 2 units become light 
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an equipment, physical, or program change implemented after January 1, 2007, that results in less energy 
used to perform the same function. ‘Energy efficiency measure’ includes, but is not limited to, energy 
produced from a combined heat and power system that uses nonrenewable energy resources. ‘Energy  
efficiency measure’ does not include demand-side management. 
This definition would seem to include, for example, physical changes to power plants to increase 
their efficiency. However, in the 208 documents about implementing the energy efficiency side 
of REPS, no one proposes efficiency improvements to power plants, transmission lines, or other 
supply/production-side changes as changes IOUs could do to meet the requirements of REPS.  
Instead, energy efficiency is consistently treated as located on the consumption end of 
electricity systems. For instance, the environmental groups Environmental Defense, Southern 
Alliance for Clean Energy, and Southern Environmental Law Center63 frame “demand-side 
initiatives (DSM and EE)” as distinct from “generation resources.” Even though using less 
energy itself is being framed as something that is produced, it is not about the production of 
energy. This assumption that energy efficiency is about the consumption side of electricity is 
common in discourses beyond REPS; for example, the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy’s 
writes on their website64, “Energy efficiency simply means receiving the same service (light, 
cooling, heating, for example) out of a device or system without using more energy than 
necessary – using equipment that performs well.” 
 The second half of the REPS definition of energy efficiency appears to include an 
important exception to this framing of energy efficiency as a demand-side resource. In it, the 
legislature includes combined heat and power (CHP)65 as qualifying energy efficiency. Yet 
although the definition seems to suggest that IOUs might meet the requirements of REPS by 
                                                
63 E-100, sub 113: 11-14-07 	  
64 http://www.cleanenergy.org/learn/learn-about/learn-about-energy-efficiency/	  
65 Seen by many as a type of efficient power plant, often fueled by fossil fuels, where the electricity and heat 
resulting from the combustion of such fuels are both used.	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upgrading their own power plants to CHP facilities, this possibility does not play out in the 
discourses. Instead, the main way CHP systems enter the REPS conversations is through 
concerns that IOUs will use the CHP provision in REPS as a way to build more coal-fired power 
plants. The consumer advocacy group the Public Staff66 worries that IOUs will use CHP systems 
to “game” compliance with REPS, concluding, “Obviously, this would be diametrically at 
variance with the General Assembly’s intent [in the REPS law] to promote renewable 
generation.” Yet if groups were thinking of energy efficiency as encompassing both the 
production of electricity and its consumption, it is not obvious that CHP violates the spirit of 
REPS. Instead, the Public Staff’s argument suggests that many groups view the production of 
clean energy as something done with renewable energy sources, while the consumption of clean 
energy is done with energy efficiency. Otherwise, the REPS rulemaking is remarkable for the 
fact that no one suggests that the power plants or transmission lines should become more energy 
efficient as a way for IOUs to meet their REPS requirements.  
A second exception to the framing of energy efficiency as a demand-side resource 
illustrates the ways these contested spatialities of energy efficiency are largely struggles over 
who gets to profit from energy efficiency. Piedmont Natural Gas, a natural gas company in NC, 
is one of the only groups that treats energy efficiency as applying to the entire length of Figure 
4.6. Whereas most groups treat energy efficiency as a product of appliances themselves (as a 
matter of a more or less efficient light bulb, for example), Piedmont argues67 that energy 
efficiency programs should be “evaluated on a total fuel efficiency basis (i.e., source-to-site 
efficiency plus appliance efficiency).” Piedmont’s concern likely stems from the ways natural 
gas companies could lose market share from certain energy efficiency programs if they focus 
                                                
66 Representatives of the “using and consuming public,” (E-100, sub 113: 11-14-07)	  
67 E-100, sub 113: 11-14-07 	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only on appliances within homes as the sites of energy efficiency68. They are concerned that 
electric companies might, for example, incentivize customers to replace their water heaters with 
high-efficiency electric models, resulting in some customers who had even more-efficient natural 
gas-power water heaters replacing those natural gas heaters with less-efficient electric heaters. 
The result, they say: “what at first glance appeared to be a program to promote lower electric 
usage and increase energy efficiency, is revealed to be a program that builds electric load and 
unnecessarily increases greenhouse gas emissions.” Whether such fuel-switching is happening 
and whose equipment is “in actuality” more “efficient”69 is beyond the scope of this paper; 
instead, what is important is that the only times that energy efficiency is framed as an issue of the 
more-than-consumption part of electricity systems is when a natural gas company is concerned 
that the effects of such exclusions will affect its bottom line70.  
From Demand-Side to Homes 
Despite positioning using less energy as a demand-side resource, negawatts are 
consistently framed in these discourses as mainly about the demand of the residential sector, not 
all consumers or even all buildings. The REPS law states that IOUs can implement energy 
efficiency programs for residential, commercial, or industrial customers. Yet there is a special 
provision of REPS71 that states that “any industrial customer” and “commercial customers with 
significant annual usage at a threshold level to be established by the Commission” are allowed to 
“opt out” of IOU energy efficiency programs. If a customer opts-out, they can avoid paying the 
                                                
68 As the NCUC puts it in their final Order: “it is clear that both gas and electric utilities see the new statute as  
potentially enabling them to build market share.” (E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order))	  
69 Which turns out to be a very complex socio-political question.	  
70 Piedmont’s line of reasoning was ultimately rejected by the NCUC in light of the fact that general statutes already  
“[forbid] destructive competition.” (E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order))	  
71 REPS of 2007	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higher electricity rates that compensate IOUs for energy efficiency programs, so long as such 
opting-out customers implements similar programs themselves. A large part of the REPS 
rulemaking proceedings thus were about the appropriate threshold level for such opt outs72. 
 Yet is not clear why residential customers, small businesses, governments, and other 
customers should not also be allowed to opt-out. If a residential customer buys and installs their 
own CFLs, they still have to pay higher rates on their electricity to compensate Duke Energy for 
CFL giveaways to the residential customer class (in other words: they would pay twice for 
CFLs). Yet if a large-enough commercial customer installs CFLs in its buildings, it can choose to 
not pay for any IOU programs installing CFLs in the commercial customer class. It is possible 
that the reason residential and small commercial customers are excluded from opting-out is 
because it would be logistically difficult to manage many small units. Yet it is unclear why 
residential customers could not bundle their energy efficiency savings together and opt-out as a 
larger unit, a solution that commercial customer Wal-Mart proposes73 for its own buildings to 
meet the threshold. It is an important patterned absence that no one in the rulemaking procedures 
even suggests that residential customers should also be able to opt-out74. Instead, the entire class 
of customers who use electricity in their homes are being positioned so that the value of their 
negawatts is claimable by others, while larger customers, including global capital such as Wal-
Mart, are allowed to keep the value that using less energy generates for themselves. It is likely 
                                                
72 The main thresholds considered were 1,000,000 kWh (initially favored by Duke Energy’s large commercial 
customers such as Wal-Mart, NCSEA, and Public Staff (E-100, sub 113: 11-14-07), 3,000,000 kWh (initially 
favored by Dominion (E-100, 113: 11-14-07), and 5,000,000 kWh (initially favored by Progress Energy (E-100, sub 
113: 11-14-07) and Duke Energy (E-100, sub 113: 11-14-07). Given the throughput incentive, it makes sense why  
IOUs would favor threshold levels that exclude as many customers as possible. 	  
73 E-100, 113: 12-14-07	  
74 But note that the City of Durham suggests such a thing in the Save-a-Watt proceedings (a separate rulemaking 
docket, E-7, sub 831), writing, “If large users want to have the option of implementing their own EE measures and 
opting out of the surcharge, shouldn’t local governments, small businesses and residents have the option of investing 
in EE on their own and opting out of the surcharge too?” (6-26-08)	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that, in part because households are largely underrepresented75 in the NCUC proceedings 
compared with other actors and interest groups, energy efficiency in homes is being treated as a 
the first frontier of energy efficiency appropriation by IOUs. 
Struggles to Claim Negawatts 
Positioning mainly the energy efficiency that is implemented in homes as counting 
toward REPS requirements may appear to have the paradoxical effect of placing it out of reach 
of IOUs’ accumulation efforts. IOUs and other groups struggled in the REPS rulemaking 
proceedings to determine who produces negawatts and how; these struggles resulted in home 
energy efficiency being framed as produced by energy providers and the exclusion of other 
possible producers of energy efficiency. 
Defining the Processes that Count in Producing Energy Efficiency 
 Electricity flows into homes, but traditionally the only way that homes produce value for 
IOUs is by paying for kilowatt hours they use. This is why the discursive and legal appropriation 
of negawatts includes both the valorization discussed above and processes which position IOUs 
as the producers of these negawatts. Becoming seen as the producers of residential negawatts is 
an accomplishment in particular because it can be counter-intuitive to think of external 
corporations producing value in private homes when those homes consume less of their product. 
IOUs become positioned as the producers of residential negawatts in part through debates about 
what does and does not constitute the production processes76 for negawatts. When IOUs 
                                                
75 The only representation households have directly is through the Public Staff, who are appointed by the state to 
represent the using and consuming public. Otherwise customers are represented only in various interest groups (e.g.,  
ENGOs, the AARP, etc.) in normal NCUC proceedings.	  
76 The idea that energy efficiency itself has production processes (although not always the language of production) is 
widespread among IOUs and ENGOs. For example, some groups frame energy efficiency as something that should 
be mined, captured, or found, as when the ENGO ACEEE (Oct. 2013 white paper, 
http://www.aceee.org/files/pdf/white-paper/eer-2013.pdf) writes, “That future of mining demand-side energy 
resources holds rich veins of remaining opportunities, not to mention yet-to-be-discovered efficiency resources.” It 
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implement programs to encourage their customers to use less energy, which actions should these 
IOUs be compensated for by way of rate increases? The answers to this question by various 
stakeholders construct what counts as part of negawatt production. This debate in the REPS 
proceedings centers around which parts of negawatt production are considered “costs” for which 
IOUs can raise rates as compensation, or which costs should be considered “recoverable.” 
Many groups in these proceedings converged on the theme that negawatt production 
involves buying new technologies77. This framing is visible in the REPS legal definition of 
energy efficiency, which emphasizes “equipment, physical, or program change.” The “program 
change” part of the definition leaves some room for energy efficiency to be interpreted outside of 
or beyond the consumption of new technologies. Yet the vast majority78 of the energy efficiency 
programs approved for compensation and implementation by the NCUC thus far have involved 
technologies. This framing of energy efficiency excludes any saving of energy that results from 
non-technologies such as behaviors. For example, in the case of lighting, this discourse treats 
CFL use as producing negawatts, but not turning off the lights. One possible reason for this 
narrowing of what counts as part of negawatt production is because it can be difficult to measure 
saved energy that results from behaviors, making it especially hard to abstract it. It may also be 
                                                                                                                                                       
was common in the REPS proceedings for environmentalists, policymakers, IOUs, and others to speak of the 
“development” of energy efficiency resources and that energy efficiency must be “made” and “delivered.” Note, 
however, that I am leaving aside the question of what “really are” the production processes of negawatts, in this  
paper. 
77 I am not using “technology” in the STS frame of “technologies and techniques”; rather, I mean material things 
that are more commonly thought of in lay language as “technologies.” Examples of energy efficiency technologies 
might include: CFLs, combined heating and power (CHP) plants, hybrid cars, etc.; they require the producer of 
negawatts to acquire (usually buy) a thing first in order to save energy. Examples of non-technology-centric actions 
that can result in using less energy are behaviors such as turning off the lights, turning down the thermostat, or 
walking to work instead of driving; these actions can involve technologies, but do not necessarily require buying  
new items.	  
78 The main exception of which I am aware is a new set of energy-saving programs proposed by Duke Energy in 
2013 that have not yet been ruled upon by the NCUC that may ultimately include energy conservation education as a 
program, and thus educational programs as recoverable costs.	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difficult to attribute these actions that reduce energy consumption to actions taken by IOUs, 
making it harder for IOUs to claim they are the producers of these negawatts. 
Most groups in these proceedings seem to agree that negawatt production involves 
technologies, but some processes are much more contested; in particular, groups disagreed over 
whether advertising and education about energy efficiency programs and studies of customer 
energy use should be considered recoverable costs for IOUs. IOUs tend to frame all such costs as 
part of the production of negawatts. For example, Duke Energy79 asserts that energy efficiency 
recoverable costs should include “all capital costs, including cost of capital and depreciation 
expenses, marketing and advertising costs, implementation costs, incentive payments to program 
participants, administrative costs, operating costs and measurement and verification costs.” Duke 
Energy is claiming that all of these expenses are part of producing negawatts. In contrast, ENGO 
NCWARN80, addressing a similar claim from Progress Energy, argues against the idea that some 
of these expenditures should be recoverable, saying that accurately counting certain kinds of 
these activities will be too difficult:  
Measuring the real world impacts of the utility energy efficiency programs will be a difficult undertaking. 
As an example, Progress Energy has been running newspaper ads with the ‘Save the Watts Guy’ who [is 
dressed up as a CFL and] suggests ways to save electricity… Does Progress Energy get credit and cost 
recovery for every instance that one of its suggestions is actually followed? Who gets the credit if a 
residential customer buys an energy efficient light bulb on his or her own without paying attention to the 
ad? Does Progress Energy recover advertising expenses even if the ads might not have any substantive  
content and just allow Progress Energy to polish its corporate image? 
NCWARN is arguing that advertising should not always be considered a recoverable cost, and 
thus should not be considered part of negawatt production, because it is unclear that advertising 
results in saved energy.  
                                                
79 E-100, sub 113: 9-24-07 	  
80 E-100, sub 113: 11-7-07	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In its Order81 on these issues, the NCUC ruled that recoverable costs would include costs 
of investments in infrastructure, administration of energy efficiency programs, incentives to 
customers to participate, but not advertising or measurement of whether energy efficiency has 
happened. In other words, for a CFL giveaway, the costs of bulbs, their shipping, any rebates for 
customers, and labor of Duke Energy workers who administer the program are all part of the 
production of negawatts, but the marketing of the program to customers and any follow-up 
studies to see how many people are actually using the bulbs are not. Even with these limitations, 
IOUs are positioned as the producers of negawatts because multiple actions that IOUs can 
contribute to are framed as part of the production of using less energy. But household labor of 
installing, using, cleaning up after, and disposing of CFLs are not considered part of production, 
even though these actions are necessary to the creation of value that happens when such bulbs 
are installed (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 3). 
Excluding Alternative Producers of Energy Efficiency 
A second way that IOUs are positioned as the producers of energy efficiency in homes is 
by excluding alternative producers both legally and discursively. Given other states’ electricity 
policies, IOUs are not the only possible state-endorsed producer of negawatts, because energy 
efficiency programs have also been administered by state agencies and third parties. In NC, 
government-administration of energy efficiency programs was proposed as a law called 
NCSAVE$, which never passed the legislature. In interviews, ENGO representatives told me this 
was because Duke Energy did not want it to pass. In Oregon and Vermont, Energy Trusts were 
created independently of IOUs to implement energy efficiency programs (RAP 2011b: 78). In 
practice, such third party production could include a third party contractor installing CFLs in 
                                                
81 E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order)	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homes, which generates an energy efficiency credit (“white tag”) equal to the number of 
kilowatt-hours saved; an IOU could then purchase this credit to meet their REPS requirement. 
NC law allows such third parties to produce negawatts that IOUs could then purchase to 
meet the requirements of REPS, but neither a market for white tags nor a platform through which 
IOUs could buy such credits from third parties has materialized. This is surprising because many 
other natural resources have been fully commodified (e.g., carbon offsets and wetlands). The 
REPS law specifically creates such a platform for registering (although not trading; however, the 
registration is supposed to facilitate trading by abstracting the energy) renewable energy credits 
and states that “one megawatt hour of electricity…reduced by implementation of an energy 
efficiency measure” can count as such a renewable energy credit (REPS of 2007). Yet in the 
rulemaking for REPS, the platform for registering such credits is only established for renewable 
energy projects; in my observations and interviews, I found that many stakeholders seemed 
unaware82 that energy efficiency could legally be included. To date, no energy efficiency credits 
have been registered on the NC green tag trading platform83. In the rulemaking, the NCUC ruled 
that such white tags were a legal means for IOUs to fulfill their REPS requirements, but noted 
that the REPS law does not “provide for the purchase of RECs associated with the 
implementation of EE.”84 The lack of a platform for registering energy efficiency excludes 
alternative producers of energy efficiency from participating in the implementation of REPS, 
                                                
82 Even experts on energy policy in NC are not always aware that energy efficiency can be included in the green tag 
platform established for IOUs to buy green tags from third parties. For example, I interviewed a representative of 
DSIRE, a database for renewable and energy efficiency policies nationwide; the representative is considered an 
expert in NC green energy policies in the electricity sector. In the interview, I asked him why energy efficiency is 
not traded as part of REPS. He responded that such an action was legally excluded by the NC REPS law. However, 
during the course of the interview, he looked up the NC REPS law on his computer and then, sounding surprised, he 
corrected himself, reading the pertinent part of the law out loud to me and saying that he had just found out that  
REPS does include energy efficiency as part of the green tag platform. 	  
83 As of 28 March 2014; platform available: http://www.ncrets.org/ 	  
84 E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order)	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including third party contractors as well as households, who might otherwise buy CFLs 
themselves and sell the saved energy to their utility (which might be accomplished, in theory, 
similarly to net metering for renewable energy). 
Finally, the exclusion of non-IOUs as producers of negawatts is also accomplished 
through language that normalizes IOUs as implementers of energy efficiency and frames other 
producers as exceptions. In these proceedings, “energy efficiency” usually refers to negawatts 
implemented through IOU-administered programs. When customers (industrial, commercial, or 
residential) implement their own energy efficiency without IOU influence, many stakeholders in 
these proceedings referred to this as self-initiated,” 85 “self-implemented”86, or “self-directed”87 
energy efficiency. These framings of energy efficiency are about giving large corporations (IOUs 
and other big capital88) the opportunity to claim the value of energy efficiency for itself, by 
framing “normal” negawatts as belonging first and foremost to them.  
 
Through these struggles over what energy efficiency is, where it is located, how it is 
produced and by whom, the negawatt is created as a valuable resource for IOUs to control in 
order to accumulate wealth. By creating the negawatt as a valuable thing that they produce, but 
also as an absence that leads to corporate lost revenues, IOUs position themselves as the proper 
recipients of value and of compensation for lost value. By limiting valuable energy efficiency to 
that which happens in homes, while normalizing IOUs as the producers of negawatts, IOUs 
                                                
85 E-100, sub 113: 9-24-07 (Progress Energy)	  
86 E-100, sub 113: 2-29-08 (NCUC Order)	  
87 E-100, sub 113: 12-17-07 (Nucor)	  
88 E.g., Wal-Mart and other commercial/industrial opt-outs.	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effectively appropriate the low-hanging negawatt fruit that previously had been causing them 
short-term revenue shortfalls compared to their predictions.  
Discussion 
Two aspects of the struggles over the valuation, spatiality, and control of negawatts are 
unusual compared with neoliberalizations of other socio-natures. First, negawatts already create 
monetary value for households, so their appropriation does not involve traditional discourses of 
valuation that have to first posit nature as valuable; instead, the struggle is to define the value in 
certain ways. Second, negawatts are appropriated in the context of a large regulated monopoly 
system. Given these unique qualities, these struggles over negawatts in the REPS proceedings 
have particular implications. 
Appropriating Negawatts 
Out of these struggles over the valuation, spatiality, and control of negawatts, IOUs have 
effectively gained control over some of the energy efficiency occurring in homes in NC. The 
value of energy efficiency that used to accrue primarily to households when they installed 
energy-saving technologies for themselves instead has been positioned as the private property of 
IOUs. The processes through which negawatts are valorized and abstracted separate the value of 
using less from the traditional producers of that value, who are people in households performing 
the labor of using less. Previous research has shown that what is widely considered the easiest 
energy efficiency action, using CFLs, can be labor for residents, particularly when those 
households try to use the CFLs to the environmental and health standards set by ENGOs and the 
EPA (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 3). If even using CFLs can entail five different actions 
(including self-education, altered habits of lighting use, transportation to buy the bulbs, extensive 
clean-up from breakage, and disposal of a hazardous substance), it is not a stretch to imagine that 
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many actions to use less electricity involve household labor. Yet this labor is completely absent 
from struggles in the REPS proceedings over what should be considered to count (and be 
compensated for) in the production of using less. The question of whether households might be 
part or full “owners” of the negawatts they help to produce with their labor (and money) is also 
neglected.  
The case of negawatt appropriation shares features with the privatization and 
commodification of other socio-natures. Scholars have distinguished different phases of 
commodification of nature. Castree (2003), for example, argues that commodification includes 
privatization, alienation, individuation, valuation, and displacement. Bumpus (2011) shows how 
commodification of carbon offsets involves privatization, individuation/abstraction, 
monitoring/verification, and displacement/exchange and Robertson (2000) argues the moments 
of wetland commodification include abstraction, monetary valuation, spatial abstraction, and 
exchange. The literature on the commodification of nature suggests what the appropriation of 
negawatts can accomplish for IOUs: a specific kind of saved energy (that in homes) is valorized 
and abstracted in ways that make it available to spatially-removed capital, IOUs, to use for 
accumulation.  
The neoliberalization of negawatts involves sub-processes often thought of as part of 
commodification: valuation and abstraction. In the REPS rulemaking, valorization struggles have 
resulted in a paradoxical definition of energy efficiency as something that both creates and 
destroys value for IOUs. Unlike minerals, using less energy can be more difficult to envision as a 
traditional resource because of its lack of materiality, which is perhaps one of the reasons that so 
much effort is expended in establishing the negawatt as a resource, fuel, and power plant; 
framing energy efficiency as a resource – as a thing that exists - is an accomplishment that could 
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fail and thus requires effort to maintain. Constructing a valuable resource as located in homes 
poses a particular challenge for IOUs: how can they accrue the value of this resource if it is 
located in a sphere traditionally thought of as private and outside the influence of outside energy 
providers? Thus the value of household energy efficiency must be abstracted so that it can 
circulate and accrue to actors outside of homes. Valorizing using less energy and then narrowing 
it to only a portion of the potential saved energy resource sets only some energy efficiency free 
for circulation, and the subset that is abstracted in this way is mainly different from the rest of 
negawatts in not being controlled by large corporations. The result is that the value from using 
less energy comes to be seen as a thing separatable from its traditional producers (people in 
households), able to circulate beyond them, and hence as claimable by others: it becomes 
appropriable. Thus valorization and abstraction processes are here key conditions for the 
corporate accumulation happening through appropriation of negawatts. 
A key comparison with negawatts is the case of carbon offsets, an ecosystem service-like 
commodity with some similarities to negawatts. Bumpus and Liverman (2008) show that 
abstracting carbon is a key process in what they call the “accumulation by decarbonization” 
through which “carbon is materially created [in] sinks or destroyed in reductions, but eventually 
becomes a virtual commodity that is abstracted and transferred across space as a tonne of 
reduced carbon to be ‘consumed’ by an organization that wants to compensate for emissions of 
equal value…” Similarly, reductions in energy use, measured in kilowatt-hours saved, are 
abstracted across a variety of energy efficiency technologies, across different types of homes 
across landscapes, and separated from the social contexts (Robertson 2000) – including labor 
processes - in which they are saved, so that they come to be treated as one thing, a kilowatt-hour 
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less. These processes of abstraction separate saved energy from its context so that it can be 
framed as produced, controlled, and owned by IOUs.  
Yet there are important differences between these other cases of neoliberalization of 
nature and the appropriation of negawatts. Energy efficiency has commonly already been a 
private good, unlike many other socio-natures which have been held collectively, so the process 
occurring here is appropriation, not privatization. Because of the absence of any market or ability 
to exchange negawatts, energy efficiency has also not been fully commodified in NC. While 
other neoliberalized natures have been fully commodified, in this case appropriation via 
regulation may more fully allow capital to control the value of energy efficiency, especially in an 
already-regulated monopoly system.  
Neoliberalizing Negawatts as Accumulation Strategy 
The neoliberalization of household negawatts can be seen as a transfer of wealth from 
households to IOUs because value that is produced in part through household labor is claimed by 
and becomes a source of profits for IOUs. In the case of CFL giveaways and other utility-
implemented energy efficiency programs, utilities and households are clearly both involved in 
the production of negawatts. Yet in the REPS proceedings, only corporate value-making is 
recognized. Part of the way the erasure of the household in producing the value of negawatts is 
facilitated by the ways that the labor of using CFLs and other home green technologies is often 
coded as “women’s work” and thus as not work (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 3). The 
appropriation of negawatts can be seen as part of the larger class project of neoliberalism that 
represents multiple ways to transfer wealth to capitalists (Harvey 2005). As Bridge (2010) 
writes, “resource making” can be seen as “theft.” 
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How much wealth is being transferred? This question is surprisingly complex, a 
complexity that both highlights the paradoxical processes occurring and hides the transfer of 
wealth. Given that the NCUC has granted utilities the ability to raise rates for creating/destroying 
value through energy efficiency, it is surprising that the amount of money households and 
utilities benefit and/or lose is not easy to find in public records. In Appendix 1, I create a 
conceptual model of the relationships within utility-sponsored energy efficiency programs under 
REPS regulation between: electricity prices; utility costs, revenues, and profits; and customer 
electricity bills. I conclude that the neoliberalization of negawatts in this case is a transfer of 
wealth to IOUs because utilities see higher profits and customers see higher electricity bills. 
Before REPS, the relationship was the opposite, because people in households paid lower 
electricity bills when they used energy efficient technologies (Figures 4.2-4.5). This transfer of 
wealth is especially true for those customers who do not take part in the utility programs; for 
example, not all Duke Energy residential customers receive free CFLs, but all receive higher 
prices of electricity to pay for such programs. These conceptual relationships are based upon my 
back-of-the envelope calculations, but are not surprising given the near-universal agreement 
among stakeholders in these proceedings that utilities should receive rates of return on money 
invested in energy efficiency programs higher than those they receive from traditional 
investments in order to provide incentives to energy efficiency programs. 
I used a back-of-the-envelope calculation (also in Appendix 1) to estimate the scale of 
the wealth transfer over four years, the length of the first Duke Energy household energy 
efficiency programs. Buying CFLs themselves in the absence of the REPS legislation, 
households would save an average of $130; in the presence of REPS, customers installing the 
CFLs would pay net $30 to Duke Energy, so the implementation of REPS results in a transfer for 
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value of $160 from CFL-using households to the IOU. Customers who did not use the CFLs 
given away by Duke Energy under the presence of REPS would pay $60 in higher electricity 
bills over the same period, another layer in the transfer of wealth. 
The neoliberalization of negawatts through REPS can be seen as a way that IOUs, largely 
with the backing of policymakers, the NCUC, and, perhaps most surprisingly, ENGOs, use 
environmental governance and the threat of environmental crisis to secure markets into the 
future. McCarthy’s (2004) case of NAFTA as primitive accumulation of the conditions of 
production sheds particular light for the case of negawatts. He found that NAFTA resulted in 
guarantees of corporate profits by positioning environmental regulations as “takings” for which 
these corporations should be compensated. Similarly, I have shown that energy efficiency 
imposed on IOUs through the REPS law is framed as resulting in “revenue erosion” and “lost 
revenues” for which IOUs as considered to be entitled compensation. In a related docket, the 
City of Durham89 in fact argues that Duke Energy is trying to impose a normalization of 
compensation for such “takings” through their implementation of REPS. 
Neoliberalization of negawatts can be seen as an accumulation strategy in the short- and 
long-term for electricity companies in an era of threats to profits from environmentalism and 
climate change mitigation. In a world where people use less and less electricity in order to 
mitigate climate change, IOUs are likely to experience decreasing sales of kilowatt hours but 
increasing prices of electricity, which can result in both short- and long-term declines in profits. 
Appropriating household negawatts allows utilities to resolve both the throughput incentive 
problem and the Averch-Johnson Effect, providing incentives for IOUs to promote energy 
efficiency in the short- and long-term but also turning negawatts into profits in both time scales. 
In addition, like carbon offsets (Bumpus 2011), negawatts requires its “opposite” (kilowatt 
                                                
89 E-7, sub 831: 6-26-08	  
 127 
 
hours) to continue to be consumed in order to exist. We can see this for negawatts by asking 
“how many negawatts are there?”, a question implying that there are exactly as many negawatts 
potentially consumable as electricity that is being consumed (or produced) in a given moment. 
The emphasis on using less energy via negawatt appropriation perpetuates long-term 
consumption of IOU products, be they electricity or the absence of electricity. 
In these ways, it is possible to take the following statement by Duke Energy in its 2007 
Energy Efficiency Plan90 seriously:  
The Company’s new role is to manage energy efficiency as a reliable ‘fifth fuel’ and provide customers 
with universal access to energy efficiency services and new technology. Duke Energy Carolinas has the 
expertise, infrastructure and customer relationships to produce energy efficiency and make it a significant  
part of its resource mix.  
IOU moves to appropriate household negawatts are both a short-term and long-term business 
strategy that provides utilities with profits even in the face of climate change mitigation and its 
potential high rates of energy conservation. They normalize the idea that IOUs have a right to 
certain levels of sales and that IOUs are the rightful owners of this residential negawatts 
resource. Other forms of energy efficiency – those produced by businesses, governments, 
industries, along other parts of electricity production networks, as well as behaviors, in addition 
to technologies - have not been appropriated by IOUs. They may well represent new frontiers for 
the mining of energy values. 
Negawatt Spatiality 
The struggles to define energy efficiency under REPS law in NC have resulted in the 
valorization and abstraction of a spatially-specific form of negawatts: those in homes. However, 
electrical negawatts might be thought to occur throughout human-built landscapes: in the realms 
of other electricity customers (businesses, governments, industries) but also along other parts of 
                                                
90 E-7, sub 831: 5-7-07	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electricity networks (in the mining of coal, in power plants, along transmission lines and within 
transformers). It is also possible to imagine saved energy as about behaviors instead of 
technologies, further expanding the possibilities for electrical energy efficiency landscapes. 
How can using less energy, which is often thought of as an absence, have a spatiality? In 
part this spatiality is an imaginary landscape of disappearing currently-consumed electricity. In 
that way, the landscape of negawatts is closely tied to the spatiality of electricity. While 
electricity is generally treated as a universal service available to everyone who can pay, its 
spatiality is determined by the current infrastructure of the electricity grid and by the political 
boundaries drawn by regulatory bodies. NC falls under the Eastern Interconnection, a set of 
linked transmission lines spanning the Eastern U.S. from the Rocky Mountains (excluding 
Texas, which has a separate grid) (RAP 2011b: 15). In theory, then, it is possible to imagine 
negawatts “flowing” along this grid, and thus circulatable among energy providers throughout it. 
Yet state boundaries delimit negawatt realms because of the ways electricity is regulated on a 
state, not federal, basis. Thus, the NCUC has determined that negawatts only count for IOUs if 
they are produced in that IOU’s territory in the state of NC; an alternative arrangement that has 
not been implemented might be to say that IOUs could buy negawatts from neighboring states, 
just as they do for electricity. Even if negawatts were fully commodified, they would still be 
limited by the regulatory landscape of white tag trading markets; for example, at present the 
regulatory landscape of renewable energy certificates (which NC white tags can, in theory, join) 
is limited to trading in NC and the North American Renewables Registry, encompassing parts of 
the Southeastern and Midwestern U.S. and roughly half the provinces of Canada (NC-RETS 
2012). 
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Carbon offsets again provide an important comparison. Energy efficient technologies like 
CFLs have been used in other countries to produce carbon offsets, but the spatiality of NC’s 
negawatts and global carbon offsets is fundamentally different, posing particular challenges for 
those attempting to accumulate by claiming its value. As Bumpus and Liverman (2008) show, 
carbon offsets link Global North with Global South countries because they are less expensive to 
obtain in developing countries. In contrast, the REPS law limits the extent of the similar 
geographical reach of negawatts because energy efficiency projects to fulfill it must occur in the 
state of NC and, at least in practice (because a white tag market has not developed) has been 
limited to the territory of each IOU. Yet the neoliberalization of negawatts still results in a power 
imbalance, as corporations outside of homes claim a “resource” within homes for the purposes of 
resolving challenges of accumulation. Because they occur in homes, the accumulation of 
negawatts is also different from carbon offsets because it is tied to social reproduction, including 
gender inequalities (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 3) and identities (Thoyre dissertation Chapter 
2).  
Conclusions 
In this paper, I have shown how IOUs gained control over the value of household 
negawatts in NC by appropriating them in legal and discursive struggles over the implementation 
of a state Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard. Because traditional 
regulatory structures of electricity monopolies in the U.S. have disincentivized energy efficiency 
from the point of view of electricity providers, the state of NC attempted to encourage such 
energy efficiency through mechanisms of compensation through which IOUs are paid for both 
the value created and destroyed by negawatts. In struggles over the spatiality of negawatts, the 
energy efficiency that counts according to REPS law became codified as that which occurs in 
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homes. Yet IOUs gained control of such energy efficiency by defining what counts in the 
production of energy efficiency and by excluding alternative possible producers of energy 
efficiency. The resulting appropriation of energy efficiency via environmental governance 
represents an accumulation strategy for IOUs that has allowed them to turn climate change from 
threat to opportunity for profit in both the short- and long-term. 
 This research suggests several future directions. It is still unknown how much wealth is 
being transferred and how much greenhouse gas emissions are effected by this kind of energy 
efficiency policy. Would a more competitive market for energy efficiency or government-run 
energy efficiency programs, help or hinder equity and sustainability goals embodied by energy 
efficiency policies? Since the neoliberalization of other systems has often involved appropriation 
(often via privatization) as a first step toward commodification, will negawatts ultimately be 
commodified as well, or does the unique history and geography of electricity systems mean that 
appropriation is the more lucrative accumulation strategy? 
 The energy efficiency portion of REPS applies to three different kinds of electricity 
utilities in NC, investor-owned utilities, municipalities, and cooperatives91, but I have focused 
my research on IOUs. A test of whether this appropriation of negawatts is driven primarily by 
the profit motive could compare the effects of REPS on IOU-, municipality-, and cooperative-
run energy efficiency programs. Such a comparison is not possible in the present research 
because of data limitations. Even though REPS applies to IOUs and munis/coops, munis and 
coops only participated in the energy efficiency rulemaking in a limited way. Of the 208 
documents that made up the energy efficiency rulemaking, only six represented participation by 
                                                
91 The magnitude of the portfolio standard is larger for IOUs vs. munis/coops, but no cap is put on the percent that 
can be met through energy efficiency (REPS of 2007).	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munis or coops. Of these, one92 was a petition to intervene by an electric coop that was denied 
for not meeting regulations by the NCUC; two93 were comments by a group of municipalities 
who expressed opinions on the guidelines for opting out (since munis are consumers of IOU-
produced electricity); and otherwise these groups mainly commented on issues unrelated to the 
present analysis94 or expressed broad agreement95 with the stance taken by Progress Energy. It is 
possible that such groups did not participate in the rulemaking as much as IOUs, ENGOs, and 
other groups because they have fewer resources and because their incentive structure is different 
when it comes to energy efficiency because they are not shareholder-owned private companies. 
A test of the profit-motive explanation would be possible by comparing the energy efficiency 
programs of different kinds of electricity providers and tracing where the value of energy 
efficiency is flowing, and would be an area ripe for further research beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
 Such a comparison between IOUs and munis/coops could be especially useful for 
understanding questions of equity and sustainability embodied by energy efficiency programs. 
For example, munis and government-run utilities like the TVA were some of the first utilities in 
the nation to implement energy-saving utility programs in the 1970s and 1980s, spurring state 
regulators to require energy efficiency of IOUs (Hirsch 199: 157-169). What kinds of political 
economic structures for commodities such as electricity can best attain the sustainability goals of 
reducing energy consumption in a neoliberal era is an area of research that should be further 
examined. 
                                                
92 E-100, sub 113: 9-21-07 (EnergyUnited)	  
93 E-100, sub 113: 11-14-07 (ElectriCities) and 12-14-07 (ElectriCities and NC EMC)	  
94 E-100, sub 113: 9-24-07 (ElectriCities) and 11-14-07 (NC EMC)	  
95 E-100, sub 113: 9-27-07 (NC EMC)	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Finally, this research has several implications for thinking through climate change and 
energy policies. How might we make such policies more equitable? As they exist now, the REPS 
and other energy efficiency policies have the effect of transferring wealth from residential 
customers to energy companies. This framing of energy efficiency, which is not the only one 
possible, requires that electricity consumption continue into the future, as Bumpus (2011) shows 
is also true for carbon offsets: the value that derives from this socio-nature only accrues to IOUs 
if people continue to consume electricity. However, it is not clear if equitable energy efficiency 
portfolio standards are possible in a monopoly system where electricity companies are 
guaranteed survival.  
How might energy efficiency portfolio standards (or energy efficiency parts of RPSs) be 
crafted to avoid the transfer of wealth from customers to IOUs within monopoly systems? In 
some ways, a fuller commodification of negawatts may be more equitable in that it might allow 
for a less uneven distribution of the value of such saved energy than the one currently in effect in 
NC. For example, broadening what counts as energy efficiency to include behaviors, commercial 
and industrial buildings, and especially the supply-side (power plants), while also allowing 
residential customers to opt-out and to sell their energy efficiency to the grid (like net metering) 
could minimize the magnitude of the transfer of wealth accompanying such policies. Indeed, as 
Hess (2011) and Bakker (2005) have shown, not all neoliberalizations of nature result in worse 
social or environmental outcomes than what came before. However, the history of 
neoliberalizations, including that of more “full” commodifications of resources, suggests that 
such a move is likely to exacerbate existing inequalities (e.g., McCarthy 2007). Because of the 
ways that using less energy is valuable and the large potential for low-income households to 
benefit from such value (given their low levels of energy efficiency adoption and high levels of 
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energy poverty), there is also a great potential for energy efficiency programs to help build 
resources for low-incomes households and communities, particularly if they are structured to do 
so. 
A key starting point may be to alter the ways that environmentalists, policymakers, and 
consumer advocates frame energy efficiency in such policy discourses to more fully reflect the 
range of production processes of energy efficiency and to question the assumption that electricity 
companies should always be paid for selling less of their product. Opening up this hegemonic 
discourse has the potential to center perhaps more equitable energy efficiency producers, from 
state and local governments, to individuals, but also social movements.  
Finally, it is important to question whether REPS legislation is, in fact, resulting in the 
material environmental sustainability that its proponents claim. Legislating energy efficiency, 
similar to legislating “no net loss” of wetlands (Robertson 2000), may not always increase 
energy efficiency or decrease greenhouse gas emissions (for example in the ways Piedmont 
Natural Gas argued that they may not, above). Such considerations should be a part of any 
negawatt-promoting policies. It is not clear that REPS has resulted in people using less energy in 
the aggregate, but more importantly, it is not clear that the benefits that lay behind desires for 
energy efficiency are being impacted. It is not energy efficiency per se that is desired, but the 
values it produces in lowered electricity bills, lower pollution, and lower environmental impacts 
from coal and uranium mining.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 I have used political ecological and symbolic interactionist theories, mixed qualitative 
methods of data collection and analysis, and the case of CFL promotions to analyze processes in 
the production of consuming less electricity. My findings suggest that, far from being a self-
evident technical entity, “energy efficiency” is produced as an idea, a part of identities, a 
resource, and a source of value through social, political, and economic processes. In Chapter 2, I 
showed how environmentalists use CFLs to make and claim neoliberal identities, proposing the 
concept of green neoliberal identity work as a mechanism through which neoliberal ideologies 
are translated into individualistic, consumptive, techno-centric environmentalist practices. In 
Chapter 3, I showed how using even this seemingly easiest energy efficient technology 
constitutes labor that is gendered in ways that reflect and reproduce inequalities. In Chapter 4, I 
showed how electricity companies have used environmental governance to valorize and 
appropriate home energy efficiency in ways that represent an accumulation strategy. In these 
ways, my research tells us about how environmentalists become laboring subjects in an era of 
neoliberalism and how energy companies are responding to the threat of climate change by 
turning mitigation into an opportunity for profits. 
My research hinges on the ways that energy efficiency promotions by environmentalists 
and electricity companies call for consuming less energy by consuming more technologies, a 
relationship I examine more explicitly in this chapter. This conclusion represents a drawing 
together of the work done so far and a pointing toward further research possibilities. I will begin 
by examining how my findings explain ENGO and IOU promotions of CFLs that appear 
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counter-intuitive, by drawing out the symbolic flexibility and power of CFLs. I then propose a 
theory of green obsolescence as a way to better understand why energy efficiency in particular 
has become such a focus of environmentalism and energy providers. Building off this theory, I 
begin to frame the production of energy efficiency as a global production network which weaves 
together different commodities, laborers, and governance networks. I conclude with suggestions 
for future research directions that further develop the findings of each chapter as well as the ideas 
of green obsolescence, energy efficiency production networks, and energy efficiency as a 
relationship. 
Explaining Apparently Counter-Intuitive CFL Promotions 
 I began my research interested in understanding how and why environmentalists and 
electricity companies have promoted the use of CFLs as a key solution to climate change, given 
the contradictions in these positions. For environmentalists, the magnitude of these CFL 
promotions seemed surprising given how small an impact (<1%) they can make on U.S. GHG 
emissions. For electricity companies, the CFL promotions were surprising because it is unusual 
for companies to encourage their customers to buy less of their product. These two strange 
bedfellows have converged on the promotion of a technology that is supposed to use less energy. 
This dissertation, especially Chapters 2 and 4, helps explain these counter-intuitive CFL 
promotions by showing what CFLs do for environmentalists and IOUs as well as what 
environmentalists and IOUs do with CFLs. 
Explaining IOU promotions of CFLs and energy efficiency in NC is more clear-cut than 
explaining environmentalist promotions. In Chapter 4, I showed how the struggles to implement 
NC’s REPS policy resulted in the valorization and appropriation of residential negawatts in ways 
that help IOUs accumulate profits in the short- and long-term. IOUs have used such 
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environmental governance to turn the threat of widespread climate change mitigation into an 
opportunity for profits. It is also likely that CFLs in particular are an attractive vehicle for IOU 
energy efficiency programs because they involve a usually seamless transition from traditional 
incandescent technologies (same rough size, shape, light quality and quality) and they have a 
clear maximum limit on the amount of energy that could be saved, maintaining the hegemonic 
power of electricity as a system. Although an important part of the story, my analysis of the ways 
environmentalists use CFLs to do green neoliberal identity work in Chapter 2 does not fully 
explain how environmentalists come to promote such an insignificant technology for such a large 
environmental problem. Here I want to discuss the ways that the CFL’s symbolic flexibility and 
power take the explanation further; these understandings also help explain why IOUs have 
fixated on CFLs in particular to carry their energy efficiency programs. In the section following 
this, I will broaden to another part of the story, proposing a theory of green obsolescence.  
The CFL as a Flexible Symbol 
 CFLs are a particularly flexible symbol for carrying the disparate desires and needs of 
both environmentalists and electricity providers. In Chapter 2, I showed how people could use 
CFLs to claim a range of neoliberal identities. This reflects a particular ambivalence about CFLs 
on the part of environmentalists that I encountered throughout my research. In many ways, 
ENGOs portray CFLs in very different ways depending on who and where their audience is, 
showing CFLs’ symbolic flexibility. I found that ENGOs publicly and nationally portrayed CFLs 
as an unproblematic key climate change activist action, while locally and privately the messages 
and identity work are more complex and ambivalent. 
On the national and public stages, environmentalists have tended to portray using CFLs 
as an unproblematic yet key action people should do to solve climate change. All the “Big 10” 
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ENGOs I examined linked CFLs to climate change via personal actions except for the 
Wilderness Society, and many portrayed CFLs as a key action individuals can and should do to 
mitigate climate change. About half the ENGOs featured CFLs prominently in general lists of 
things “you” or “individuals” can do to mitigate global warming. EDF listed CFLs #2 out of 
four; Defenders of Wildlife #4 of seven; and TNC #3 of nine. The Sierra Club’s “Ten things you 
can do to help curb global warming” (see list in the Chapter 1) listed CFLs as #4. The Audubon 
Society said CFLs or natural lighting are #2 out of the “most important” of eleven “ways we can 
all make a difference.”  
When I analyzed websites for the other 35 ENGOs included in USCAN, 15 said CFLs 
were an important action to help stop climate change; 12 of these strongly suggest CFLs as a key 
way to solve climate change, while four said it is important to use CFLs but they are not enough 
(one group did both). Of these 35, the Coalition on the Environment and Jewish Life (COEJL) 
pushed for CFLs the hardest, writing, “Our message is as easy as changing a light bulb: If you 
could conserve energy and help stop global warming in one simple step, wouldn’t you? CFLs use 
up to 75% less energy than incandescent light bulbs, while lasting approximately eight times 
longer…” [emphasis theirs]. In contrast, 350.org provided a list of ten things to do to solve 
climate change, where CFLs are fourth, but they caution that these ten things are just “a few 
places to start,” because “if we all were just to focus on individual changes in our lifestyles, we 
might never reach 350 ppm.” The split between the “Big 10” ENGOs and the other 35 less 
mainstream, regional, or smaller ENGOs suggests that not all ENGOs with an online, more-than-
local presence agree that CFLs are a key action. However, all 25 groups that talk about CFLs 
suggest that their use is largely unproblematic: they make a difference and are an important start.  
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In contrast with these national discourses, I found that privately and more locally, 
environmentalists exhibited more ambivalence about the connection between CFLs and climate 
change. I encountered this ambivalence in many of the formal and informal interviews with local 
environmentalists in one-on-one settings. Nearly everyone I spoke with told me enthusiastically 
that “of course, all earth advocates use them” (as one interviewee put it), yet when I asked them 
what difference the bulbs make, or how climate change will be solved, they said things like, 
“everyone knows it’s like spitting in the ocean” (as a different interviewee put it) to use CFLs. 
As an illustration, here are two excerpts from the same interview with Hillary, a stay-at-home-
parent who uses CFLs in her home and has been talking about how she promoted CFLs at her 
church: 
Interviewer: So what was the purpose of having CFLs? What was that program- 
Hillary: Mostly to educate people and to get CFLs into their hands. 
Interviewee: For what purpose? 
Hillary: For energy savings? [Her tone sounds confused] I mean, for the obvious reasons you might want 
to use a CFL. 
Interviewee: And what are those obvious reasons? 
Hillary: Energy savings, mostly. Decrease electricity use. 
Interviewee: To save money mostly? 
Hillary: For me, it’s to save energy. I think for many people it’s to save money. 
Interviewee: And when you say, “to save energy,” why do you want to do that? What do you kind of 
envision as kind of the end goal of that? 
Hillary [Her tone sounds somewhat annoyed]: Because we’re destroying the earth. [She laughs bitterly] 
There’s an elephant in the room which is that there’s an urgency and enormity of climate change that is not  
being addressed. 
Notice how she does not seem to understand what I am asking when I ask why one should use or 
promote CFLs. Her tone, repetitions that she is using CFLs “to save energy,” and her final ironic 
laughter signify how common-sense it is to her that you would use CFLs for the climate. Yet, 
later in the interview, when I asked her, “how do you think that climate change will be solved?” 
she responded, 
I don’t know what you mean by climate change solved. But, I think it’s going to be multifaceted and little 
bits of everything that can be done. [She discusses the possibility of Carbon Capture and Storage]… 
Particularly in Europe, they’re doing some novel technology that we don’t have here yet but you know, 
[articles about the technologies in Europe] talk about all sorts of solutions that I had never heard of, that I 
think are gonna be part of the final, kind of, way this thing hopefully works itself out. I don’t think it’s  
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gonna be changing my bulbs. [emphasis mine] 
On the one hand, Hillary promotes CFLs because of the enormity of climate change: she has 
taken care to use CFLs throughout her own home and spread the gospel about them. On the other 
hand, she clearly says she does not think changing her own bulbs really matters to solving 
climate change. This contradiction was common in the interviews. 
Research on the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) has shown that many 
technologies take on multiple meanings that are inherently social. These scholars call attention to 
the “relevant social groups” that form around a technology and how they often have different 
meanings for the same technology (Pinch and Bijker 1987: 29-34). SCOT theorists follow 
sociology of scientific knowledge theorist Bloor in insisting on symmetry: that “successful” 
technologies be studied in the same way as “unsuccessful” ones (Pinch and Bijker 1987: 18, 28). 
Bijker (1992) showed this in his history of early (non-compact) fluorescent lights. CFLs can thus 
hold different meanings for different groups of environmentalists, and even in different contexts 
for the same person. “Interpretive flexibility” means that these groups may see different 
symbolic meanings in the CFLs as well as have different ideas about what makes a light bulb 
“successful” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999: 21). The CFLs’ symbolic flexibility allows several 
contradictory views about the future of climate change mitigation to co-exist, at least 
momentarily, within the same movements, organizations, and even individuals. 
The CFL as a Powerful Symbol of Ecological Modernity 
Although CFLs are a flexible symbol, they are likely most often used as a symbol of 
ecological modernity, following a long tradition of light bulbs symbolizing more than light. The 
incandescent light bulb ushered in the era of electricity as the first wide-spread technological use 
of electric power in homes (Schewe 2007: 70) after its invention in the 1870s (RAP 2011b: 1). It 
became a symbol of modernity in homes, particularly symbolizing modern electricity. During the 
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Depression, the U.S. government’s Rural Electrification Administration famously used images of 
incandescents to promote electricity through Lester Beall’s posters (MoMA 2012). Even today, 
people invoke the symbolism of lighting representing electricity when they call electricity losses 
“blackouts” (Nye 2010). Even the image of light bulbs (and phrases like, “a light bulb went off 
in my head”) to signify “aha!” moments, inventions, or ideas can be linked to a long history of 
light bulbs symbolizing novelty, speed, convenience, and modernity.  
CFLs can be seen as the latest incarnation of this tradition of light bulbs symbolizing 
progress, modernity, and innovation. My research shows that the image and idea of the CFL 
symbolizes a certain kind of modernity, what Hajer (1995) would call “ecological 
modernization,” characterized by extensive adoption of home green technologies. Throughout 
my research, I have observed the image of the CFL being used to represent energy efficiency and 
climate change mitigation-oriented environmental activism. For example, it was common for a 
squiggly-shaped CFL to be the image used by environmental groups, electricity providers, and 
governmental agencies at the local, state, and federal levels to represent energy efficiency.  
The following moment in the Colbert Report TV show (2007) illustrates the larger 
environmentalist discourses at stake when talking about CFLs and climate change mitigation: 
It’s February 12, 2007, and satirical pundit Stephen Colbert is interviewing scientist Michael Oppenheimer 
about climate change. Colbert says, “Now let me guess. We’re all doomed, right? We’re gonna be lucky to 
make it through this interview. We’re gonna die.” After a short back-and-forth, Oppenheimer responds, 
“No, this is a problem that can still be solved… The future remains soundly in our hands.” Colbert 
demands, “How do we solve it without me making any sacrifices?” Oppenheimer admits, “You’re gonna 
probably have to make some sacrifices,” but Colbert interrupts him to dismiss this possibility: “You’ve got 
the wrong guy!” Oppenheimer quickly says, “Oh no, they’re small… Even you will be able to do it.” He 
suggests Colbert should drive a “high fuel economy” car. Then he says, “Do you have light bulbs in your 
house?” Colbert reluctantly admits he does. Oppenheimer says, “Use the compact fluorescent ones. They 
use a quarter less energy.” Colbert refuses because CFLs “make you turn green, you look like a skull-faced 
creature.” Oppenheimer assures Colbert the “new” bulbs are improved. He then suggests other actions to 
solve climate change - planting a tree and buying an EnergyStar dishwasher - before Colbert changes the  
subject.  
Here, Colbert plays the role of the doubting public reluctant to be an environmentalist because 
he’s sure this will involve gloom-and-doom and sacrifice. Oppenheimer plays the 
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environmentalist, insisting that climate change is easily solvable by doing things like buying 
fuel-efficient vehicles and switching to CFLs. In this brief exchange, we can see the conflict 
between two distinct environmentalist discourses: “ecological modernization” (Hajer 1995) 
environmentalism, which falls under a neoliberal ideology, and “apocalypse” (Killingsworth and 
Palmer 1996) environmentalism. In the former, environmentalists use CFLs to align themselves 
with modernity, progress, high technology, and efficiency. The latter, which Colbert expects 
Oppenheimer to take, and which Oppenheimer is strategically guarding against, also uses CFLs, 
but in a less clear way, to signal a vision of the future based in part in a simpler past. These two 
discourses have been some of the most powerful visions of future worlds taken up by 
environmentalists over the past half century. Over the past two decades they have increasingly 
been taken up and contested in the name of climate change mitigation. These two discourses are 
co-constitutive: they depend on the other for their meaning, particularly when talking about the 
enormously challenging environmental problem of climate change. Environmentalists use CFLs 
to do identity work in part because CFLs allow them to claim a more ecological modernizationist 
perspective. 
From the ecological modernization perspective, environmental problems are caused by 
the structure of political, economic, and social institutions, and can be solved by reforming these 
institutions to make them more environmentally friendly (Hajer 1995: 25). Environmental 
problems are caused by “modernization and industrialization” and will be solved by more 
modernization and superindustrialization (Buttel 2000). This is because further economic 
development “will lead industry to become more ecologically rational, that is, to weigh the costs 
and benefits of ecological disruption and take steps to minimize externalities, just as 
modernization also drives industry to be more economically rational,” (York et al. 2003). 
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Capitalism is considered fundamentally compatible with environmental protection so long as it is 
appropriately “greened,” (Hajer 1995: 26). Some of the driving forces behind the greening of 
capitalism are seen as technological innovation (York et al. 2003; Murphy 2000; Hajer 1995: 32, 
35); market forces (York et al. 2003); and the power of consumption (Buttel 2000). Solving 
environmental problems is fundamentally beneficial for both industries and the environment, 
allowing environmentalism to serve neoliberal interests. Ecological modernization is often seen 
as a rather automatic path to environmental protection (Murphy 2000; Mol 2000) that is driven 
by environmental groups (York et al. 2003) and the need for environmental protection.  
Environmentalists can use CFLs to invoke this discourse of ecological modernization to 
make their environmentalist discourse more palatable to skeptics. CFLs easily fit into this 
discourse because of the way that ecological modernizationists envision the natural progress of 
technological change, using the CFL to perform the subcultural identity work of expanding the 
identity of “environmentalist” to everyone, as I showed in Chapter 2. Many climate change 
scientists have adopted ecological modernizationist assumptions, suggesting that the key to 
mitigating climate change is large-scale implementation of particular technologies. For example, 
Pacala and Socolow’s (2004) popular “stabilization wedges” paper argued that we can solve 
climate change by simply scaling up technologies that already exist. NRDC writes that 
“technological innovations” are a key part of what’s “critical to any successful effort to curb 
greenhouse gas pollution and avoid the worst impacts of climate change.” The Sierra Club 
declares, “choosing modern technology can reduce our use of fossil fuels to help protect the 
planet” and that “for nearly all the thousands of ways we use energy, we have the technology to 
use less – reducing pollution and lower our energy bills.”  
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It is CFLs’ symbolic flexibility and power as a symbol of ecological modernity in 
particular that makes them such a useful technology for environmentalists and IOUs. Their 
flexibility allows a range of neoliberal environmentalists to claim CFLs as a technology that 
serves their identity, even when they say that CFLs make a big difference and that they cannot 
make a big difference. As a symbol of ecological modernity, this makes sense, because in that 
vision of social change, it is the impact of many small technological changes that help to mitigate 
climate change rather than large-scale restructuring of the economy or society, so that using 
CFLs is part of doing one’s part, a sentiment I heard frequently in interviews.  
Toward a Theory of Green Obsolescence 
If the long tradition of light bulbs as flexible and powerful symbols helps to explain the 
emphasis on CFLs, how might we understand ENGO and IOU emphases on home energy 
efficient technologies more broadly? There are a broad range of other possible solutions to 
climate change, including home behaviors rather than technologies, such as turning out the 
lights; other individual actions that could potentially impact more GHG emissions, such as 
limiting airplane travel or eating vegan food; changes to the ways homes are built, such as using 
daylighting or building smaller homes; focusing on reducing energy use by other electricity 
consumers beyond homes, such as commercial and industrial customers; and focusing on parts of 
the electricity system other than consumption, such as the production side. While ENGOs and 
IOUs do promote some of these changes, these alternatives to energy efficiency technologies are 
arguably not promoted as prominently.  
I propose that the emphasis on energy efficiency by ENGOs, IOUs, and others is 
prominent because of the ways that promoting energy efficiency means promoting the 
consumption of more technologies to consume less energy. This calculus that consuming less 
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means consuming more has the potential to expand markets for large corporations in ways that I 
am grouping together as the beginnings of a theory I call “green obsolescence.” Slade (2007: 3-
5) distinguishes several types of obsolescence: “technological,” or “obsolescence due to 
technological innovation,” as when a new, better model of a technology is invented and then 
bought by people; “psychological,” or “changing product style as a way to manipulate consumers 
into repetitive buying,” as when people upgrade still-functional cell phones to new phones to 
stay trendy; and “planned,” or “the assortment of techniques used to artificially limit the 
durability of a manufactured good in order to stimulate repetitive consumption,” as when 
products are designed to break. “Green” obsolescence, I propose, is the specifically 
environmental crisis-oriented types of these obsolescences. I focus here on a combination of 
technological and psychological obsolescence which I call “cultural green obsolescence,” or 
when people buy newly-invented “greener” versions of products in order to protect the 
environment, especially when they make these upgrades before their old product versions have 
expired. I also propose another category of obsolescence, what I call “regulatory” obsolescence: 
the buying of new technologies as encouraged or required by laws, rules, and other governance. 
“Regulatory green obsolescence,” then, is the buying of new technologies in order to meet new 
environmental governance. 
Cultural Green Obsolescence 
Interviewer: What do you think that people will be doing for lighting in the future? 
Hillary: …I mean what you read is, CFLs and then it’s gonna be LEDs and there’s another bulb which I 
can’t think of the name of that’s better than LEDs that’s very close by, so I think that I don’t know what 
they’ll be doing. It’ll be something that I don’t know about yet… And my kids will look at an incandescent 
and go, “What’s that? I remember when we used to use those!”… It’s just like the CD, the CD versus the  
LP. My son said, “An LP. What’s a record?” Maybe it will be the same. Hopefully it will be the same. 
Hillary, a stay-at-home mother of two I interviewed, is here putting clearly an idea I 
encountered in many interviews, observations, and texts. Cultural green obsolescence includes a 
narrative of how green technologies like light bulbs, dishwashers, cars, and power plants all 
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become more and more environmentally sustainable over time. Part of making and claiming 
environmentalist identities, then, involves constantly upgrading to the new, better technology, 
even when this involves more consumption. I found similar narratives of a natural technological 
progression for green technologies in analyzing the websites of national ENGOs. For example, 
the Environmental Defense Fund, on a page called “What you can do about climate change,” 
promotes CFLs by writing,  
In the 1880s, light bulbs revolutionized the world. Though we call them ‘lights,’ traditional 
incandescent bulbs are actually small heaters that produce a little light – but waste a lot of energy  
producing heat. Today we can do better (emphases mine). 
This portrayal of technology assumes that it is inevitably getting better and better, and it implies 
that CFLs will revolutionize our world. 
The narratives of progress and waste I discussed in Chapter 2 are related to purchasing 
behaviors in ways that I have not yet fully examined, but which pose an important future area of 
research. From my research so far on CFLs, we can see that there are consumptive consequences 
of such cultural green obsolescent assumptions. For example, later in my conversation with 
Hillary, the following exchange occurred: 
Hillary: …There’s, you know there’s, the train of [thought that] “Let the bulb die before you replace it.” 
And then there’s the train of thought that “You’re gonna save more money if you just throw out a good 
bulb and replace it.” And then-. Well, my husband says “Just throw them all out now and replace it,” and I 
think I tend to want to let it burn out, [pauses] for no reason. I mean it just logically doesn’t make sense, but 
then I feel like I’m wasting something. 
Interviewer: Say a little more about that. What do you feel like you’re wasting? 
Hillary: The manufacturing, the energy that went into making that bulb. At some level, [it] costs some 
energy, so I feel like, just to take it and toss it-. But I don’t know the actual kilowatts that it costs to make 
that bulb and the materials, to mine the materials, and to put it all together, and the labor. There’s a cost in 
that bulb beyond just its energy use. So. [pauses] But I don’t know the magic formula. I’m sure somebody’s  
researched it. 
Others interviewed expressed similar ideas about not knowing if they should change their bulbs 
now or wait for the incandescents to burn out first. Further research could determine the extent to 
which people are waiting vs. switching immediately and the consequences. 
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Regulatory Green Obsolescence 
 
Figure 5.1. Letter from Duke Energy Encouraging Household to Use CFLs. Received and photographed by 
author in NC in 2012. 
There are similar themes of obsolescence in Figure 5.1, an excerpt from a letter my 
household received from Duke Energy that accompanied our coupon for free GE-brand CFLs 
from Wal-Mart, giveaways through which the IOU met the requirements of the REPS law. Duke 
Energy writes in it, “DON’T WAIT FOR YOUR REGULAR BULBS TO BURN OUT,” 
encouraging customers to make a change Hillary and her husband debated. The assumption that 
people will change their bulbs to CFLs before their incandescents burn out is implied by Duke 
Energy’s giveaways, which sent 6-18 CFLs to households, an amount of bulbs highly unlikely to 
all be burned out at once when the household receives their giveaway. Although many people 
told me they were storing their CFLs in a closet while they wait for old bulbs to burn out, this is 
still a program that encourages them to replace working light bulbs with new bulbs, for which 
customers are paying higher electricity rates. 
In recent years, a number of other laws, rules, and programs have made similar moves to 
encourage people to progress to new, better green technologies. In 2007, the U.S. Congress 
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passed the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), which notoriously phased out 
energy-inefficient light bulbs starting in 2012, effectively promoting CFLs (as well as other 
bulbs that meet efficiency requirements). Although EISA is the most recent federal requirement 
for bulbs, effective national standards for fluorescent bulbs have been set as far back as 1988 
(Gillingham et al. 2006). The U.S. EPA’s “Change a light, change the world” campaign to 
promote CFLs started in 2007, but as of 2014, the EPA’s ENERGY STAR lighting website now 
promotes LEDs through the “ENERGY STAR LED bulb challenge,” with the goal of “20 
million by Earth Day 2014” (ENERGY STAR N.D.(b)). Also note that the “Change a light, 
change a world” does not encourage people to wait until their incandescents burn out before 
changing to CFLs. 
I argue that these regulations (REPS, EISA, federal appliance standards) and governance-
prompted programs (like Duke Energy’s CFL giveaways and the EPA’s “Change a light” 
program) can be seen as “regulatory green obsolescence” that acts as a spatial-temporal fix for 
economies and companies. Such a ramping up of energy efficiency standards along with a 
narrative of changing from incandescents to CFLs to LEDs strongly reflects the environmentalist 
narratives of neutral, progressive changes in green technology that I have called cultural green 
obsolescence. Thus cultural and regulatory green obsolescence seem to share much in common 
and may go hand in hand. 
Green Obsolescence 
The cultural narratives and regulatory changes falling under the idea of green 
obsolescence help explain how both environmentalist identities and environmental governance 
are being used to expand profits for several different kinds of corporations in the face of the 
possible threat of a consuming-less environmentalism. For CFLs, cultural green obsolescence 
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can translate into expanded markets for large multinational light bulb manufacturers like GE, 
Philips, and Osram-Sylvania and for light bulb distributors like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and 
Lowe’s. Regulatory green obsolescence can expand markets for the same companies as well as 
for the IOUs (Chapter 4) who are profiting from negawatts, a supply of which is similarly 
assumed to be constantly growing. Under the banner of environmental concern, people are being 
encouraged through identity-making practices and environmental governance to repetitively buy 
new, better energy efficient technologies as the old technologies are coded as obsolete. Although 
it shares some elements of greenwashing (c.f. Cox 2009: 345; Beder 2002: 29), green 
obsolescence is broader, more clearly tied to assumptions about the nature of technological 
change that are deeply rooted in narratives of progress (including in both capitalist and Marxist 
ideologies), and more deeply imbricated in governance and environmentalist identity-making 
processes. Such a theory can be thought of as contributing to the literature on green 
neoliberalism by looking specifically at how environmentalists can end up promoting the 
consumption of more products even when they appear to be promoting using less, in ways that 
echo drives for higher consumption in non-environmentalist arenas of the economy. 
What are the consequences of these practices, narratives, regulations, and programs to 
promote CFLs, then LEDs, and then “something that I don’t know about yet”? A green 
obsolescent assumption that environmental problems like climate change will be solved by a 
ramping up of better and better technologies turns consumption into a political act, and keeps the 
identity work of environmentalism focused on the private sphere and individuals rather than on 
production systems. Green obsolescence expands markets and profits for electricity, light bulb 
manufacturer, and light bulb distributor corporations in at least two ways. In a highly-
competitive light bulb market dominated by just a few large multinational companies (Chapter 
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1), it potentially creates new demand for light bulbs by encouraging customers to buy more bulbs 
than they otherwise would have. This new market could be only a short-term expansion in profits 
because CFLs generally last longer than incandescents (although this is tempered by the higher 
cost of CFLs); however, if customers can, in a few years and before their CFLs burn out, be 
convinced to switch to LEDs, then the market for light bulbs can expand again. Second, green 
obsolescence can help create a new market for energy efficiency, which creates profits for IOUs 
(Chapter 4) and potentially also for the manufacturers and distributors of energy efficient 
technologies promoted by IOUs.  
Feenberg’s (1991) theories of the relationship between capitalism and technologies can 
be useful for thinking through green obsolescence. Feenberg (v) insists on the interests embodied 
in the design and production of technologies as a key arena of technological politics. His 
approach complements and expands Marx’s (1976) theory of technological innovation where 
technological change is a key process in capitalism because of the coercive laws of firm 
competition. These theories also highlight technology’s ties to social change: technology is a 
scene of struggle (Feenberg 1991: 14). He is interested in how modern societies become focused 
on technical things, including technologies (artifacts, things) and techniques, because those 
things are crucial ways that the hegemony of capitalist classes is reproduced (65). Feenberg 
draws on Marcuse to argue that society has become dominated by a particular form of rationality, 
which Marcuse called “technological rationality” (69). Feenberg (80) explains that capitalist 
classes use a “technical code,” or cultural and other rules about how technical choices will be 
made; under capitalism, such codes tend to signify “efficiency” as a primary end goal and 
efficiency comes to be seen as a value-free standard, making it hard to question. In the current 
case, we can see that technologies deemed “energy efficient” can take on a similar veneer of 
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neutrality that makes them difficult to question, so that green obsolescence comes to be seen as 
natural and even progressive, even when installing a new energy efficient technology can mean 
higher GHG emissions (as Piedmont Natural Gas claims it can in Chapter 4). In expanding the 
theory of green obsolescence, Feenberg’s theories may be useful in thinking through efficiency 
as a green variant of larger hegemonic capitalist technical codes privileging economic efficiency. 
Implications: Toward Viewing the Production of Energy Efficiency as a Global Production  
Network 
As a way to further understand these trends toward normalization of green obsolescence, 
I propose that the materiality of CFLs themselves and their production can be better understood 
as constituting part of energy efficiency’s Global Production Network (GPN). Such GPN 
analyses emphasize the ways that commodities, labor, and governance are interlinked across 
networks that span multiple national borders (Coe et al. 2008a). Much of this scholarship has 
focused on production networks and value chains of things which are traditionally and clearly 
physical commodities, which is why it is not obvious to think of such a production network for a 
valuable absence, consuming less energy. But because consuming less energy with energy 
efficiency involves consuming more technologies, a GPN framework can be useful. 
In this research, I have shown three processes in the production of consuming less:  
• In Chapter 2, I showed how consuming less is produced through 
subjectification, through which environmentalists and other electricity 
customers become neoliberal subjects who talk about and use CFLs to make 
and claim identities; 
• In Chapter 3, I showed how the production of consuming less happens 
through such environmentalist subjects’ private, gendered labor in their 
homes, cars, and stores; and  
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• In Chapter 4, I showed how consuming less is also produced through 
environmental governance which neoliberalizes the value of negawatts. 
If these are three parts of the production of consuming less, what does the full production 
process look like? Although I cannot yet do it justice, I propose that thinking through the 
production of negawatts as a Global Production Network (GPN) holds potential for insights. For 
example, it might help us to think more systematically about the sustainability implications of 
focusing environmentalism and environmental governance on the production of consuming less 
with energy efficient technologies by helping us to build a more complete picture of the life-
cycle analyses of such actions. It might also help us better analyze the wealth and other 
inequality implications of producing energy efficiency. In broad contours, thinking through the 
production of energy negawatts through a “cultural political economy approach” which 
acknowledges the connections of GPNs to people’s lives and identities (Hudson 2008; Coe et al. 
2008b) can help us to understand what is at stake in the ways that environmentalist, policy, and 
electricity provider struggles over the value of energy efficiency in terms of identities, labor, 
resources, and profits. Figure 5.2 shows one way to think about the different parts of a cultural 
GPN for energy efficiency, which involves the production of two traditional commodities, 
electricity and CFLs, the production of a new subject, the CFL-user, and the production of 
energy efficiency as a valuable resource.  
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Figure 5.2. Broad Processes in the Production of Energy Efficiency. I propose that producing energy efficiency 
involves producing electricity, CFLs, CFL users, and negawatts, all of which involve their own labor, material, 
cultural, and political economic processes.  
 Because of negawatts’ status as both a thing and an absence, the production of consuming 
less energy with energy efficiency involves producing both the technology (CFL) that uses less 
energy and the idea that negawatts are a valuable thing. The following is not exhaustive, but 
represents some of the processes of labor (re)production and material good production that I 
became aware of during this research that go into producing energy efficiency with CFLs: 
(Re)production of Laborers, including: 
- Workers who produce electricity, including those who: 
o Mine coal 
o Ship coal to power plants in NC 
o Operate power plants 
o Repair transmission, power lines, home electricity connections 
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- Workers who produce CFLs, including those who: 
o Mine the mercury and other raw material minerals 
o Ship the raw materials to factories for assembly 
o Assemble CFLs in factories in China 
o Ship the CFLs to distribution centers (big box stores) in the U.S. 
o Work at Wal-Mart 
o Administer Duke Energy’s CFL programs 
o Package and ship Duke Energy’s coupons or CFLs to customers 
o Landfill workers who dispose of the hazardous components of CFLs 
- CFL users, including those who (Chapter 3) 
o Self-educate about and perform the “headwork” of CFL use 
o Drive to big box stores, buy CFLs, and transport them home 
o Clean up from broken CFLs and dispose of them at hazardous waste sites 
- Others 
o Workers involved in the NCUC proceedings to make rules to implement REPS of 
2007 (lawyers, ENGO employees, the utility commissioners, NCUC public staff, 
etc.) 
o Workers involved in the NCGA proceedings to make and sign REPS of 2007 (state 
legislators, their aids, etc.)  
Production of Material Goods, including 
- Electricity 
o Raw materials (e.g., coal) 
o Power plants and their equipment 
o Power and transmission lines 
o Infrastructure within customer buildings that link to electricity systems 
- CFLs 
o Mercury, glass, other materials 
o CFL-assembling factories and their equipment 
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o Shipping centers and ships/trucks/trains which transport materials and CFLs 
o CFL-distributing big box stores and their equipment 
o Landfill stations for CFL disposal 
o Cars for transporting CFL users to big box stores and landfills 
As can be seen, there are many different kinds of laborers and labor involved in producing 
energy efficiency in NC with CFLs, including labor to produce electricity itself, labor to produce 
the CFLs (including their raw materials, assembly, transport, distribution, and IOU program 
components), and labor to use (and dispose of) CFLs in homes (Chapter 3). There is labor 
involved in the environmental governance that created energy efficiency as a valuable resource 
and the NCUC rulemaking proceedings through which this value was appropriated by IOUs. 
There are also many different kinds of material goods involved in consuming less energy. These 
include the raw materials, power plants, equipment, and other infrastructures involved in 
producing electricity; and the raw materials, factories, shipping, landfill, and other infrastructures 
for producing CFLs. This is where the materiality of CFLs matters: since consuming less 
(electricity) requires consuming more (of a technology, CFLs), it involves multiple types of 
GPNs with their attendant laborers and materials. 
 Because there are multiple types of global production networks involved in producing 
these two traditional commodities (electricity and light bulbs), this new subject (the CFL 
consumer-environmentalist), and a new almost-commodity (the negawatt), there are multiple 
layers of cultural and political-economic influences at stake. Here were some of the most 
important involved in this research: 
Elements in the cultural and political-economic landscape of influences on these processes of 
(re)producing labor and materials:  
- Production of electricity 
o Regulations by the North Carolina Utility Commission (Chapter 4) 
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- Production of CFLs 
o Anti-dumping tariffs in the EU (see Chapter 1) 
o EISA 2007 (see Chapter 1) 
o Duke Energy CFL giveaway programs in NC (Chapter 4) 
- Production of CFL users 
o Processes to produce electricity customers and environmentalists as green 
neoliberal subjects (Chapter 2) 
- Production of energy efficiency – beyond production of electricity, CFLs, CFL users 
o REPS of 2007 and its rulemaking processes (Chapter 4) 
There are clearly other layers of cultural and political-economic influences here. Multiple types 
of laborers are subject to identity-making processes and there are regulations affecting most of 
the laborers and materials involved in the production of electricity and CFLs. A complete picture 
of the dynamics here (including how other GPNs for incandescent light bulbs, for example, are 
effected) is not yet possible.  
 One way that thinking about the GPN of energy efficiency is useful is that it highlights 
the complexity of labor, material, regulatory, and cultural processes hidden by neoliberal 
ideologies and discourses of green obsolescence. By calling CFLs easy to use (Chapter 3), the 
labor of using energy efficient technologies is made invisible, even though it is part of producing 
energy efficiency. The myth that environmentalism is “for everyone” (Chapter 2) hides 
household producers and makes it easier for IOUs and other energy providers to position 
themselves as the main producers of energy efficiency for which they should be paid (Chapter 
4). These different production processes may also be thought of in terms of costs, where some 
costs are made invisible and thus treated as free (the costs of household labor, Chapter 3) while 
others are fully remunerated (the costs of energy efficiency for IOUs through higher electricity 
prices, Chapter 4). Further, the labor of many others in this process are also hidden. For 
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example, the labor of Duke Energy’s workers in running CFL programs (or in the electricity 
system at all) is nearly completely absent from the REPS of 2007 rulemaking proceedings, which 
has not always been the case for struggles over energy resources. Coal miners, for example, are 
clear discursive players in struggles over mountaintop removal, in ways that Duke Energy’s 
workers are not. In fact, in the REPS rulemaking, I noticed that “Duke Energy” as an actor was 
most commonly invoked to mean Duke Energy’s CEO and/or shareholders, and never meant the 
company’s laborers. 
Directions for Future Research 
 This dissertation began in a question about light bulbs but has moved into a larger group 
of questions about power, identities, labor, production, and governance of energy. The research 
has opened up new lines of inquiry to help us better understand environmentalism in an era of 
neoliberalism, energy efficiency policies as environmental governance, global production 
networks for energy efficiency, green obsolescence, and the relational nature of “energy 
efficiency.” I turn to these new directions to conclude. 
Environmentalist Identities, Subjectivities, and Labor 
Further work can expand on an understanding of environmental practices as identity work 
and as labor in several ways. Interviews with the leaders of national ENGOs could focus on 
better understanding environmentalists’ assumptions about how social change happens to help 
explain how subcultural and individual identities get made in particular ways. Such interviews 
could ask about institutional histories and reasoning, asking how these groups came to choose 
not to calculate and/or publicize the <1% figure for CFLs (and similar figures for other actions); 
how they choose which scientific numbers and data to use; how they think people become 
environmentalists; and the roles they see for “things you can do to fight climate change” lists.  
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In a different direction to better understand green obsolescent identity work, a 
comparison with groups using CFLs in a more critical way could be done. Although these groups 
are by far in the minority, I did encounter their use of CFLs once in my research, while looking 
at CFL images online. In an protest against proposed national climate change legislation, Rising 
Tide North America and a few other ENGOs sometimes dismissed as “radical” distributed fake 
money showing Al Gore holding a CFL surrounded by flames, with the caption, “As the world 
burns” (Hiskes 2009; Merchant 2009). How are these groups turning the symbol of mainstream 
energy efficiency and climate change mitigation into part of an illustration protesting the 
mainstreaming of green neoliberalism? How do members of such groups view energy efficiency 
and light bulbs and their role in climate change mitigation? How do such groups’ narratives 
about environmental social change compare with those of more mainstream ENGOs? 
There is also work to be done about environmentalist imaginaries of sustainable energy 
futures. I noticed in some interviews during my research that the visions of future sustainable 
communities held and constructed by some environmentalists seemed to draw from racialized, 
gendered, and class-based tropes. For example, many seemed to draw inspiration from the trope 
of “sustainable Europe,” a high-tech, super-modern vision of communities where people use the 
latest technologies and live in high-density neighborhoods. While useful in many ways, this 
vision of sustainability is of a white, affluent society and the vision often relies on gendered 
assumptions that someone is at home to provide environmental care labor around the house (or 
that people work fewer hours than in the U.S. and have more time for this labor?). Other 
sustainability tropes that interviewees in my dissertation research raised that would be useful to 
examine more deeply include: “sustainable Native America” (a vision of past communities living 
“in harmony with the Earth”) and “sustainable 1950s America” (a vision of suburban 
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communities where everyone cooks their own food, cans, gardens, and performs other DIY 
activities). Understanding these visions of sustainability can help political ecologists to 
understand the ways that mainstream U.S. environmental movements can reproduce or resist 
inequalities in race, gender, and class, helping us understand how to make these movements 
more socially just. This research could be undertaken through a combination of short, open-
ended surveys to a listserv of members of a state environmental group along with follow-up 
semi-structured interviews.  
 To understand the labor of environmentalism further, there is room to expand my 
research in several ways. First, a study could use a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to find out the frequency with which different environmental labors (including 
unexpected phases and subphases) are performed by members of different groups as well as the 
ways that these labors are coded in gendered, classed, and racialized ways. A qualitative study 
should be conducted first, examining several different environmental actions beyond CFLs 
(including using other technologies, such as energy-efficient hot water heaters and clothes 
washing machines, and behaviors, such as composting and recycling). This qualitative 
component could illuminate the different labor components involved (since the vast majority of 
those for CFLs came as a surprise to me) and the ways performing them involves particular 
identity codes. A survey could follow this, asking a representative sampling of environmentalists 
about how much time they spend doing each task, who in their family performs them, and other 
questions about frequency, to understand better who is doing these pieces of labor and how much 
time they entail. Key variables I think will be useful to include are people’s salaried labor, other 
household labor, and caregiving responsibilities, which can help us better understand the effects 
of other energy and time constraints on ability to perform environmentalist labors. 
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Energy Efficiency Policies as Environmental Governance 
 Another line of research could examine the implications and dynamics of energy 
efficiency policies as environmental governance. The magnitude of wealth transfer, the extent of 
GHG emissions reduced, and the amount of energy efficiency that have resulted from CFL and 
other programs resulting from NC’s REPS policy are still unknown. The case of NC’s energy 
efficiency part of its REPS could also be used to understand what is politically and economically 
at stake in other states’ EEPS or a in a federal EEPS. Using data I have collected on the 
rulemaking procedures for implementing NC’s energy efficiency portfolio standard and 
comparing with data from other states’ experiences, the dominant issues that stakeholders 
debated concerning how to implement such policies could be analyzed, drawing out their 
implications for similar policies. Such stakes include GHG emissions, but also the question of 
who has a right to be compensated for using less energy and how, who can opt out of energy 
efficiency programs, and who reaps the monetary benefits of such programs. 
 It would also be useful to compare the case of the neoliberalization of negawatts in NC to 
other states’ experiences with energy efficiency programs. Comparisons could include: states 
where negawatts have been more fully commodified, as well as government-run energy 
efficiency-promotion programs (at municipal levels, regional levels as with TVA or BPA, or at 
state levels). Such comparisons could help us understand the conditions under which energy 
efficiency is commodified or appropriated (and is it ever privatized?), illuminating the driving 
forces behind such changes in energy efficiency’s political economy. Thinking through different 
institutional arrangements for promoting home energy efficiency can also illuminate the extent to 
which particular arrangements, including market forces, centralization, or hybridizations, may 
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have different implications for both sustainability goals (GHG emissions, net amounts of energy 
consumed) and social justice goals (transfers of wealth, gender inequalities, and others). 
Energy Efficiency Global Production Networks and Green Obsolescence 
To understand the cultural, political, and economic processes involved in the production 
of consuming less, further research should be done into the GPNs of energy efficiency. For the 
present case, that includes understanding CFLs’ GPNs more clearly. Carefully tracing the 
geographies of where CFLs are manufactured, by what companies, out of what raw materials, 
how they are distributed and by whom, how value is added to the commodity networks, and 
which companies and countries benefit and lose to a switch from incandescent to CFL light bulbs 
can help build this GPN. Combining scholarship from GPNs and work on life cycle analyses can 
show the implications of environmentalists’ promotions of one light bulb over another. 
Connecting back to questions of the labor involved in environmental actions, a study could 
compare several possible climate change mitigation policies through a fuller examination of the 
costs of the policies by including labor costs to individuals across the GPN.  
Such a GPN should also extend into the spatial implications of the disposal of energy 
efficient technologies. For example, while many ENGOs and environmentalists cite the fact that 
net mercury emissions from using CFLs is lower than for incandescents because the burning of 
coal to make electricity also emits mercury (Eckelman et al. 2008), few talk about how the 
spatiality of these two mercury regimes is fundamentally different. Further research could better 
understand the ways that mercury pollution may be being privatized within homes (closer to 
children?) from this shift to CFLs. However, at the same time, because CFLs are not consumed 
at equal rates across different socio-economic classes of people, this new mercury regime is 
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likely to have complex spatial implications, and may even shift toxic substances away from 
poorer neighborhoods. 
 Using this research into the GPNs of energy efficiency, the idea of green obsolescence 
holds potential for further research to help us understand both environmentalism and energy 
companies under the influence of capitalist drives toward commodification and accumulation. 
Using critical theories of technology such as Feenberg’s work, a study could be conducted to 
examine more explicitly how environmentalists envision technological change for green 
technologies like CFLs. A related study could analyze the history of the ways that regulations of 
energy efficient appliances and other equipment ratchet up expectations for efficiency. By 
researching negawatts’ GPN dynamically, as a network that shifts over time, we might also 
understand the changes that have happened to make green obsolescence seem so acceptable. For 
example, one question that remains is how CFLs came to be promoted before LEDs, given that 
they were invented within years of each other. It is possible that the materiality of LEDs made 
them simply not able to be scaled up as quickly as CFLs because of some resource scarcity or 
technical reason. However, it is also possible that investing in a much more high-efficient bulb 
was not useful for companies in the long-run given the higher potential for profits from green 
obsolescence resulting from first investing in CFLs and then in LEDs. 
Energy Efficiency as a Relationship 
There is also a great potential for research into understanding energy efficiency as a 
relationship, or what might be thought of in short-hand as the social construction of energy 
efficiency. In this research, I found that environmentalists, policymakers, and energy providers 
often treat energy efficiency as a self-evident technical entity that is a good in itself. Yet this 
research has shown that it is not a static, technical thing. Further research could examine more 
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explicitly how energy efficiency is constructed in certain ways and how engineering discourses 
appear to fix energy efficiency as a thing when I would argue that it is really a relationship. This 
relationship aspect can be seen by asking “How much energy efficiency is there?” There is likely 
to be as much energy efficiency as there is energy consumed/produced, meaning that energy 
efficiency only exists in the context of a relationship with its Other, energy consumed/produced.  
One way to understand this further would be to map energy efficiency across landscapes; 
to my knowledge, no one has attempted to do such a thing. How is energy efficiency measured, 
how much is there, and how does its meaning change over time and space? Analyses of 
renewable energy resources have mapped solar and wind energy potentials for states and 
countries. If we take seriously the idea that energy efficiency is a similar resource, as 
environmentalists and energy companies say it is, we should be able to map its potential as well. 
Yet doing so raises questions about how energy efficiency compares with other fuels and how it 
may be thought to “congeal” in particular spaces, for example urban vs. rural and poor vs. 
wealthy areas. It also shows the relational aspect of energy efficiency. For example, the 
“quantity” of energy efficiency in a home changes when we consider how much energy 
efficiency might be produced with a CFL versus an LED: a home “has” more energy efficiency 
if we think about the amount of energy efficiency in terms of LEDs than in terms of CFLs. In 
other words, energy efficiency’s quantity or supply is dependent on a relationship between 
technologies, as an upgrade from incandescents to CFLs yields a different “supply” of energy 
efficiency than an upgrade from incandescents to LEDs or from CFLs to LEDs. The outcome of 
this project could be an online Atlas of Energy Efficiency, useful to scholars as well as city and 
state governments. This study could advance theoretical debates within the social science of 
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technologies and could be conducted through textual analyses and interviews with energy 
efficiency consultants. 
 
Finally, there are two more outreach-oriented projects that could grow out of this 
research. First, I think it would be useful to create a website or white paper calculating, in 
percent of U.S. GHG emissions so that different actions might be compared, the maximum 
potential impact of a variety of individual and collective actions. I have already noted my 
surprise that no one has done this for CFLs or for other actions; not only would it be useful to my 
own and others’ research, but it could be useful to those seeking environmental sustainability 
goals. Second, I found it surprisingly difficult to sort through the workings of the electricity 
system in NC, especially how prices are set; a white paper or “people’s guide to electricity in 
NC” would likely be useful to ENGOs and other social movement organizations, as well as to 
electricity customers, in thinking through the implications of rate hikes and other electricity 
governance issues. For example, many people I spoke with over the course of my research 
expressed surprise when I told them they were paying higher rates of electricity to pay for the 
CFLs they received from Duke Energy. Many told me they thought the bulbs were “free” (a gift 
from Duke Energy). Such a people’s guide to the political economics of electricity would help 
illuminate the ways that electricity prices are related to such programs.  
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APPENDIX: EFFECTS OF UTILITY-IMPLEMENTED ENERGY EFFICIENCY  
PROGRAMS UNDER REPS 
 The following figures are meant as a conceptual model of the relationships within utility-
sponsored energy efficiency programs under REPS regulation between: electricity prices; utility 
costs, revenues, and profits; and customer electricity bills. I conclude that the effect of energy 
efficiency programs under REPS is a transfer of wealth from households to IOUs because the 
result of REPS rules are that utilities see higher profits and customers see higher electricity bills. 
This is especially true for those customers who do not take part in the utility programs; for 
example, not all Duke Energy residential customers receive free CFLs, but all receive higher 
prices of electricity to pay for such programs. These conceptual models are based upon my back-
of-the envelope calculations, but are not surprising given the near-universal agreement among 
stakeholders in these proceedings that utilities should receive rates of return on energy efficiency 
investments higher than those they receive from traditional investments in order to incentivized 
such green investments. 
Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations 
The question of how much wealth is being transferred through the neoliberalization of 
negawatts in the energy efficiency programs IOUs use to fulfill REPS is surprisingly complex. 
Much of the data on the energy efficiency riders IOUs file to increase rates to pay for energy 
efficiency programs does not distinguish between the proportion going to pay for CFL 
giveaways vs. other programs. My back-of-the-envelope calculations assume that the main 
benefit the average Duke Energy customer receives from paying an increased price for all their 
electricity in the form of an energy efficiency rider is from the CFL programs, or receiving 12 
CFLs, which is likely given how widespread this program is. I made to comparisons. 
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First, I compared a household’s monetary costs and benefits if they buy CFLs on their 
own (including a standard price for CFLs from a big box store) in the absence of a REPS policy 
vs. if they received CFLs from their IOU but paid a higher price for all their electricity to 
compensate the IOUs. After one year, the benefits to such households are relatively similar 
whether they get their CFLs via REPS or buy them on their own. However, after four years (the 
initial time period estimated in the energy efficiency riders), such customers pay net $30 to Duke 
Energy for their CFLs, whereas if they had bought the bulbs themselves without the REPS rider, 
they would save $130 (which includes lower electricity bills). 
Second, I compared a household’s monetary costs and benefits if they do not buy CFLs 
on their own in the absence of a REPS policy vs. if they do not participate in the CFL giveaways 
in the presence of a REPS policy (i.e.: in the latter case, they experience higher rates to pay for 
the program but do not receive its benefits). In the first year, such customers pay $15 more in the 
presence of a REPS policy. However, after four years, they pay $60 in higher electricity prices in 
the presence of the REPS policy than they would have without it, and they receive no direct 
benefits. 
Explaining the Figures 
Figure A.1 is a reminder of the effect of customer-implemented energy efficiency on an 
electricity provider’s sales. It shows how energy efficiency implemented in year two results in 
lowered sales compared with the predicted sales that were used in the rate case in year 0. 
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Figure A.2 shows the change in price of electricity in a traditional (pre-REPS) regulatory 
structure in comparison with the price changes under REPS. Recall that the model assumes that 
under traditional regulation, the utility responds to the lowered sales it experiences from energy 
efficiency implemented by customers by increasing the price at the next rate case, in year 3, 
which raises the price in year 4. Under REPS, the difference is that energy efficiency happens in 
year 2, but because it is implemented by utilities and is accompanied by a rider to increase the 
price of all electricity to compensate for the negawatts, the price of electricity increases at the 
same time as the energy efficiency, in year 2. The price is shown to increase beyond what would 
happen in year 4 under traditional regulation because IOUs are being incentivized beyond 
traditional investments to encourage investments in energy efficiency. 
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 Figure A.3 shows the effect of utility-implemented energy efficiency on an IOU’s costs 
and revenues under REPS. It shows that the revenues exceed the costs in years 3-4, resulting in 
profits for shareholders. I assumed that costs were mainly steady because most people argue that 
energy efficiency is a less expensive investment per kilowatt-hour/negawatt-hour produced than 
traditional investments. In actuality, the revenue requirement that is usually thought to be 
represented by costs is actually increasing because the rate of return on energy efficiency 
investments is higher than traditional investments, and profits are considered a cost. I chose to 
represent revenues as higher than costs in this case to illustrate that there is an increase in profit 
that the rise in costs hides. 
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 Figure A.4 shows the effects of the price increases in Figure A.2 on customer electricity 
bills for the average customer who does not implement energy efficiency (e.g., does not receive 
the box of CFLs from Duke Energy). This shows that, for customers who do not receive the 
benefits of energy efficiency, electricity bills go up. 
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 Figure A.5 shows the effects of the price increases in Figure A.2 on customer electricity 
bills for the average customer who does implement energy efficiency (e.g., who does receive and 
install the box of CFLs from Duke Energy). This shows that, for customers who do implement 
energy efficiency, electricity bills still go up overall according to my estimates, so value is 
accumulated from all categories of residential customers, although the increase in electricity bills 
is lower than for those who do not implement energy efficiency. 
 
Further research is needed to put numbers to these figures, which only show relationships at this 
time. 
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